Who really started the Filipino-American war?

Generations of Filipinos have been taught that the bloody Philippine-American war broke out on the night of February 4, 1899, because a Filipino lieutenant and three of his men allegedly refused to heed the challenge to halt at the approach of the American post at the San Juan bridge in the outskirts of Manila and were fired upon and killed by the American sentry, Private Grayson.

A reliable source presented an entirely different story, exactly the opposite of the textbook version. Felipe Buencamino, a cabinet official of the Filipino government in Malolos, testified before the U.S. Senate that an American patrol forced its way into Filipino lines and provoked the unwary Filipinos into a fight. In the ensuing exchanges of fire that spread across a fifteen-mile stretch, three thousand Filipino soldiers whose officers were mostly on leave on that night fell dead on the first day of battle (Blount,193).

However, U.S. Republican President William McKinley took advantage of the resulting conflict to place the blame on Aguinaldo, secure from the U.S. Senate the ratification of the Treaty of Paris, and unleash the dogs of war. What followed next was now history - the 30,000 strong Filipino army was routed by the Americans; the towns and provinces held and administered by the newly independent Philippine government were forcibly taken; the Malolos Republic, the first in Asia, was dismantled, and the Filipino people were forced at gunpoint to submit to American rule.

Two versions of the incident

U.S. General Arthur MacArthur’s official report states that the Filipinos invaded American territory, viz:

 “At about half past 8 p.m. February 4^th, an insurgent patrol, consisting of four armed soldiers, entered our territory at Blockhouse No. 7, and advanced to the little village of Santol, which was occupied from the pipeline outpost of the Nebraska Regiment.  This, it will be observed, was precisely the point referred to in the correspondence above quoted.  The American sentinel challenged twice, and then, as the insurgent patrol retired to Blockhouse 7, from whence fire was immediately opened by the entire insurgent outpost at that point.”  (Philippine Information Society[1:6], 30)

This incident was amplified somewhat melodramatically in history textbooks  taught to generations of Filipinos as follows: 

"On the evening of February 4, Private Grayson, of the First Nebraska Volunteers, was standing on guard at the American end of this bridge; there was no moon, and the darkness was exceedingly dense, when there suddenly appeared on the bridge a Filipino lieutenant and three privates, all strongly armed, who advanced in perfect step toward him. In obedience to his instructions from the Officer of the Guard, he called, 'Halt!' The summons was deliberately unheeded. Crouching somewhat, with guns in hands, they stealthily moved forward. Again Grayson cried out in a challenging tone, 'Halt!' This second warning was also ignored. The Filipinos moved even more rapidly toward him than before. They were now within a few feet of him. He fired. The Filipino lieutenant fell dead." (Coursey, 72-73)

Compare the above with the following version, which has yet to find its way into the pages of Philippine history books, viz:

"On the 4th of February the towns of Santa Ana and San Juan del Monte were under the command of General Ricarte and Colonel San Miguel. On this day those two commanders abandoned their posts and went to a ball, leaving a major by the name of Gray [Major Fernando E. Grey y Formentos], about 26 years of age, very young and without experience, in command of about 1,800 troops. They extended along the eastern part of the outskirts of Manila and were about half a mile distant from the American troops. We took the deposition of this major, who said that about 9 o'clock p.m. the sergeant of the guard came to his headquarters and told him that a party of American troops desired to cross their lines or were attempting to cross their lines, which was opposed by the Philippine guards. At this time a shot was heard; that he could not say for certain whether the shot came from the American command or from the men under his command, but he ran to the place from which the shot appeared to come, and seeing the American troops in a belligerent attitude gave an order to fire. That is the way the hostilities began." (Buencamino, 3)

The preceding is an account of Felipe Buencamino, Sr., which was taken from the transcript of a hearing conducted by the U.S. Senate regarding the Philippine question and could be considered the official Filipino version of the February 4, 1899 incident.

In support of Buencamino's statement, here's the report of Serapio Narvaez, Commander of the Column of the Infantry Battalion of Morong Expeditionary that was submitted to a commission headed by General Mariano Trias, that was tasked to investigate the outbreak of hostilities:

“At about 9 p.m. Yesterday, while Corporal Anastacio Felix of the 4^th company, with two soldiers was at the door of Blockhouse No. 7, they were fired upon by two sentinel of the American soldiers who were passing on the road near the barrio Santol, close to the Blockhouse. In spite of this our people did not reply, and finally other companies of the former (Americans) fired other shots upon that blockhouse and even upon (blockhouse) No. 6. The urgency being great they began firing and continued until driven out...” (Legarda, 43; Taylor[IV], 540-541)

The report was confirmed by Major Fernando E. Grey of the Third Zone who took charge during the absence of Col. Luciano San Miguel.  According to Grey, he sent this telegram: 

"Captain Adjutant Grey to War Department, San Juan del Monte, February 4, 1899, 9:58 p.m. - At exactly nine o'clock tonight, American camp opened fire.  The reply was made by our troops.  All hold their positions without fear.  I await orders ..fire was first opened by the advance guard of the American forces, who were stationed in the barrio of Santol in the jurisdiction of Sampaloc, corresponding to the third zone of Manila; as according to a report received from the Commander of our forces who were garrisoning Blockhouse number 7, when the two soldiers left to patrol until they met those of blockhouse number 6, which is done every night in order to ascertain whether anything has occurred along the military cordon which separates the territory of the occupation from that of the Republican government, it was observed that the American sentinels appeared to be closer to ours than usual; and when said soldiers arrived opposite the said sentinel, the latter fired a shot; they, therefore, did not continue further but returned to their posts to report what had occurred.  Hardly had they arrived at blockhouse number 7, when more shots were fired at them.  They noticed at the same that from the direction of the Balsa bridge other shots were being fired of the same sound as the previous ones; for which reason they supposed that they also proceeded from the enemy.  It should also be noted that another circumstance which led the deponent to believe that there was an intention to make an attack by the American forces, was that their tents at Santa Mesa were that night completely dark and not illuminated, which was not the case on preceding nights." (Taylor, v4:559-560)

[Author's note: The National Historical Institute (NHI) of the Philippines removed on February 4, 2004 the historical marker that had been on the San Juan bridge for years and transferred it to a site at the corner of Sociego and Silencio streets in Sta. Mesa, Manila. Grayson mentioned Sta. Mesa and not San Juan as the village that the Nebraska regiment was ordered to occupy where the shooting incident happened.]

 

Who is the aggressor?

The textbook (or American) version tagged the Filipinos as the aggressors because they continued to approach the American sentry, notwithstanding the challenge to halt. In the Filipino version, the aggressors were the American soldiers because they crossed into Filipino lines, and the Filipino guards opposed it.

Charles E. Russell also cited the intrusion of the Americans into Filipino-held territory.  This famous  American writer-journalist, wrote that it was the Americans who violated the demarcation lines, viz:

"On February 4, 1899, after the American lines outside the city had been advanced a mile into what was indisputably Filipino territory, an order came to push them still farther. The Filipino officer in command of that sector made the usual protest. It was reported to the American commander, Colonel Stotsenburg, of the Nebraska contingent. In response, he advised another advance in the same direction." (Russell, 92)

In a letter cited by U.S. Senator Pettigrew, Private Grayson, the American soldier who fired the first shots of the war, said that it was 

"the damn bullheadedness of the officers in invading insurgent territory that was responsible for that shot."(Pettigrew, 270) 

Grayson’s statement contradicted the textbook version and confirmed that the American soldiers indeed crossed into Filipino lines and fired the first shots, resulting in an exchange of fire.

The loose alliance

Why would the Americans start a war with the Filipinos, who considered the former an ally in the war against Spain? McKinley wanted the Philippine islands as an American colony. However, the 30,000-strong Filipino Revolutionary Army stood as the main stumbling block. And a war that the Filipinos themselves would start was needed to justify the use of superior force against the upstart Filipino army. McKinley was very careful in pursuing this course lest he end up a conqueror and not the benefactor that he wanted himself viewed by the American people. He took advantage of the February 4 incident to drag Filipinos into a war, throw the blame on them, and achieve his dream of putting the Philippine islands on the map of the United States.

McKinley's dream of acquiring the Philippine islands did not occur to Aguinaldo when he was sought on April 24, 1898, by Spencer Pratt, the United States Consul in Singapore. An arrangement for a general cooperation with Admiral (then Commodore) Dewey was agreed with assurances that Philippine independence would be respected. Dewey had already sailed for Manila when informed of the arrangement with Aguinaldo, but nevertheless, he agreed and cabled Consul Pratt to send Aguinaldo in.

After Dewey destroyed the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay on May 1, 1898, the Americans controlled the bay and harbor of Manila and the Cavite arsenal that the Spanish marines surrendered to Dewey. Dewey needed land forces to drive the Spaniards out because the Spanish flag was still hoisted over the city. Aguinaldo came very handily for the purpose. Mr. Wildman, the American Consul in Hong Kong, facilitated the expatriation of Aguinaldo and thirteen of his staff to Cavite, assuring Aguinaldo that the United States was actuated by the same feeling for the Filipinos as it was in undertaking the war to free the Cubans from Spain.

On May 19, 1898, one of Dewey's ships, the McCullough, brought Aguinaldo to Cavite from Hong Kong. After being assured that the United States had no intention of keeping the islands and would undoubtedly recognize its independence, Aguinaldo undertook the task of renewing the revolution against Spain. He issued three proclamations on May 24, 1898, explaining why he had returned, the presence of the Americans, and the need to renew the revolution. Aguinaldo's call spread like wildfire, and leaders of the prior uprising rallied behind him and declared their adhesion to his cause. Donations and army enlistments flooded the headquarters of Aguinaldo in Cavite, enabling him to raise a fairly large army, including a small navy.

The initial cache of arms secured by Aguinaldo consisting of 200 Mauser rifles and a few cannons were taken from the Cavite Arsenal courtesy of Commodore Dewey after the Spanish marines manning the arsenal surrendered to the Americans.  A large shipment of 3,000 Remington rifles and ammunition, which were bought in Hong Kong through the help of American Consul, Mr. Wildman, also arrived.  The shipment was paid for out of the funds generated by the Biak-na-bato agreement, which Aguinaldo deposited in two banks in Hong Kong for use in the renewal of the revolution should the Spaniards fail to abide by the peace agreement. More arms were secured from captured Spanish soldiers and garrisons, and also additional shipments from abroad were shipped by the group of Filipinos in Hong Kong who styled themselves as the "Comite Central Filipino" and later served as the propagandists of the revolution.  Military uniforms were also fitted for the army sewn from imported blue drilling cloth.

Visayan men serving in the Spanish army, notably in the 74th regiment and another regiment, defected to the rebels in late March. Native militias organized by the Spanish authorities to fight the Americans and placed under the command of a former rebel General, Pio del Pilar, similarly joined Aguinaldo. These additions greatly raised the morale and fighting capability of the Filipino army. Dewey estimated Aguinaldo had about 25,000 troops, but "..they could have any number of men; it was just a matter of arming them." (Blount, 23)

By June 30, 1898, Aguinaldo had practically crushed the Spanish army, taken 9,000 prisoners, declared Philippine independence, established a government, and surrounded the city of Manila. In less than a month, all Spanish garrisons in the province of Cavite and its surroundings were quickly overrun. Expeditions were sent to the rest of Luzon, the islands of Mindoro, Palawan, Batanes, Samar, Leyte, Cebu, the provinces of Iloilo, Antique, and Agusan, Cagayan, Zamboanga, and with the help of local revolutionaries, they successfully hoisted the Filipino flag in those liberated provinces. Aguinaldo's achievement did not escape the notice of Dewey, who reported his admiration of Aguinaldo's accomplishment to Washington.

Disowning the alliance

While the Filipinos were celebrating their succession of victories, American troops started arriving and by the end of August, the number swelled to more than 20,000 men. Some suspicious Filipino generals began to question the presence of American troops because the Spanish army was practically defeated. Aguinaldo never entertained the idea that the American army would eventually be used against him. He kept his trust in the Americans, assisting them in securing supplies - ponies, oxen, carts, and fresh provisions. Aguinaldo even gave up large, newly liberated areas in the outskirts of the city of Manila for use as encampments of newly arrived American soldiers, including defenses and entrenchments that were built by Filipino troops in preparation for the assault of Manila. By this maneuver, the Americans gained a tactical advantage, taking positions between the Filipinos and the remnants of the Spanish forces in Intramuros.

The unwary Aguinaldo did not realize he was only being used by the Americans. One American author described this American treatment of Aguinaldo as follows:

"The cipher code used in all state cablegrams in the case of Aguinaldo was undoubtedly as follows - 'Play Aguinaldo for a sucker! String him along until Manila is captured - and then don't do a thing to him, but get out the Gatling guns.' This is inferential from the mutilated and asterisk bestrewed cablegrams set forth in the records of Doc. 62 and Mess. and Doc., Vols. 3 and 4. Furthermore, these records show that Aguinaldo and the insurgents up to the time of the capture of Manila were treated as allies to be made use of' by the representatives of our government with the full sanction of President McKinley, and in view of the facts clearly presented to him that they were fighting for independence and expected recognition of their cause from the United States." (Thomas, 87)

The seemingly deceitful treatment of Aguinaldo by the American naval and military commanders was clearly expressed by Colonel James Russell Codman of an old, wealthy and respected family of New England, viz:

"It is an undeniable fact, proved by unquestionable evidence, accessible to any citizen who will take the pains to obtain it, that Aguinaldo's assistance in the war with Spain was solicited by United States officials; that he and his friends were used as allies by the American naval and military commanders; that, until after the capture of Manila, to which they contributed, they were allowed to believe that the independence of the Philippine Islands would be recognized by the American government; and that it was not until after the American forces in the islands had been made strong enough to be able - as was supposed - to conquer the islanders, that the mask was thrown off. Independence was then refused them, and the purpose of the president to extend the sovereignty of the United States over them by military force was openly proclaimed. That the Filipinos resisted and that they took up arms against foreign rule, was something that ought to have been expected, for it is exactly what Americans would have done." (Codman, 1)

In the assault of Manila on August 13, 1898, U.S. General Wesley Merritt, the commanding officer of American forces, directed the operation under strict orders from Washington not to allow Filipino troops inside the city or enter into any unauthorized agreement with Aguinaldo. Through the Belgian consul, 191 Mr. Edward Andre, the Spanish authorities secretly arranged with the Americans that a token resistance would precede the city's capitulation to save the honor of Spain. The Filipinos, who were left out in the pre-arranged surrender, attacked from four points. The column of General Pio del Pilar took Sampaloc; that of General Gregorio del Pilar's, Tondo, Pritil and Paseo de Azcarraga (now Claro M. Recto Avenue); that of General Noriel's, Singalong and Paco; that of General Ricarte's, Sta. Ana, and pursued the Spaniards to Intramuros. (Aguinaldo[True Version], 39)

When Filipino troops attempted to enter the walled city, the American soldiers blocked the entry points. An agitated atmosphere ensued that was ready to explode into a firefight had it not been for Filipino Generals Noriel and Ricarte and U.S. General Thomas Anderson, whose friendly relations diffused the situation. Anderson telegraphed Aguinaldo in Bacoor, asking him to order his troops out of Intramuros in order to prevent a bloody confrontation, and the order was given. Reluctantly, the Filipinos moved out of the walled city. The other Filipino generals wanted to take the opportunity to strike at the Americans, but Aguinaldo stayed calm and refused to be pushed into a war. He continued to entertain the hope that the promises of Consul Pratt, Consul Wildman, and Admiral Dewey would be respected by the McKinley administration, if not by the United States Congress. With the surrender of Manila, the land area controlled by the Americans significantly increased.

U.S. General Elwell S. Otis, who took over from General Merritt on August 21, 1898, continued to do what his predecessor had done - maltreat Aguinaldo. General Otis demanded that Filipino troops evacuate the city of Manila and its suburbs by September 15 beyond the demarcation lines marked on a map that Otis presented to Aguinaldo. Otis claimed that the August 12 Peace Protocol signed in Washington D.C. between Spain and the United States gave the latter the right to occupy the bay, harbor, and city of Manila. Aguinaldo questioned the inclusion of some villages and tried to secure a written commitment that the same position of the troops would be restored to the Filipinos should the United States decide to leave the islands to Spain. But General Otis simply ignored him.

When Otis realized that the Filipinos were not showing signs of evacuating the city and suburbs, he gave an ultimatum on September 13, threatening to use force. Aguinaldo gave in, and on September 15, while the Congress of the first Philippine Republic was being inaugurated at Malolos, four thousand Filipino soldiers in their bright blue drilling uniforms and every man with his rifle marched out of the city of Manila to the cadence of the ninety piece Pasig band, amidst the enthusiastic shouts of a multitude that lined the streets. As Colonel Juan Cailles and his brigade passed by the Wyoming barracks near the city walls and were cheered by American soldiers, an observer remarked that ".. it sounded strange to hear one force cheering another which the day before was looked on as half an enemy." (Stickney, 296-297)

Like a cue from a prepared script, more incidences of maltreatment followed. The following incidents were enough reason to commence war against the Americans, but these failed to provoke Aguinaldo:

(1) On September 23, 1898, Dewey ordered the seizure of the 700-ton Filipino steamer, the Patria, disguised as the Abbey and registered as an American steamer. This vessel was clandestinely smuggling arms and ammunition for the Filipino army. The seizure of the steamer was protested by the Filipinos to no avail.

(2) Dewey suddenly seized all thirteen other Filipino vessels that constituted the Filipino navy the following month.  

[Author's note: The small navy was formed with captured small launches from the Spaniards and from the bigger ships of heavier tonnage that were donated by rich families like Apacible, Lopez, Villavicencio, and other families in the province of Batangas and were named TAALENO, BALAYAN, BULUSAN, TAAL, and PURISIMA CONCEPCION.  The 900-ton ship COMPANIA DE FILIPINAS was added after the Filipino crew led by Vincent Catalan killed the Spanish officers and surrendered the vessel to Aguinaldo.  The big ships were armed with cannons taken from sunken Spanish vessels, casualties of the battle of Manila Bay between Dewey and the Spanish Armada.  The armed ships were used to transport soldiers, supplies, and equipment to north Luzon, Visayas, and some parts of Mindanao.  The ship FILIPINAS (originally the COMPANIA DE FILIPINAS) was ordered by Aguinaldo to proceed to the Spanish fort in Subic to capture it.  While the bombardment was ineffective, the 500 Spanish marines thought their fate was sealed and raised the white flag of surrender.  The German ship IRENE interceded and challenged the FILIPINAS on the basis that the flag it was flying was not a belligerent.  The FILIPINAS hauled down the Philippine flag replaced it with a white flag, and went back to report to Aguinaldo, who complained to Dewey.  Accordingly, Dewey dispatched two gunships, the CONCORD  and the RALEIGH to go after the German vessel IRENE.  As soon the American ships appeared, the IRENE withdrew.  It can be seen from this incident that there was indeed some form of cooperation, if not an alliance,  between Dewey and Aguinaldo. (Van Meter, 91-97)]

 (3) After the Treaty of Paris was signed on December 10, 1898, but before its ratification by the U.S. Senate, McKinley ordered General Otis to effect the establishment of a military government that would administer the islands with him, Otis, as Governor-General. The formal protest of Aguinaldo, who took it as an affront to his position as president of the Philippine Republic, was ignored.

(4) Almost simultaneous with McKinley's order to Otis, General Marcus Miller sailed for Iloilo to occupy the city. The Ilonggo general, Martin Delgado, and his Tagalog aide, Ananias Diokno, opposed the disembarkation of American troops without prior authorization from Aguinaldo. General Miller could have used force to break the impasse, but he preferred to lay in wait in Iloilo harbor for a more opportune time because a forcible occupation of the Iloilo at that time, without a ratified treaty, would be considered aggression. The opportune time came in less than two months, i.e., on February 4, 1899, the date hostilities were opened, and Iloilo fell into American hands after a quixotic resistance by the Ilonggos.

Filipinos already administering the islands

It should be recalled that prior to February 4, the Americans were confined within the limits of the city of Manila, and the Filipinos held the rest of the country. An important document, the Memorial to the Senate of the United States, which was presented by Felipe Agoncillo to the State Department and copied to the U.S. Senate, articulated the situation, viz:

"America is in actual possession at this time [around October, 1898 - author] of 143 square miles of territory, with a population of 300,000, while the Philippine Government is in possession and control of 167,845 square miles, with a population of 9,395,000, and only a few scattered Spanish garrisons are to be found in islands having an area of 51,630 square miles, with a population of 305,000. The figures, as to the Spanish possessions, should be diminished, and those of the Philippine Government enlarged, by virtue of the fact that the inhabitants of the islands where Spanish troops yet remain have practically confined such troops to the narrow quarters of their garrison towns." (Atkinson, 4)

In other words, in terms of land area, the Philippine government held ninety-three percent of the country, while the United States, only seven percent. In terms of population, the Philippine government administered to ninety-four percent of the people, while the United States, to only three percent. Unfortunately, no weight was given to the memorial because no official acknowledgment was received from the U.S. State Department. A similar document in the form of a protest was also ignored by the American and Spanish peace commissioners at the Paris conference during their deliberations from October 1, 1898, to December 10, 1898, the date McKinley signed the treaty.

War needed to ratify the treaty

Unknown to Aguinaldo, General Otis was actually facing a problem. McKinley's orders, originally given to General Merritt, to establish immediately a military government that would administer American authority on all of the islands had not been accomplished. General Otis knew he could not comply with the order because the only territory that the Americans occupied was the city of Manila, which the Spaniards yielded in an act of surrender and later qualified by the Peace Protocol of August 12. The Treaty of Paris, which was supposed to cede the islands to the United States, although signed by McKinley, was not effective until the U.S. Senate had ratified it. It did not give the American forces the authority to forcefully evict the Filipinos from the territories they held, and doing so would have been considered criminal aggression.

However, the situation was not favorable to the Americans because the Filipinos had established a functioning government that administered the political, social, and commercial affairs of the islands, including the regulation of customs at all major ports except the port of Manila. General Otis knew that the only way to implement the instructions of McKinley was to get the Philippine government out of the way and raise the American flag over the dead bodies of Filipino soldiers. This, of course, meant opening hostilities with the Filipinos.

The treaty of peace between Spain and the United States was up for a U.S. Senate vote on February 6. The expectation was the treaty would not be ratified because the Senate was lukewarm to the idea of administering an archipelago 10,000 miles away from the U.S. mainland. John Foreman, the widely quoted English historian, said:

"A week before the vote was taken it was doubtful whether the necessary two-thirds majority could be obtained. It was a remarkable coincidence that just when the Republican Party was straining every nerve to secure the two or three wavering votes, the first shots were exchanged between a native and an American outpost in the suburbs of the capital." (Foreman, 486-487)

U.S. Senator Pettigrew supported the contention that the unilateral extension of American outpost lines was the primary cause of the outbreak of the war. He said that the Filipinos were patrolling what they thought was their side of the demarcation line when the incident occurred. Here is the statement of the senator:

"It appears that there was a town between the lines of the two armies, occupied by the forces of Aguinaldo - a town 150 yards in advance of the line of the American troops - and that Otis wished to obtain possession of it. He therefore entered into an agreement to have Aguinaldo withdraw his pickets therefrom and retire to a greater distance. This was done. On the night after this had been accomplished a patrol of the insurgents entered the abandoned town. A patrol is not a war party; a patrol is simply to pick up stragglers. They had occupied the place the night before, and they sent a patrol in the evening to see if any of their men had remained behind - if there were any stragglers in this village. We had occupied the place as a picket station, and when these Malays, who do not speak our language, came along, a Nebraska boy ordered them to halt, and they did not halt." (Pettigrew, 214)

The senator also read before the U.S. Senate a letter from a soldier named Abram L. Mumpher from Colorado, supporting the claim that Americans intruded into Philippine territory, viz:

"The Nebraska regiment had been sent to Santa Mesa. Aguinaldo had vigorously protested against this and pointed out to General Otis that Santa Mesa was outside the line of the protocol. General Otis looks it up and admits to Aguinaldo that such is the case (pages 20 and 21, General Otis's report), but holds fast to the position. Here, outside the limits of the protocol, in an effort to make the insurgents move back a sentry post, the first shot was fired. Grayson, the man who fired that shot, told me, on board the Hancock, as his regiment was ready to sail for America, that it was "the damn bullheadedness of the officers in invading insurgent territory" that was responsible for that shot. But we fired the second shot and third shot before we got a response. And this was two days before the Senate was to vote upon the peace treaty, and many of the insurgent officers away from the firing line! This is the way the insurgents made what the President calls a "foul attack" upon us. But the Filipinos returned the fire and the war was on." (Pettigrew, 270)

The statement of U.S. Senator Pettigrew is essentially consistent with the testimony of Filipino soldiers to the effect that they were patrolling the distance between their two blockhouses when a group of American soldiers approached and fired upon them.  

Filipinos did not want war

The Filipinos did not want a war with the Americans. If they did, the war would have broken out much earlier. Atkinson, a noted anti-imperialist of Boston, Massachusetts, cited a report of General MacArthur about an incident on February 2, 1899, or two days before the outbreak of hostilities, indicating that Filipino officers respected the demarcation line separating the two armies:

"The original note from these headquarters, which was prepared after conference with the department commander, was carried by Major Strong, who entered the insurgent lines and placed the paper in the hands of Colonel San Miguel. The answer of Colonel San Miguel was communicated in an autograph note, which was written in the presence of Major Strong, who also saw Colonel San Miguel write an order to his officer at the outpost in question, directing him to withdraw from the American side of the line." (Philippine Information Society[1:6], 28])

According to Aguinaldo, the Filipinos could not have started the war. On that day, being Saturday, many Filipino officers were on leave and only General Pantaleon Garcia was at his post at Maypajo. Here is Aguinaldo's statement:

"While I, the Government, the Congress and the entire populace were awaiting the arrival of such a greatly desired reply [proposal for an independent Philippines under American protectorate - author], ... there came the fatal day of 4th February, during the night of which day the American forces suddenly attacked all our lines, which were in fact at the time almost deserted, because being Saturday, the day before the regular feast day, our Generals and some of the most prominent officers had obtained leave to pass the Sabbath with their respective families. General Pantaleon Garcia was the only one who at such a critical moment was at his post in Maypajo, north of Manila, Generals Noriel, Rizal and Ricarte and Colonels San Miguel, Cailles and others being away enjoying their leave. …Filipinos could never be the aggressors as against the American forces, with whom we had sworn eternal friendship and in whose power we expected to find the necessary protection to enable us to obtain recognition of our independence from the other powers. General Otis, according to trustworthy information, telegraphed to Washington stating that the Filipinos had attacked the American Army. President McKinley read aloud the telegram in the Senate, where the Treaty of Paris of the 10th December, 1898, was being discussed with a view to its ratification, the question of annexation of the Philippines being, the chief subject of debate, and through this criminal procedure secured the acceptation of the said Treaty in toto by a majority of only three votes." (Aguinaldo, 51-52)

Senor Escamillo, Aguinaldo's private secretary, was arrested by the Americans in Manila the day after the outbreak of the war. If there was anyone who should know if the Filipinos would launch an attack on American positions would be Aguinaldo's private secretary. If there was really a plan to attack the Americans, Sr. Escamilo would perhaps have the better judgment of not loitering in the city.

That the Filipinos did not intend to commence hostilities is borne out by the official report of General Otis to the Department of War in Washington, which said in part: 

"It is not believed that the chief insurgent leaders wish to open hostilities at this time"(Storey, 92,). 

The fact is the Filipinos were forced into a war.  And in response, Aguinaldo issued a General Order to the Philippine army in Malolos on February 4, 1899, viz: 

“Nine o’clock p.m., this date, I received from Caloocan station a message communicated to me that the American forces, without prior notification or any just motive, attacked our camp at San Juan del Monte and our forces garrisoning the block-houses around the outskirts of Manila, causing losses among our soldiers, who in view of this unexpected aggression and of the decided attack of the aggressors, were obliged to defend themselves until the firing became general all along the line.

 

“No one can deplore more than I this rupture of friendly relations.  I have a clear conscience that I have endeavored to avoid it at all costs, using all my efforts to preserve friendship with the army of occupation, even at the cost of not a few humiliations and many sacrificed rights.

 

“But it is my unavoidable duty to maintain the integrity of the national honor and that of the army so unjustly attacked by those who, posing as our friends and liberators, attempted to dominate us in place of the Spaniards, as is shown by the grievances enumerated in my manifesto of January 8^th last; such as the continued outrages and violent exactions committed against the people of Manila, the useless conferences and all my frustrated efforts in favor of peace and concord.

 

“Summoned by this unexpected provocation, urged by the duties imposed upon me by honor and patriotism and for the defense of the nation entrusted to me, calling on God as a witness of my good faith and the uprightness of my intentions, I order and command:

 

“1.  Peace and friendly relations between the Philippine forces and the American forces of occupation are broken, and the latter will be treated as enemies, within the limits prescribed by the laws of war.

 

“2.  American soldiers who may be captured by the Philippine forces will be treated as prisoners of war.

 

“3.  This proclamation shall be communicated to the accredited consuls of Manila, and to Congress, in order that it may accord the suspension of the constitutional guaranties and the resulting declaration of war.”

The day after the outbreak of war, Aguinaldo sent General Torres to General Otis to discuss the temporary cessation of hostilities and the establishment of a neutral zone to separate the two armies while negotiations were undertaken to resolve the conflict. General Otis refused and gave this stern reply: 

"The fighting having once begun must go on to the grim end" (Philippine Information Society [vol 1 no. 6], 38). 

This inflexible position of General Otis betrayed the true motives of the Americans and reflected the imperialist policy of McKinley when he said:

"The insurgents struck the first blow.  They reciprocated our kindness with cruelty, our mercty with Masuers ... there will be no useless parley until the insurrection is suppressed and American authority acknowledged and established. The Philippines are ours as much as Louisiana, by purchase, or Texas, or Alaska." (Sawyer, 120)

McKinley knew that the cessation of hostilities would give the American public and his enemies - the anti-imperialists - the opportunity to investigate and learn more about the character of the Filipinos and the truth about the conflict in the Philippines that could put his dream of retaining the Philippines and his chances of reelection in jeopardy.

McKinley's intervention in the Philippines became controversial in the United States. The 1900 U.S. Presidential elections saw Democrat candidate William Jennings Bryan espousing the immediate independence of the Philippines as among the principal programs of the Democratic party. Bryan's campaign rode on the declaration that McKinley was leading the United States toward imperialism. But McKinley won, and his victory signaled the death of Philippine independence. It also placed the Filipinos in an awkward position of having to prove wrong McKinley's misrepresentations: first - that the Filipinos were savages distributed among several tribes, second - that McKinley embarked on a humanitarian mission to uplift the Filipinos and prepared them for self-government, and third - that the insurgency was waged by the Tagalog tribe alone, and the rest of the other tribes were not opposed to American sovereignty. Liberal members of the U.S. Congress and prominent American citizens sharply criticized McKinley for double talk, citing his self-declared, lofty principle:

"Forcible annexation, according to our American code of morals, would be criminal aggression." (Olcott, 289)]

Conclusion

General Otis clearly understood McKinley's predicament. Dutifully, he delivered to his chief a moderate-sized war and charged it to the account of Aguinaldo. Subsequent events would show that McKinley was the principal beneficiary of the outbreak of the war. Aside from being reelected, he succeeded in acquiring the Philippine islands as an American colony with the full backing of the United States Senate and the American people, notwithstanding the prohibition in their constitution and their proud libertarian heritage. All these came about because Private Grayson fired on the Filipino lieutenant due to General Otis's maneuver to provoke the Filipinos into a war.  If there was no shootout at Sta. Mesa, the American military would have no reason to proceed beyond the city of Manila, the Treaty of Paris would have been rejected by the U.S. Senate, and the Filipinos would have proven their capacity for self-government. Obviously, given McKinley's mandate, if Grayson did not fire the first shot, another American soldier would have done it anyway.

SOURCES:

1. Aguinaldo Y Famy, Don Emilio: "True Version of the Philippine Revolution", Tarkak, P.I., 1899, Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Library 2005, http://name.umdl.umich.edu/AFJ2298Given.0001.001

2. Anti-Imperialist, edited by Edward Atkinson, August 20, 1899, Boston Mass., Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Library 2005 http://name.umdl.umich.edu/acd4260.0001.001

3. Blount, James H.: "The American Occupation of the Philippines, 1898-1912", New York, London, G.P. Putnam's Son, 1912, Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Library 2005, http://name.umdl.umich.edu/AHZ9397.1913.001

4. Buencamino, Felipe: "Statement before the Committee on insular affairs ... on conditions in the Philippine Islands, by Felipe Buencamino". May 31, June 3 and 4, 1902, Washington: Gov't print. Off., 1902, Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Library 2005, http://name.umdl.umich.edu/AFJ2372.0001.001

5. Codman, Charles Russell: "Why he supports Bryan: Col. Charles R. Codman sets forth his reasons", New York: Anti-Imperialist League of New York, 1901, Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Library 2005, http://name.umdl.umich.edu/ADT4649.0001.001

6. Coursey, Oscar William: "The Philippines and Filipinos; a treatise on the history, the civics, and the mathematical, physical and political geography of the Philippine archipelago", The Educator supply co, 1914", Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Library 2005, http://name.umdl.umich.edu/ABH1047.0001.001

7. Foreman, John:  "The Philippines", Manila, Filipiniana Book Guild, 1980, Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Library 2005, http://name.umdl.umich.edu/AAQ5315.0001.001

8. Legarda, Benito, Jr.: "The Hills of Sampaloc", The Bookmark, Inc., Makati, Philippines, 2001.

9. Olcott, Charles S:. "The Life of William McKinley", Boston, New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1916, Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Library 2005, http://name.umdl.umich.edu/ABZ5144.0002.001

10. Pettigrew, Richard F.: "The Course of Empire, an official record of Senator R. F. Pettigrew", New York, Boni & Liveright, 1920, Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Library 2005, http://name.umdl.umich.edu/ABZ4072.0001.001

11. Philippine Information Society, "The Outbreak of Hostilities", Boston, Mass., Vol. 1, No. 6, July 15, 1901, Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Library 2005, http://name.umdl.umich.edu/ACC6166.0001.006

12. Russell, Charles Edward: "The outlook for the Philippines", New York, The Century Co., 1922, Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Library 2005, http://name.umdl.umich.edu/AFJ2122.0001.001

13. Sawyer, Frederick Henry Read: "The Inhabitants of the Philippines", London, Sampson Low, Marston and Company, 1900, Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Library 2005, http://name.umdl.umich.edu/AFJ2163.0001.001

14. Taylor, John R..M.: "The Philippine Insurrection Against the United States, a compilation of documents with introduction by Renato Constantino," Eugenio Lopez Foundation, 5 Volumes, Pasay City, Philippines, 1971;

15. Stickney, Joseph: "Admiral Dewey at Manila and the complete story of the Philippines: life and glorious deeds of Admiral George Dewey, including a thrilling account of our conflicts with the Spaniards and Filipinos in the Orient", Chicago: Imperial Pub. Co., 1899, Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Library 2005, http://name.umdl.umich.edu/ADE2873.0001.001

16. Storey, Moorefield and Lichauco,  Marcial P.:  "The Conquest of the Philippines by the United States", New York and London, G.Putnam's Sons, 1926, Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Library 2005, http://name.umdl.umich.edu/AFJ2371.0001.001

17. Thomas, Aretas W.: "The Philippines and the purpose. Being the facts concerning the Philippines and the acts of the administration in relation thereto, as officially transmitted by the president to congress--proving the purpose of imperialism.", Washington, D.C.: The Jeffersonian democrat pub. co., 1900, Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Library 2005, http://name.umdl.umich.edu/AFJ2123.0001.001

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