The Luna-Mascardo feud that cost the battle of Bagbag

General Antonio Luna was a latecomer in the revolutionary struggle. He was not a member of the Katipunan and rebuked Andres Bonifacio's invitation to join asking, "How shall we fight?  With this?, He pointed to his teeth." (Kalaw[Development],76)  

After the discovery of the Katipunan, Luna tried to shy away from involvement and pointed to Dr. Jose Rizal as the founder. (Taylor[I], 237-238)  However, his masonic activities were enough to lodge him in jail.  He was released upon the intercession of his famous brother, the painter Juan.

He then left the country and spent some time in Europe studying military tactics.  He returned to the Philippines via Hongkong at the time when the Spanish-American war had just broken out. He secured credentials from Don Felipe Agoncillo, a confidante and close adviser of Aguinaldo, and this paved the way for Luna's commission in September 1898 in the Filipino Republican Army with the rank of  Brigadier General. 

While the Army's senior officers looked with disfavor, Luna's appointment, Aguinaldo prevailed upon them, saying Luna had military training and was urgently needed to instill discipline and make the army one coordinated unit.  The hidden disenchantment of the senior officers eventually showed in the refusal of some to recognize Luna's authority.  One of them, Captain Pedro Janolino of the Kawit Brigade, did so in the battle of Caloocan and in whose hands General Luna lost his life.  But the most famous feud that caused the loss of a battle was between General Luna and General Tomas Mascardo, a veteran of the revolution and a trusted senior officer of Aguinaldo.  The hostility between the two was heightened by a rivalry over a beautiful maiden in Pampanga whose favor the two were trying to win and, Mascardo ended up the victor.

The drama preceding the battle of Bagbag started with General Mascardo's refusal to obey General Luna's orders to reinforce the Filipino defenses in Bagbag, Calumpit, Bulacan.  Mascardo contended that while the troops of Pampanga and Nueva Ecija were placed by Aguinaldo under Luna's command, the general officers were not.  Luna was so pissed off that he ordered the preparation of two companies of infantry and cavalry and two mountain guns to go after Mascardo in Guagua.  His aide warned him that the Americans were about to attack and withdrawal of the soldiers might weaken the defenses.

The warning successfully weathered the storm for a while until Luna learned about the preparations made by Mascardo to fight it out should Luna come over to arrest him, and especially what Mascardo said to Luna's aide: "If General Luna has enough guts to enforce his decree, Mascardo has enough to resist him". This angered Luna and taking with him the men and the artillery confronted Mascardo at his headquarters in Guagua who eventually submitted to his authority. But it was too late to change the course of the battle at Bagbag because when Luna arrived the Filipino defenses had already been breached by the Americans and the Filipinos had already retreated.

[Author's note: The following article, entitled "How the battle of Bagbag was lost" by Epifanio Delos Santos was lifted en-Toto from The Philippine Review, Vol II, No. 3, 1917, pp. 40-44, and  is a detailed narration of the events revolving around the feud between General Luna and General Mascardo.]

"It was in May, in the year of Our Lord 1899. The Filipino forces, shattered in the battles of Caloocan and Marilao, but reorganized by the skillful iron hand of General Luna, formed a solid line of resistance, the right wing of which rested on Hagonoy and the left on the hills of the municipality of Santa Maria. A division, composed of the troops dispersed in the preceding engagements and of forces from Pampanga and Nueva Ecija, held this line, which had as natural defenses the Bagbag river, the Quingua forests, and the undulating territory of Santa Maria. This division was commanded by General Luna, who had under his orders, as brigade commanders, Generals M.(Mascardo), Gregorio del Pilar, and Llanera. While the enemy was accumulating means of attack in the city of Malolos, the Filipino army, on its part, was building strong trenches on the line mentioned, the central brigade forming a second line of defense, with the Rio Grande de la Pampanga as a base.

"On a certain day of the month mentioned, General Luna ordered General M. (Mascardo) to send reinforcements to the Bagbag line, for the reason that the preparations being made by the enemy were a sure indication of an impending attack upon the Filipino lines. The order was carried out tardily and grudgingly, for the reason that General M. happened to be attending a dance. General Luna, exasperated by such an attitude, ordered General M. under arrest for twelve hours. General M. refused to consider himself under arrest, his argument being that while the decree of Commander-in-Chief A. (Aguinaldo) placed all the troops of the Provinces of Pampanga and Nueva Ecija under General Luna's orders, it did not specify that the general officers of those troops had also to consider themselves as subordinates of General Luna. This gave rise to a dramatic incident between the division and brigade commanders which resulted in our defeat on the gloomy day when the American army broke through the Filipino lines.

"It was about ten o'clock in the morning when an aide-de-camp of General Luna's entered the office of Major H. (Eugenio Hernando), chief of staff of the division.

"'Major, the general wishes to see you.'

"'Very well; I am coming immediately.'

"'At your orders, general,' saluted Major H.

"'Major, start immediately with two companies of riflemen, a section of cavalry, and two mountain guns and bring me General M. under arrest, whether he resists or not.'

"Perplexed by this order and vacillating as to strict obedience, in view of the consequences which its execution might bring with it, Major H., taking advantage of his being General Luna's chief of staff, respectfully made the following objections:

"'General, I do not refuse to obey your orders, but the enemy may attack at any moment and the withdrawal of such a number of troops from our firing line may, perhaps, be imprudent. If you will permit me, I shall endeavor to convince General M. of his mistake......'

"'Very well", replied the General. With compromises like these, we shall never have an army. I will give in this time, but it will be the last.'

"Major H. mounted his horse and made the sixty kilometers between Calumpit and Guagua, General M.'s headquarters, in less than four hours. He arrived at Guagua towards two o'clock in the afternoon and found General M. taking a nap. He asked Major Fj (?) to wake up the general, as he had important business. General M. woke up and received him.

"'General", said Major H., "pardon my disturbing you in your sleep, but an order of General Luna compelled me to do so.'

"'Tell me what it is he wants', replied General M. with a frown.

"Major H. thereupon endeavored, by the kindest of words and arguments, to make him understand what military discipline required, and that if the enlisted men, officers, and field officers of his brigade were under General Luna's orders in accordance with the decree of the President, General M. was also under his orders. General M. would not be convinced and stubbornly sustained his own theory. At last, his patience having come to an end Major H. said:

'"General, you know General Luna and know his disposition. Do you not believe it is very possible that he will decide to exact by force what he can not obtain by reasoning?'

"General M., enraged, jumped up and said:

"'Major, you tell General Luna for me that if he has guts enough to enforce his orders, General M. has enough to resist.'

"In the face of this outburst, Major H. sadly left General M.'s room without saying further. It was about seven o'clock in the evening when Major H. arrived at General Luna's Headquarters at Calumpit and reported on the ill success of his mission, taking good care, however, not to say anything about the disrespectful phrase uttered by General M.

"'Very well", said General Luna, "now you will no longer have any objection to carrying out the order I gave you this morning.'

"'I believe there is still some other way left, General", suggested Major H. "Before using violence, permit me to report the matter to General A.'

"General Luna having authorized this, Major H. got on his horse and hurried to Baliuag, where the Commander-in-Chief had his headquarters. He was received by Colonel R. S. (?) who, realizing that the matter was an urgent one, ushered the major immediately into the office of the Commander-in-Chief. The latter, upon being informed of the details of the incident, said indignantly:

"'No, don't obey any such orders. What would become of our country and army if a breach of discipline would make us expend what little ammunition we have in trying to exterminate each other? Take this order to General M.; in it I give him twenty-four hours of arrest instead of the 12 hours General Luna gave him, besides a severe reprimand for his insubordination." And General A. added, "keep me posted on what happens.'

"Riding as fast as he could urge his horse to go, Major H. succeeded in reaching about dawn the vicinity of the residence of General M., where he was met, in the middle of a field, by Major Fj.

"'Hello, old boy, how do you happen to be out so early?' these were the words with which he was greeted by Major H.

"'Nothing! I have had the deuce of a night" replied Major Fj. "We have been up all night on guard, waiting for you and your men to come; I and my men had orders from my general to drive you back. Thank God, nothing of the kind has happened and I can receive you with an embrace instead of greeting you with the gun.'

"They went together to see General M., to whom Major H. delivered the order of the Commander-in-Chief. General M. complied with the order of the Commander-in-Chief, which pleased General Luna. This seemed for the moment to have dispersed the thundercloud. Just about that time, Colonel Francisco Roman joined General Luna's headquarters. Upon learning of the affair, he proved to General Luna that he had shown such weakness in it that it was liable to ostracize him or cost him the respect of the army. He gave him such a talking-to that one morning General Luna sent for Major H.

"'Major, get a special train ready; put all available infantry, cavalry, and artillery on it, and when you have everything ready, let me know.'

"The order was executed, and General N., Colonel Roman, and two of Luna's aides, the Bernal brothers, boarded the train with General Luna.

"'Order the train to start and stop at San Fernando', were General Luna's directions.

"It was not until the train was underway when it became known that they were going for General M. This new order was due not only to Colonel R.'s suggestions but to the fact that General Luna had learned of the nocturnal ambuscade prepared by General M. for the purpose of receiving Major H.'s detachment with shots. How General Luna learned of this and who it was who told him, is still a mystery. Major H. did not tell him and would not tell anybody. The train having come to a stop in San Fernando station, the following order was issued:

"'Major, take your cavalry to Bacolor, place sentries at the head of every street, and do not allow anybody to leave the pueblo. If anybody tries to get out, fire on him without any consideration.'

"General Luna's brothers, Don Jose and Don J (Juan)., tried to dissuade their brother, but it seems that instead of listening to them, he had them detained in a railroad car for several hours, with sentries mounting guard over them. At Bacolor, General Luna put up at the convent. Here, too, a bevy of pretty damsels of the Red Cross interceded with him but had no luck at all. The general would not be moved. Lieutenant-Colonel L. of the Judge Advocate's Department asked Major H. to allow him to pass through the cordon in order to go to Guagua and appeal to General M. to capitulate, for the sake of the country, but in view of the strict orders that had been issued, he was told that the only thing that could be done for him was to close an eye, but that he certainly ran the risk of leaving his hide, as the sentries might fire on him.

"At this stage of the proceedings, a telegram was received from Baliuag to the effect that the Americans were forcing the Bagbag line; that our troops at Quingua had already fallen back, and that reinforcements were urgently needed. General Luna believed this telegram to be nothing but an artifice and refused to budge. At two o'clock in the afternoon another, more urgent telegram was received, but for the same reason as before, General Luna refused to do anything and gave orders to march on to Guagua.

"When they were already at the pueblo of Betis, the cavalry detachment forming the advance guard saw a quiles escorted by several officers. The quiles and escort were halted; the passengers were General M. and Lieutenant-Colonel L (?). The two battalions of riflemen then lined up, with the colors unfurled; General M. was placed in front of them and in this position, he was asked by General Luna, with serious mien:

"'General M., do you acknowledge my authority? Will you obey whatever orders you may receive from my headquarters?' General M. answered in the affirmative.

"'Very well", said General Luna, and, addressing Major H., he gave the order: "Accompany General M. in his quiles to headquarters.'

"They arrived at headquarters at Calumpit approximately at 6 p. m., when the Bagbag line had already been forced by the American troops. There only remained a point of support at the barrios of Santa Lucia (Calumpit), which, despite the fierce resistance offered by General Luna, was occupied by the invading army the next day. Two days later, with the first bulwark taken by the enemy, the strenuously resisting Filipino forces were routed at the Rio Grande de Calumpit, and this defeat threw open to American invasion the provinces of Pampanga and Nueva Ecija."

SOURCES:
1.  Epifanio delos Santos, "How the Battle of Bagbag was Lost", Philippine Review, (Revista Filipina), Vol II, No. 3, G. Nieva: Manila, P.I., 1917, pp. 40-44

2.  Kalaw, Maximo M.: "The development of Philippine politics", Manila: P.I., Oriental commercial company, inc, 1927, Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Library 2005, http://name.umdl.umich.edu/AFJ2233.0001.001

3.  Taylor, John R..M.: "The Philippine Insurrection Against the United States, a compilation of documents with introduction by Renato Constantino", Eugenio Lopez Foundation, Vol. 1, 1571 to May 19, 1898, Pasay City, Philippines, 1971
#TUKLAS

The Killing of General Antonio Luna

President Emilio Aguinaldo had been the target of the accusation that he was the mastermind in the killing of General Antonio Luna. His detractors claim that he summoned Luna by a telegram to come to Cabanatuan and set him up for the kill by Filipino soldiers from Kawit, Cavite, who happened to be his townmates and were acting as his presidential guards. This Machiavellian scheme was allegedly rooted in his fear of losing power and authority to a potential rival; in like manner that he was accused of causing the death of another rival, Katipunan Supremo Andres Bonifacio. Did President Emilio Aguinaldo have a hand in the killing of General Antonio Luna? As discussed in the succeeding paragraphs, the answer is no.

How Luna was Killed

Here is the more credible version among several accounts of the controversial assassination of General Antonio Luna 

"On June 3, 1899 (correct date is 5), accompanied by his aide-de-camp, Captain Roman, and an escort, Luna entered the official residence of President Aguinaldo at Cabanatuan (Nueva Ecija). The guard, composed of a company of Cavite men from Cauit (Aguinaldo's native town), under the command of Captain Pedro Janolino, saluted him on his entry. As Luna and Roman ascended the staircase to seek Aguinaldo a revolver shot was heard. Luna rushed down the stairs in a furious rage and insulted Captain Janolino in the presence of his troops. This was too much for Janolino, who drew a dagger and thrust it violently into Luna's head. In the scuffle, Luna was knocked down and shot several times. He was able to reach the roadway, and, after shouting "Cowards!" fell down dead. In the meantime, whilst Captain Roman was running towards a house he was shot dead by a bullet in his breast. The Insurgent Government passed a vote of regret at the occurrence, and the two officers were buried with military honors." (Foreman, 501)  

Testimony of Eyewitnesses

Several persons witnessed or claimed to have witnessed the killing of Luna, namely Gregorio Fajardo, Teodoro Cada, Arcadio Zialcita, Ireneo de Guzman, and Captain Eduardo Rusca, one of the companions of Luna who survived the tragedy at Cabanatuan.  The facsimile of Fajardo’s statement can be found on pages 435-436 of Teodoro Agoncillo’s book, “Malolos, The Crisis of the Republic.”  Zialcita’s statements were secured by the newspaper El Progreso and the United States Schurman Commission.  The statements of the rest of the witnesses can be found in Juan Villamor’s book, “La Tagedia de Cabanatuan Crimen o Razon de Estado. 

And of course, there was the principal witness, Captain Pedro Janolino, alias Pedrong Kastila, the leader of the presidential guards who allegedly struck the first blow on Luna’s head with his dagger, whom Antonio K. Abad interviewed.

Here is Zialcita’s testimony before the Schurman Commission:

 

Q. Will you be kind enough to give us an account of the killing of General Luna?

 

A. I told everything that I saw and that I knew about it to a representative of El Progresso. That interview tells all I know. 

Q. Will you be kind enough to repeat that for our benefit?

 

A. I saw his death, but the occasion of his death I only know from rumor. 

Q. Where were you?

 

A. I was in a house where I was waiting, in the plaza, where the convent and the government headquarters and the church are, and commanded a view of the whole place. They say that Luna went up to ask for Aguinaldo, with Francisco Ramon, to visit Aguinaldo. Not finding him there he became angry and insulted the guard, and when the guard wanted to seize him and his companion they thought the man was half crazy and immediately began shooting, and the guard, returned the fire. 

Q. Did the guard fire on him?

 

A. All of them. They wanted to take him, but he had saber and revolver to defend himself, and they could not do anything else. 

Q. Was he killed by bullets, knives, or bayonets?

 

A. By knives, and probably by bullet wounds, too, for there were three or four discharges, and so I cannot say whether entirely by bolos or bullets. 

Q. What was the effect of this killing of General Luna there?

 

A. I could not say exactly. At first, the people were much surprised, but afterward, they said it was better so because he was very cruel; he killed a great many of his own soldiers, and officers and was a great tyrant. 

Q. Aguinaldo did not come back when he heard of the death of Luna?

 

A. That I could not say, whether he was told of it or whether he returned. I did not see his return up to the time I came away.  (United States[Commission 1.2]:148) 

The newspaper El Progresso also interviewed Arcadio Zialcita, and it was quoted as having submitted this report: 

“… Luna and his aide Francisco Roman went to the residence of Aguinaldo at Cabanatuan in a passion and after passing the outer sentry went up the stairs and attempted to force his way into the rooms where he believed Aguinaldo to be.  The officer in charge of the guard interposed and after a few hot words Luna drew his revolver and fired at the officer.  A sentry then fired at Luna and wounded him in the arm.  Roman sprang to Luna’s side and began shooting at the guard, meanwhile both men retreated down the stairs.  The guard turned out and used their bolos, forcing Luna and his aide out of the building to the plaza in front where they were literally cut to pieces.  Luna is said to have received 20 wounds.”  (Singapore, 12)

 

Testimony of Pedro Janolino

Capt. Janolino, the head of the Presidential guards, claimed full responsibility in an interview conducted by Antonio K. Abad in 1929, as appeared in an article in the Philippines Free Press on April 3, 1954, entitled "More on Luna's Death". (De Viana, 108-109). 

Below is the question and answer as it appeared in the publication above-cited: 

ABAD: Who ordered you to kill Gen, Luna?  

JANOLINO: No one ordered us to kill Gen. Luna. I assume the whole responsibility for the sad happening.  

ABAD: If that is true, why did you treacherously kill the general?  

JANOLINO: The incident was unexpected because when General Luna heard someone fire at the stairs under the convent, he became very furious and rushed downstairs and uttered the following words: “Idiot, fool! You do not know how to handle a rifle!” “We thought at that moment that Gen. Luna would harm us because he was mad and was known to be a very harsh and temperamental man and due to this belief, I was frightened and immediately hit him in the head with my dagger. At that juncture, my soldiers (from the Kawit Company) helped me in attacking him until he rushed out of the convent badly wounded."  

And here is the official statement from Severino de las Alas, Secretary of the Department of the Interior of the government of the Filipino Republic, dated June 8, 1899, viz:

“Supplementary to my telegram of the 8th instant, making known the death of General Antonio Luna and of his aide, Colonel Francisco Roman I must add that the causes of the deaths of these gentlemen were the insulting and assaulting of the sentinel and guard of the house of the Honorable President of the Republic, and slurs directed against the person of the latter, who was at the time absent in the field. Therefore, the sentinel and the guards being insulted by the said General and also kicked and cuffed by him and even having revolvers discharged against them, not only by the General but also by his aide Colonel Francisco Roman, and being still much more wrought up over the gross insults and threats of death which both made against the Honorable President, who, thank God, was absent in the field, the sentinel and other guards made use of their arms to repel the unjust aggression of General Luna and his aid, both of whom were instantly killed.” (Kalaw, 210)

The Alleged Plot to Kill Luna

The story being peddled around by detractors of Aguinaldo is the allegation that he invited Luna to a conference in Cabanatuan to prepare him to be killed by the Presidential guards of Aguinaldo.  The invitation is said to be contained in a telegram dated June 4, 1899, summoning Luna to a conference in Cabanatuan. 

An authentic telegram was the object of a much-publicized auction conducted in November 2018 by a well-known auction house in Metro Manila, and this document was pointed to as the “smoking gun” linking Aguinaldo to the killing of General Antonio Luna (https://nolisoli.ph/52289/aguinaldos-telegram-that-led-to-heneral-luna-abulan-20181120/).  The telegram’s authenticity was further bolstered by historian Jim Richardson, who presented photos of the entry in the telegraph operator's message logbook from the Philippine Insurgents Records (PIR) microfilm.   

The coded text of the telegram as transcribed is as follows: 

"Folabo puoncimane iun thiundotonade sin ordenar fegmicaen ciusi Esperando contestacion a me telegram anterior en que le pedia piso incupsicaen. Suplico urgencia." 

Note that the message does not make sense.  This is because some letters were interchanged to confuse readers except those who are privy to the code.  For example, the letter  “e” was replaced by the letter “o”, “b” by “p”, etc.. But in the catalog of the auction house that advertised the above-cited telegram, the message was transliterated and printed to read as follows: 

“Paging for an important meeting therefore you are ordered to come here immediately.  Waiting for a reply to my telegram about urgent matters to discuss.  It is really an emergency.” 

Anyone reading the above message would immediately conclude that Aguinaldo summoned Luna to Cabanatuan to deal with him.  But this translation was proven inaccurate and misleading because the correct decoding of the message is as follows: 

“Felipe Buencamino aun detenido sin ordenar formacion causa.  Esperando contestacion a mi telegrama anterior en que le pedia acusacion.  Suplico urgencia.” 

And correctly translates to English as: 

“Felipe Buencamino is being detained without ordering the formation of the case.  I am waiting for your reply to my previous telegram where I request the basis of your accusation.  I plead with urgency.” 

The telegram does not say that Aguinaldo is summoning Luna to Cabanatuan.  

According to historian Ambeth Ocampo, in a column in the “Philippines Daily Inquirer” of December 2, 2018, with a subtitle, “The Luna Telegram:  Not so Deadly After All,” the telegram is not a “smoking gun” or the evidence that historians have been looking for all these years.  In other words, there is no truth to the story that Aguinaldo purposely ordered Luna to come to Cabanatuan so that the scheme allegedly concocted to assassinate him could be carried out by the Kawit soldiers.  And so the telegram that supposedly proved the alleged complicity of Aguinaldo to the killing of General Antonio Luna is nothing but a farce, a fabrication made up by some quarters in their malicious effort to denigrate the memory of Aguinaldo.

 

So, if there was no telegram purportedly sent by Aguinaldo to summon Luna to Cabanatuan, how did this telegram story come about?

 

One person who claimed Aguinaldo sent Luna the telegram to come to Cabanatuan was Teodoro Cada.  In the statement submitted to Juan Villamor, Cada says he was the telegraph operator at Cabanatuan, and one evening, Aguinaldo came to see him in his underpants (carjoncillo) and T-shirt and asked him to contact Luna in Tarlac and the two exchanged greetings with Aguinaldo asking Luna to come to Cabanatuan to confer (Villamor, 72).  However, Cada’s whole story is not given weight because the part where he says the commander of the guards accosted Luna and an aide sneaked from behind and pulled out Luna’s dagger and thrust it into Luna’s chest was belied by the autopsy conducted in 1903 by Antonio Jimenez on the exhumed body of Luna showing his skull bore two holes caused by a sharp instrument (Villamor, 38).  In short, the autopsy proved that Luna was struck on his head by a dagger and not into his chest as claimed by Cada which cast doubt on the veracity of his whole testimony.  Also, the alleged telegram that he claimed he sent to Tarlac was not recorded in the logbook of the receiving station.  In addition,  historian Agoncillo says it was improbable that Aguinaldo, as President of a republic, would show himself publicly in a bedroom outfit as Cada had described.

 

The other source of the telegram story was eyewitness Fajardo.  In his signed statement, he says he heard and saw Felipe Buencamino instructing the soldiers to search the pockets of the dead men, Luna and Paco Roman, for any papers, especially a telegram.

Aguinaldo's Version of the Events

According to Aguinaldo, he did not ask Luna to come to Cabanatuan. It was the other way around;  Luna was the one who sent him a telegram advising that he (Luna) was coming for a conference. This information is based on the unpublished notes of Aguinaldo entitled "Ang Pagkamatay ng Heneral Luna," which have come up lately. The documents were kept initially by Aguinaldo's secretary, the late Felisa Diokno, and are currently in possession of Ms. Elizabeth Angsioco.

 

The photograph of the original copy of the notes of Aguinaldo is courtesy of TUKLAS PILIPINAS, Inc. Facebook page, where the notes were made public for the first time and is reproduced here with permission of Ms. Elizabeth Angsioco. 

Here is the author’s translation of the Tagalog text of the excerpts from the transcription by Ms. Elizabeth Angsioco of Aguinaldo's unpublished notes, "Ang Pagkamatay ng Heneral Luna":

 

“As the enemy – the Americans -  had driven the Presidency of the Philippine Republic to Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, I received during the first days of June the telegram of General Luna that he would come to confer with me; and because I knew that he was set on implementing his proposed Golpe de Estado against the government of the Republic during the visit; and I know that the coup will lead to a civil war, or a murderous conflict among countrymen, a war that will be difficult to prevent even if it is secretly executed; having experienced the temperament of General Luna when he stormed the meeting of the cabinet with half a platoon of soldiers and disrupted the session and, without regard to my presence, he slapped the Secretary of State, Hon. Felipe Buencamino, simply because he was an autonomist.  He did not stop despite my shouts, and I had to come over to him to restrain him.  I thought it wise to avoid him, given what he has taught me from experience here in the office of the presidency in Cabanatuan.  Instead of answering his telegram, I put on my Captain-General uniform, which I had never used because I intended to make a surprise visit to the Luna Division in Bamban Tarlac, and the soldiers may not respect my authority if they saw me in civilian clothes. Before I left, I gave instructions to the officer of the guard, Capt. Pedro Janolino, that if General Luna arrives on June 5, he (Janolino) should tell General Luna that he could not bring along any soldier in going up the office of the presidency, and if he senses that General Luna might again harass or slap any of the cabinet members or any employee of the government of the Philippine Republic that he should arrest Luna and disarm his soldiers.  

“After I left Cabanatuan with some of the presidential guards on June 3, we made a stopover at Factoria or San Isidro, the old capital of Nueva Ecija, and immediately sought the column of the brigade of General Gregorio del Pilar, who I learned also left to avoid being disarmed by General Luna.  When they arrived the following day, we hurriedly embarked on our journey, walking the whole night, and arrived in Bamban, Tarlac, at dawn. The guards immediately lined up in a formation, and we were well-received by General Venancio Concepcion, who placed himself under my authority without showing any sign of hostility, although he was somewhat surprised. With my eye on preventing a civil war, I broke up the huge column of General Luna and distributed them into various brigades. And then, on this date, June 5, I sent a telegram to General Luna at his headquarters in Bayambang, Bautista, Pangasinan, to report to me in Tarlac, Tarlac. However, on the following day, I received a telegram from the politico-military Governor of Plaza in Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, informing me of the accident that caused the death of General Antonio Luna and Colonel Paco Roman.”  (Translated from Tagalog text in Aguinaldo,7-18)

Author’s note:  The original Tagalog text is as follows: "SA PAGKAT, naitaboy na ng Kalabang Americano, sa Kabanatuan, Nueva Ecija ang Presidencia ng Republika Filipina, at sa pangunahing araw ng Junio 1899, ay tumanggap ako ng isang Telegrama ng Heneral Antonio Luna, na makikipanayam lamang sa akin; at sa pagkat dati ko ng alam na isasagawa na nia, sa pagparitong ito ang panukala niang, GOLPE DE ESTADO SA Pamahalaang Republika; at sa pagkat napagalaman ko na nga, na micha o pangdikit na tuloy sa GUERRA CIVIL o Patayan ng magkababayan ang nasabing Golpe de Estado, na mahirap ng mailagan ang kahit ipanganlong (at) sa kababaan ng loob ko rin, ay minarapat ko ng unahin ang pag-ilag o pagiingat at hindi ko na sinagot ang kaniang telegrama; bakit talagang mayroon na siang naituro sa akin, na dapat pagingatan ko sia, simula ng kaniang pangahasang ipanghik dito rin sa Presidencia sa Kabanatuan, ang kalahating Pelotong Kawal na kaniang Escolta, at bago ginulo nia ang Pulong ng Gabinete, kahit kaharap ako, at bago pinagtatampal pa nia ang Secretario de Estado Don Felipe Buencamino, dahil sa pagka Autonomista lamang, na hindi nia sinunod ang sigao ko, kundi ng hawakan ko sia; kaya sa halip nga na sagutin ko pa ang nasabing telegrama nia, ay nagbihis at isinuut ko agad ang aking Uniforme sa pagka Kapitan Heneral, na kailan pa man hindi ko pa nagagamit, kundi noon lamang; dahil naman sa paggugunita ko, na baka ako hindi kilalanin, kung humarap ako ng nakapaisano at sa nais kong mabigla at makuyum ko agad ang Kuartel Heneral ng Heneral Luna, sa Bamban, Tarlak, ay umalis ako agad sa Kabanatuan, matapos na mapagtagubilinan ko ang Oficial de Guardia, Kapitan Pedro Janolino, sa Presidencia, “na mag- ingat sa pagtanggap kay Heneral Luna, na sakaling maparito sa ika 5 ng Junio; ay sabihin sa utos ko na ipinagbabawal kong makapagsama pa sia, sa pagpanghik sa Presidencia, sa sino mang Kawal na Escolta nia; at sakaling maanyuan ninyo, na ibig pa niang mangahasa at manampal uli sa sino mang Secretario ng Pamahalaan o sa sino mang Tauhan ng Presidencia ng Republika, ay Arrestuhin agad at alsan ng sandata ang kanyang Escolta. 

"AT SA AMING PAGKAALIS ng ilang Guardia kong Alabarderos, sa Kabanatuan, ng ika 3 ng Junio, ay tumigil muna kami sa Factoria o San Isidro, dating Cabecera ng Nueva Ecija, at madalian kong ipinahanap ang Columna ng Brigada ng Heneral Gregorio del PIlar, na nabalitaan kong umalis at umilag na maalsan pa sia ng Sandata ng Heneral Luna; at ng dumating ng kinabukasan, ay dalidali kaming umalis at naglakad sa boong magdamag at dumating naman kami ng naninikat na ang araw sa Kuartel Heneral sa Banban, Tarlak.

"At sa aming pagkadating na yon, ay agad sumaayos ang mga Taliba at mabuti naman ang pagkatanggap sa amin ng Heneral Venancio Concepcion, kahit parang nabigla ito sa amin, agad sumailalim sa aking Kapangyarihan at wala akong nahalatang Kilos hostil. GANITO MAN, at sa pagiingat kong mailagan ang Guerra Civil, ay pinagwatak-watak ko agad ang malaking Columnang ito ng Division Luna sa ibat ibang Brigada. AT BAGO sa araw ding ito, 5 Junio, ay Tinelegramahan ko ang Heneral Antonio Luna, sa Kuartel Heneral nia sa Bayanbang-Bautista, Pangasinan, na humarap agad sa akin, sa Tarlak, Tarlak. Subhali, sa kinabukasan ay tumanggap naman ako ng isang Telegrama ng Gobernador Politico Militar ng Plaza sa Kabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, at ipinagbibigay alam ang sakunang nanyari sa pagkamatay ng Heneral Antonio Luna at ng Coronel Pako Roman." (Aguinaldo, 17-18)   

The foregoing narration is essentially consistent with similar series of events contained in the books of Augusto de Viana, "Stories Barely Told," New Day Publishers, Quezon City, 2013, found in pages 204-206 and Dr. Emmanuel Franco Calairo's "Saloobin," Cavite Historical Society, 2002, in pages 33-35, which must have been provided to the above-mentioned authors from the same sources, but strangely, there are differences in the month and dates of some details. 

 Circumstances Surrounding  the Death of Luna

Captain Janolino, the central figure of the controversial incident, referred to the killing of Luna as unexpected, in other words, accidental. However, the circumstances surrounding the killing and the accounts of the eyewitnesses show that it was premeditated and accomplished through the participation of several people.

The incident happened at the time when the first Filipino republic, or what is known as the Malolos Republic, was in deep crisis. Not only was its army suffering from a succession of defeats against the American occupation forces, but the government itself was divided between two groups espousing conflicting policies: autonomy versus absolute independence.

General Antonio Luna and Apolinario Mabini were the primary adherents in pursuing absolute independence for the country and were steadfast in expressing their position that the country should accept nothing less. On the contrary, cabinet secretaries like Pedro Paterno, Felipe Buencamino, and several others were entertaining the idea of accepting the American offer of autonomy to end the conflict and restore peace to the embattled country.

For Luna, acceptance of autonomy would be effectively a surrender to the Americans because, under an autonomous government, the head of the government would be an American Governor-General, which meant that the sovereignty of the United States would be firmly established over the islands. On the other hand, absolute independence, countered the autonomists, was impossible, a conclusion drawn from the issues discussed during the conference in January 1899 between the commissioners of General Otis and those appointed by Aguinaldo. In that conference, the Filipinos offered a modified meaning of independence, which was the recognition by the Americans of the Filipino government accompanied by a “request that the United States establish a protectorate not on account of incapacity for self-government, but on account of lack of proper means to maintain independence.” (Taylor[III], Addendum to Volume 3, 110). In other words, the Americans would provide protection against a foreign intervention with its naval forces until the Filipinos could maintain their own.

But even this watered-down view of “independence” was unacceptable to Luna, who protested against entering into such an agreement with the Americans. Luna was firm on his position of absolute independence for the country, and his belligerent reaction to those espousing autonomy was seen as a sign that a possible upheaval would be forthcoming if the government did not take Luna’s position.

Between these two opposing positions, Aguinaldo was caught in the middle. 

Aguinaldo wanted a cessation of hostilities, and an agreement as to the future of the country concluded with the Americans under a treaty. But the Americans refused unless the Filipinos surrendered and accepted autonomy. At this juncture, attaining absolute independence was like a distant light slowly fading out due to the inability of the army to provide credible resistance against the American army. This internal weakness of the Filipino army was pointed out by General Jose Alejandrino when he said that due to the myriad types and makes of weapons, mainly rifles, used by the Filipino army, it was a logistical issue to source and distribute the ammunition to soldiers holding the correct weapon (Alejandrino, 114), and the common complaint of the soldiers was the lack of ammunition. This problem was compounded by the absence of external help from another foreign power and the inability of the Hong Kong Junta to ship armaments and ammunition due to the blockade established by the American navy.

Under these conditions, Aguinaldo saw autonomy as the only possible way out of his government's predicament. His decision to actively pursue this alternative caused the removal of Mabini as president of the Cabinet and his replacement by Pedro Paterno. It also created enmity between the new cabinet leaders and General Luna.

When Luna learned that government representatives met with American counterparts to discuss autonomy in late May 1899, Luna was furious. He arrested and sent them to jail but Aguinaldo ordered their release. Aguinaldo was wary of Luna's temperament, which he witnessed during one of the cabinet meetings when Luna, with half a platoon of soldiers, barged in and accused Felipe Buencamino, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, of treason. Then, after a heated exchange, Luna slapped Buencamino and pushed him down to the floor. As Buencamino was getting up to his feet, he mumbled, “This aggression will cost you cost you dearly, General.” (Villamor, 21 and 58)

However, Luna’s strong opposition against autonomy was inconsistent with his position as Director of War. His responsibility was to pursue the military mission of defending the country against American invasion. Whatever political direction the government was to take was the responsibility of the cabinet and Congress, not the military. As Mabini pointed out in his March 7, 1899 letter to Aguinaldo, he criticized Luna for not understanding his responsibilities as he interfered in government administration (Santos[Mabini], 18). If Luna had been faithful to his dream of absolute independence, he should have resigned from his position and worked independently of the government, which was intent on pursuing a course different from his own. Clearly, this act of Luna extending his authority beyond the bounds of the military organization and undermining or attempting to undermine the authority of government was in itself an act constituting what is known as Golpe de Estado or coup d’etat.

Aguinaldo’s Response to Luna’s Actuations

When Aguinaldo received a telegram on June 1 stating that Luna wanted to confer with him, he thought it best to avoid Luna and not answer his telegram..  Aguinaldo already knew from a confidential report of Lt. Col. Pepito Leyba (Aguinaldo[Alaala], 1) that Luna wanted to rid the government of the autonomists, or those espousing the acceptance of the American offer of peace through autonomy.  Toward this end, Luna would do a Golpe de Estado and, in Aguinaldo’s mind, the coup could lead to a civil war. 

Having learned about the coming of Luna, Buencamino wrote Aguinaldo a long letter the following day, on June 2, 1899  (Taylor[IV], 101-106).  In this letter, he sought protection from arbitrary arrest by Luna. He expressed fear for his (Buencamino) life because of reports that Luna was going after the autonomists such as himself, Paterno, the Secretary of  State, Velarde, and Arguelles being identified as the principal adherents.  However, it is not clear what protection, if any, Aguinaldo offered Buencamino, suffice it is to say that Aguinaldo left Cabanatuan for Tarlac.

So, as far as Aguinaldo was concerned, the telegram he received from Luna signaled that the coup d'etat would be launched upon Luna’s coming to Cabanatuan, and he (Aguinaldo) had to do something to prevent the situation from sparking a civil war. As mentioned in Aguinaldo’s unpublished notes cited above, he put on his Captain-General uniform and went to Bamban, Tarlac with General Gregorio del Pilar and his troops and took over the command of the Luna Division from General Venancio Concepcion, who submitted peacefully to Aguinaldo’s authority. Clearly, from the point of view of an independent observer,  Aguinaldo’s action was aimed at immobilizing Luna and preventing him from using the army for his own personal undertaking.

After successfully taking over command of the Luna Division, Aguinaldo broke it up into various brigades and then sent a telegram to Luna asking him to report to Tarlac, only to learn the following day that Luna had been killed.

President Aguinaldo had no motive to kill General Luna.  He gave him a rank in the army over and above the senior officers of the revolution who were uneasy about the appointment. Still, he insisted and prevailed upon them, some of whom were his relatives. He explained his decision as follows:  

"I took Luna and named him undersecretary of war with the rank of brigadier general because we were short of capable military leaders. Practically all of them had originally recruited their own soldiers from among their tenants and neighbors, and the soldiers often obeyed no one else. While most of our officers were men of intelligence and courage they were generally incapable of large commands. ...Neither, indeed, did Luna go to a military school, for he was a pharmacist by training, but in addition to his undeniable valor, he was an avid student of military theory and history. Not only was he our ablest commander but also he had the foresight and ability to operate a military school with which he trained most of our officers. We needed him to keep our forces as a coordinated unit. And we needed even his terrible temper to impose discipline on our unschooled army." (Saulo, 16)

Aguinaldo said that if he wanted to kill Luna, it would not be in his residence but on the battlefield and blamed it on the Americans. Here is Aguinaldo making this assertion, viz:  

"If I had wanted to have Luna murdered, do you think I would have been foolish enough to have him liquidated right in my headquarters and so draw the public suspicion on me? It was easy to have him killed by the simple expedient of ordering my loyal men to shoot him during battle and then blame the Americans for his death." (Saulo, 28)  

Resolution of Hanging Issues

 

An analysis as late as this time of this unfortunate event in our history would bring out these thoughts that need resolution:  

1.  If Aguinaldo masterminded the killing of Luna, why did he not prepare for it?  Why did he not reinforce the undermanned guards before he went to Tarlac to take over the Luna division? He knew that Luna usually traveled with an escort of a cavalry unit, although this was left behind at that time before crossing a river due to a breakdown of their wagons. 

 

2.  Aguinaldo would have moved his wife and mother to safety, knowing it could turn into a war zone and he would not be around to protect them if he had designs on Luna’s life.  Does it mean he was willing to risk the lives of his loved ones, or, there was really no plot on his part to kill Luna?

 

3.  Luna proceeded to Cabanatuan only with two aides. This could be taken to mean that Luna was expecting no trouble in having a one-on-one meeting with Aguinaldo on a very important matter. These actions of both Luna and Aguinaldo proved that there was no premeditation or intent to hurt each other.  

4.  Luna's body bore more than thirty wounds, an expression of contempt and extreme hatred of those who attacked him, compared to Colonel Roman, who was felled by a single bullet to the chest. There is no denying that the Caviteno soldiers hated Luna for a myriad of reasons: they were singled out as the cause of defeat in the battle of Caloocan, their unit was humiliated in front of the troops, and their officers stripped of their ranks and sent to jail, their brigade was ordered disbanded, and Luna horsewhipped their wives and children some of whom were sicked of chicken pox out of a military train. General Jose Alejandrino, a friend and confidant of Luna who witnessed the horsewhipping incident, said: "This act created for Luna many enemies among the chiefs and officers who came with their families in the train, and  I would not be surprised if later on some of them took part in the plot in Cabanatuan.” (Alejandrino, 133) 

5.  It is claimed that Janolino and his soldiers were not punished.  The truth is that a court-martial was prepared for them, as can be gleaned from the official government report of June 8, 1899, which says:   

“...Immediately thereupon the Military Court Martial took the proper steps and is now conducting the preliminary proceedings and the  government decided to have the burial take place with all military honors.” (Kalaw, 211). 

But the proceedings were not completed.  And this failure had become a subject of speculation.  Some say it proves that Aguinaldo was involved because he did not pursue the punishment of the perpetrators. The critics must have forgotten that the full force of the American offensive was demolishing every conceivable defense that the Filipino Republican Army could muster, gobbling up Philippine territory after territory.  The necessities of war made it impossible to complete the task of the court-martial. From all indications, however, Janolino and his soldiers were removed from services as members of the Presidential Guards and they were not part of the Aguinaldo’s entourage on his journey to Palanan.

 

6.  A story had been circulated around to the effect that Aguinaldo’s mother came out of the convent window and shouted, “Is he still breathing?” (Villamor, 25), insinuating that she was well aware of what was supposed to happen to General Luna.  This story was dismissed as a rumor because the source was a colonel who was not even present at the site of the incident.  The more credible account is the one of eyewitness Fajardo, who testified that he saw a woman come out of the convent window; he did not know if she was the wife or mother of Aguinaldo, shouting: “Why did you kill the General?  Did you not recognize him?  You are all bad men.” (Agoncillo, 436)

 

7.  The death of two officers of the Filipino Republican Army closely associated with Luna, namely, the brothers Jose and Manuel Bernal, in the hands of General Gregorio del Pilar and Servillano Aquino, respectively (Agoncillo[Malolos],  443) was claimed to be part of a grand conspiracy to kill Luna that was cooked up with the approval of Aguinaldo.  If that were so, why were the other officers who were also Luna’s confidants and close associates, such as General Jose Alejandrino, General Venancio Concepcion, Colonel Simeon Villa, Colonel Manuel Sityar, Captain Eduardo Rusca, Colonel Cavestany, Lieutenants Colonel Quirong and Cajanding, and Commanders Vister, Cruz, Estanislao and Ochoa and many others, spared?  In fact, most of them joined Aguinaldo in his arduous, long trek to Palanan. 

Conclusion 

Juan Villamor’s book, “La Tragedia de Cabanatuan Crimen o Razon de Estado” contains an exhaustive investigation of the killing of General Antonio Luna.  It was conducted at the height of the political campaign pitting Manuel L. Quezon against Aguinaldo for the presidency of the Commonwealth.  During this tumultuous period, the political machinery of the Quezon camp accused Aguinaldo of being responsible for the death of both Luna and Bonifacio, a propaganda campaign that must have cost the presidency for Aguinaldo.   Villamor did not put the blame squarely on Aguinaldo for the killing of Luna but hinted that Aguinaldo could have done everything in his power to prevent it but did not.  

Similarly, historian Teodoro Agoncillo did not blame Aguinaldo, viz: 

“There is no strong evidence to show that Aguinaldo had anything to do with Luna’s death, but there is ample circumstantial evidence to show that the men around him were interested in having Luna liquidated.” (Agoncillo, 444) 

Among the men around Aguinaldo, the accusing finger would, of course, point to Felipe Buencamino.  

The enmity between the two had gone beyond reconciliation.  Agoncillo writes about another heated exchange between the two, viz: 

“Toward the end of May, Luna went to Kabanatuan and there met Buencamino, now free, at a dinner given by Aguinaldo.  At the table, Luna threw a murderous look at Buencamino and, turning to his aide said: ‘There is another traitor whom we should imprison.’  Buencamino strongly resented the imputation  ‘It is you, he said, ‘who are a traitor to our country, because had you not withdrawn a thousand soldiers from Kalumpit in order to punish General Mascardo the Americans would have been pinned down at Malolos.  Your accusation is false as your denunciation of my late son to General Aguinaldo.”  (Agoncillo[Malolos], 426)

Luna had falsely accused Buencamino’s son, Major Joaquin Buencamino, a traitor like his father by going over to the Americans, although upon Aguinaldo’s investigation, Joaquin died a hero because he was killed in a battle against the Americans at the outskirt of San Fernando on the 26th of May. (Taylor[IV], 101; Villamor, 88) 

Recall that after he was slapped and knocked down to the floor by Luna, Buencamino threw a veiled threat on Luna saying, “This aggression will cost you dearly, General.”  (Villamor, 21) 

And then, the eyewitness Fajardo testified that shortly before the unfortunate incident, his acquaintance soldier told him to stay at Cabanatuan convent and watch for the unfolding of an extraordinary event which was Buencamino’s revenge on Luna.: “Si Don Felipe Buencamino ay gaganti kay General Luna” (Don Felipe Buencamino will take revenge on General Luna).  The same Fajardo also testified that he heard Buencamino ask the soldiers if any of them were hurt and to search the pockets of the dead men for any papers, especially a telegram. (Agoncillo[Malolos, 435)  These are circumstantial evidence pointing to Buencamino as complicit in the killing of Luna.   

However, in his letter of November 9, 1928, to his nephew, Buencamino says: 

 "But I swear before God and before the ashes of my parents that I have had no intervention, nor direct or indirect in the deplorable event." (Villamor, 80) 

Buencamino also claimed he requested Aguinaldo to give him a certification, saying he was innocent and had nothing to do with the crime, but Aguinaldo did not issue the certification.

SOURCES:

Agoncillo, Teodoro A.: “Malolos The Crisis of the Republic,” The University of the Philippines Press, Diliman, Quezon City, 1997.” 

Aguinaldo, Emilio: "Ang Pagkamatay ng Heneral Antonio Luna," unpublished notes typewritten and scribbled with edit corrections in Aguinaldo's handwriting.  (formerly kept by Felisa Diokno, the secretary of Gen. Aguinaldo, now in the custody of Elizabeth Angsioco, who approved its publication in this book.) 

Alejandrino, Jose M.: “The Price of Freedom (La Senda del Sacrificio), Episodes and anecdotes of our struggle for freedom,” Original in Spanish, prologue by Teodoro M. Kalaw, Manila, 1949 

De Viana, Augusto V.: "The I Stories - The Events in the Philippine Revolution and Filipino American war as told by Eyewitness and Participants," UST Publishing House University of Santo Tomas Espana, Manila, 2006

 

Foreman, John:  "The Philippines," Manila, Filipiniana Book Guild, 1980, http://name.umdl.umich.edu/AAQ5315.0001.001 

Kalaw, Maximo M.: "The development of Philippine politics," Manila: P.I., Oriental commercial company, http://name.umdl.umich.edu/AFJ2233.0001.001

 

Saulo, Alfredo B.: "Rewriting Philippine History - The Truth About Aguinaldo and other Heroes", Phoenix Publishing House Inc. Quezon City, 1987 

Singapore: “Newspaper Article - MANILA,” The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (Weekly), 6 July 1899, Page 12 (nlb.gov.sg) 

Taylor, John R..M.: "The Philippine Insurrection Against the United States, a compilation of documents with introduction by Renato Constantino," Eugenio Lopez Foundation, 5 Volumes (Volume I to V), Pasay City, Philippines, 1971

 

United States Philippine Commission[1899-1900]: "Report of the Philippine Commission to the President.: January 31, 1900,"  Vol 1, No.2, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1900-1901, http://name.umdl.umich.edu/aex9637.0001.002

 

Villamor, Juan: “La Tragedia de Cabanatuan Crimen o Razon de Estado?,” copyright 1931 by author, Teniente Coronel del que fue ejercito de Filipino, all rights reserved

Testimony to the Efficiency of the Aguinaldo Government

Two navy men from Admiral Dewey's fleet, W.B. Wilcox and L.R. Sargent, toured Northern Luzon and submitted a report to the Admiral on their observation and comments about  the administration of President Emilio Aguinaldo. They traveled to seven provinces with a distance extending to about 600 miles. The report makes favorable impressions on the efficiency of the administration of the government of Aguinaldo as can be gleaned from the summary of the report, viz:

"It will be remembered that at that date [October and November 1898, the United States had not yet announced its policy with regard to the Philippines. The terms of the treaty with Spain were being negotiated by our Commissioners in Paris, and the fate of the islands hung in the balance. In the meantime the native population, taking matters into their own hands, had declared their independence from all foreign jurisdiction and had set up a provisional government with Aguinaldo at its head.

 

"Although this government has never been recognized, and in all probability will go out of existence without recognition, yet it cannot be denied that, in a region occupied by many millions of inhabitants, for nearly six months it stood alone between anarchy and order. The military forces of the United States held control only in Manila, with its environs, and in Cavite, and had no authority to proceed further; while in the vast remaining districts the representatives of the only recognized power on the field were prisoners in the hands of their despised subjects. It was the opinion at Manila during this anomalous period in our Philippine relations, and possibly in the United States as well, that such a state of affairs must breed something akin to anarchy.

"I can state unreservedly, however, that Mr. Wilcox and I found the existing conditions to be much at variance with this opinion. During our absence from Manila, we traveled more than 600 miles in a very comprehensive circuit through the northern part of the island of Luzon, traversing a characteristic and important district. In this way we visited seven provinces, of which some were under the immediate control of the central government at Malolos, while others were remotely situated, separated from each other and from the seat of government by natural divisions of land, and accessible only by lengthy and arduous travel. As a tribute to the efficiency of Aguinaldo's government and to the law-abiding character of his subjects, I offer the fact that Mr. Wilcox and I pursued our journey throughout in perfect security, and returned to Manila with only the most pleasant recollections of the quiet and orderly life which we found the natives to be leading under the new regime.”

Further down the report, it reads:

"The towns of Ilagan and Aparri, with their wealthy and pleasure-loving population, provided the most elaborate entertainment. Ilagan is the capital city of the tobacco-raising province of Isabella and is situated near the head of navigation of the Rio Grande. Aparri is situated at its mouth, in the province of Cagayan, and is the only seaport of the valley. These towns are laid out in regular streets and have many squares of substantial frame buildings. They have each a population of between ten and fifteen thousand. We spent three days at Ilagan, and I think that it was here that we were brought into closest touch with the Filipino character. The cultured class, which I have spoken of before, was strongly in evidence; and I think that before leaving we had discussed views with nearly every member of it. They all realized that they were passing through a crucial period in the history of their people, and young and old were eager to acquire all possible knowledge that might assist them to think clearly at this crisis. Their realization of the gravity of their position did not, however, rob their character of its natural gayety nor make them forget their duty as hosts. On the evening following our arrival, a ball was given in our honor, which was attended by all the elite of the town. There were present about fifty young women and twice that number of men. All were dressed in European fashion. The girls were pleasant and intelligent; the men comported themselves in all respects like gentlemen. It was hard to realize that we were in the very heart of a country generally supposed to be given. up to semi-savages. At intervals between dances many songs were sung, usually by one or two of the guests, while all frequently joined in the chorus. The national hymn was repeated several times with great enthusiasm. The ball lasted until eight o'clock in the morning, and broke up with good feeling at its height.

"On the second evening we were invited to attend the theatre, where two one-act Spanish plays were presented by the young society people of the town. The theatre itself had been constructed by the villagers only a few weeks before. It was a large bamboo structure, one end of which was used as the village market, while the stage occupied the other end. The stage arrangements were good; curtain, side scenes, and footlights en regle. In the performance of the play we saw our friends - these typical young Filipinos - in a light in which very few of our nation have had an opportunity to view them. They comported themselves with credit in a position where humor, intelligence, and artistic ability were the requisites of success.

"During our stay at Ilagan, we lived at the house of the Mayor. This building was of great size, and was built of magnificent hard wood from the neighboring forest. One wing, containing a reception room and two bedrooms, was turned over to us. The reception room was very large, with a finely polished floor and with windows along two sides. It contained a piano and a set of excellent bamboo furniture, including the most comfortable chairs and divans imaginable. There were two tall mirrors on the wall, and a number of old-fashioned pictures and framed paper flowers. In this room our friends gathered in the afternoon and took measures to make the time pass pleasantly for us. Whenever the conversation threatened to lose its animation, there was always some one at hand to accede to our host's request to play on the piano or to sing. "

In two articles written by Mr. Sargent for the “Outlook” of September 2 and 23, 1899, he says:

“On the evening following our arrival a ball was given in our honor, which was attended by all the elite of the town. There were present about fifty young women and twice that number of men. All were dressed ini European fashion. The girls were pleasant, and the men comported themselves in all respects like gentlemen. It was hard to realise that we were in the very heart of a country generally supposed to be given up to semi-savages.” (Van Meter, 73, emphasis supplied)

The full text of the report may be accessed through this link, which was lifted entirely from a pamphlet published by the Philippine Information Society, "Facts about the Filipinos - "The Crucial Test," Boston, Vol. 1, No. 3, June 1, 1901, pages 36-62, http://name.umdl.umich.edu/acc6166.0001.003.

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