The petition entitled:
“TO TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO RECOGNIZE BONIFACIO AS THE FIRST PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES (BONIFACIO: UNANG PANGULO)”
was first published in the March 2015 issue of Esquire Philippines and then again in change.org after the petition was presented to President Rodrigo Duterte upon his election in 2016.
It is essential to understand the justifications put forward by those who submitted the petition so that these can be analyzed and adequately answered to guide the readers toward the truth. Here are the specific items of justification as lifted verbatim from the published petition on change.org followed by the corresponding answer to each:
JUSTIFICATION No. 1 - “By the time the Philippine Revolution erupted on 24 August 1896, the Katipunan was not just a mere organization but was transformed into a revolutionary government, according to documents. And as the leader of the Katipunan at that time, he (Bonifacio) became its president.”
ANSWER: The Katipunan did not change; when the revolution broke out, it was still the same Katipunan as when it was established, a revolutionary association. The only change is that the Katipunan became publicly open instead of secret. Following this line of argument, the title of the first President of the Philippines should go to Deodato Arellano.
JUSTIFICATION No. 2 – “The fact was that Aguinaldo’s leadership of the Revolution derived its authority from having wrestled it from the Supremo of the Katipunan by his execution in Cavite in May of 1897.”
ANSWER: It is the opposite. It was Bonifacio who tried to wrest the authority from Aguinaldo. The province of Cavite was liberated by the combined efforts of Mariano Alvarez and Emilio Aguinaldo or by the Magdiwang and Magdalo councils of the Katipunan. During the convention at Tejeros on March 22, 1897, the delegates voted to organize a new revolutionary government to replace the Katipunan with Aguinaldo as the elected president. This historical event officially established the authority of Aguinaldo and nullified all claims of power from Bonifacio. The fact is that Bonifacio tried to recapture his control by forming a separate army, rejecting the new government, and fighting it, leading to his grim end. (see more explanation later in this article)
JUSTIFICATION No. 3 – “The date and the election that happened during the start of the revolution was corroborated by a draft document of Bonifacio’s appointment of Mariano Alvarez as overall chief of all the revolutionary forces in the province of Cavite dated 26 August 1896 in Kalookan.”
ANSWER: There was no election of officers in the meeting on August 24, 1896, except for the appointment of four generals who were to command the four groups assigned to attack specific sections of the city, including the appointment of Mariano Alvarez as the overall leader of the combined forces of Magdiwang and Magdalo in Cavite. Domingo Orcullo attended the meeting as the representative of the Magdalo council, who reported to Aguinaldo what transpired during the session. The establishment of a government was not taken up, nor was the election of the officers. However, the meeting agreed on the plan of the uprising, the signals, and the appointment of Alvarez and the four generals. (see more explanation later in this article)
JUSTIFICATION No. 4 – “ . . . the documents (archivo militar) were important because they showed that Katipunan actually had a centralized working government. The different letters, decrees, and minutes from different chapters of the Katipunan and from Bonifacio himself proves that fact that the Katipunan as an organization by 1896 was in itself working like a government, a system which was already in place when the Kataastaasang Kapisanan decided to start the revolution and formalize the government.”
ANSWER: After the San Juan debacle on August 30, 1896, Bonifacio lost control of the Katipunan and lived like an outlaw for about four months, moving from one hideout to another. He had a few engagements but was unsuccessful. He expressed his frustration in his answer to Mariano Alvarez's invitation to visit Cavite when he said he could not capture a town to use as his headquarters or defense. The achievements attributed to the success of the Katipunan after the San Juan debacle are meaningless and unsubstantiated. (see more explanation later in this article)
JUSTIFICATION No. 5 – “. . . in the seals of the Haring Bayang Katagalugan, the term Kataastaasang Kapisanan is replaced by Kataastaasang Kapulungan, which also meant Supreme Assembly, but in a more stately fashion. In my (Richardson) opinion, this is a way for Bonifacio and his people to distinguish the revolutionary government from the government of the Katipunan as an organization.”
ANSWER: The seal can have any word or icon but has no meaning unless backed up by actual events or achievements.
JUSTIFICATION No. 6 – “ Jim Richardson clearly sums up the obvious: …in late 1896 and early 1897 the High Council did function as a form of local government in some areas, particularly to the East of Manila and in the Sierra Madre foothills. Its leaders both civil and military, organized elections, made appointments, planned and fought battles with the Spanish enemy, solicited funds for the revolutionary cause, and tried to deal with the consequences of the fighting on the civilian population.”
ANSWER: As in the response to JUSTIFICATION No. 5, the claim's merit lies in the substance and significance of the achievements cited, which were never observed or felt.
JUSTIFICATION No. 7 –“. . the Katipunan government also had a diplomatic component. A commission-based abroad tried to negotiate for Japanese political, military, and financial aid and they also contacted the US and French consulates in Hong Kong.
ANSWER: There were attempts, but they were to no avail. Bonifacio formed a committee to go to Japan to purchase arms. When the Japanese warship, the Kongo, arrived in Manila, the committee decided to negotiate with the Japanese naval military officials. The Japanese officials agreed to deliver 100,000 rifles and 150 cannons for one and a half million pesos. But, the deal fell through because the Filipinos could not raise the down payment of P300,000 (Alip, 43). St. Clair mentioned that Bonifacio and his companions met the commander of the same Japanese warship at the Bazar Hapones to hand over a petition to the Emperor of Japan to intrude into the islands' affairs and make it a protectorate of Japan. Nothing came out of the meeting, and the Japanese officer did not take the petition seriously. (St. Clair, 212-217) The British historian John Foreman mentioned a petition for Japan to annex the Philippines. He wrote that several months before the outbreak, the “…Katipunan sent a deputation to Japan to present a petition to the Mikado, praying him to annex the Philippines. This petition said to have been signed by 5,000 Filipinos, was received by the Japanese Government, who forwarded it to the Spanish Government, hence the names of the 5,000 disaffected persons were known to Philippine authorities, who did not find it politic to raise the storm by immediate arrests.” (Foreman[F.R.G.S], 512)
JUSTIFICATION No. 8 – “. . .the historians Milagros Guerrero and Zeus Salazar in different publications affirmed Bonifacio’s overall command of the Katipunan army and that he was the one strategizing for the Katipunan in the national perspective, in contrast to Aguinaldo’s Cavite tactical operations in the onset of the revolution.”
ANSWER: This is false. After the defeat at Pinaglabanan, San Juan, Manila, Bonifacio hid in Balara and the mountains of San Mateo and lost control of the various councils of the Katipunan. Once in a while, he would come out to raid the town of San Mateo, but he was unsuccessful. When Bonifacio moved to Cavite, he hindered the revolutionaries' plans and activities instead of helping. He refused to merge armies with Aguinaldo to meet the advancing Spanish army or help Aguinaldo defend the Magdalo towns, the first towns in the line of attack by the Spaniards. Bonifacio even blocked the reinforcement sent by Aguinaldo to help the defenders of Pasong Santol. He actually became a liability. (Saulo[Aguinaldo], 136-139)
JUSTIFICATION No. 9 – “In the February 8, 1897 publication of the “La Ilustraccion Espanola Y America” there was an item about the Philippine revolution and included was a picture of Bonifacio wearing a black coat and white necktie and written below it was: “Andres Bonifacio President of the Tagala Republic.”
ANSWER: Reliable information about the Philippine Revolution from any foreign publication should not be expected. In this regard, the letters of Spanish priest Pio Pi and Fiscal Rafael Comenje (Ronquillo, 582), and Fray Tomas Espejo (Ronquillo, 722) are better yardsticks. These letters proposing a ceasefire and peaceful negotiation were addressed to Aguinaldo, not Bonifacio, which only proves that the Spaniards recognized Aguinaldo, not Bonifacio, as the head of the revolution. (Saulo[Aguinaldo], 130)
The events after the establishment of the Katipunan, when the revolution broke out, and the last days of Supremo Andres Bonifacio in Cavite could be cited to assist in evaluating the above issues.
The Katipunan
Some historians give credit to Marcelo H. del Pilar for the idea of establishing the Katipunan when from Madrid in July 1892,
". . . he advised the creation of another association . . . which was to include the agricultural laborers and persons of little or no education and instruction, but who directed in the localities by the caciques and chiefs were to form an enormous nucleus which should, at the proper time, give forth the cry of rebellion. He provided minute instructions concerning the organization and forwarded a project of regulations." (St. Clair, 38)
The documents that became known as the founding documents of the Katipunan are the Casaysayan, the Pinagcasunduan, and the Manga Daquilang Cautusan (Richardson, 6-38).
It is not clear if these were the same documents that Del Pilar sent through Moises Salvador (Richardson, 24) together with instructions to Deodato Arellano (Del Pilar’s brother-in-law), Andres Bonifacio, Ladislao Diwa, and Teodoro Plata to establish the movement. (Taylor[I], 196)
On July 6, 1892, upon establishing the Katipunan (Santos[Katipunan], 35), Deodato Arellano was elected president and Bonifacio as secretary. The following year, Roman Basa replaced Arellano through the intervention of Bonifacio. Basa did not stay long in his position because Bonifacio replaced him. This change happened in a special election Bonifacio instigated after Basa raised issues on the condition of the Katipunan's finances under Bonifacio's custody (St. Clair, 44). When Emilio Jacinto joined in 1894, the Katipunan's policies, laws, regulations, teachings, and moral values were written and publicized among the members.
Even before the outbreak of the revolution, the Katipunan already had some semblance of a government because it had members, a constitution, an organizational structure, policies, rules, and objectives. If, in truth, the Katipunan was already a government and applying the standard of the petitioners, Arellano then should be called the first president of the Philippines. The petitioners say no. Arellano could not be the first president of the Philippines because the Katipunan was still a secret society during his tenure. The petitioners also contend that the semblance of a government applied to the Katipunan only after the Spanish authorities discovered it. And because Bonifacio was the president at the time of the society’s discovery, the honor of the first President of the Philippines should be bestowed on him.
The petitioners cite the statement of Captain John M. Taylor, an American
military officer who was once the custodian of important captured documents called the Philippine Insurgents Records (PIR), viz:
“The Katipunan came out from the cover of secret designs, threw off the cloak of any other purpose, and stood openly for the Independence of the Philippines. Bonifacio turned his lodges into battalions, his grandmasters into captains, and the supreme council of the Katipunan into the insurgent government of the Philippines." (Taylor[I], 63)
According to Taylor, the Katipunan became a revolutionary government after it shed off its secret character and emerged as a revolutionary movement. Taylor refers to August 24, 1896, at Balintawak when Bonifacio and the rebels met before staging the revolution. In that meeting, the revolutionaries divided themselves into four groups headed by an appointed general. They also agreed on how to attack the city of Manila and the signals to alert the neighboring areas.The appointed four generals were Aguedo del Rosario, Ramon Bernardo, Francisco Carreon, and Vicente Fernandez. Also appointed was Mariano Alvarez, who was to lead the combined forces of the Katipunan councils of Tangway [Cavite] (Ronquillo, 31). Domingo Orcullo attended the meeting as the representative of the Magdalo council, who handed Aguinaldo a letter from the Supremo Andres Bonifacio dated August 24, 1896, announcing the plan to attack Manila on the night of August 29, 1896, to be preceded by a signal which was the putting out of the lights at the Luneta. There was no mention in the letter of establishing a new government or the election of new officials. (Aguinaldo[Gunita], 68)Haring Bayang Katagalugan
According to the proponents, Bonifacio was the first President of the Philippines because he was President of the Katipunan, the first Filipino government of the principal inhabitants of the archipelago. This line of thinking proceeded from the Tagalog term Bayan, meaning nation or an aggregation of people bound together by identical race, language, history, culture, and aspirations. They claim the Katipunan was a Haring Bayan, or sovereign nation, because the Katipunan and its members were self-governing or sovereign. A territory is not needed, nor is a state or a republic structure required to qualify a government to be such. It is sufficient that a unified group of people exists over whom the authority to govern can operate. Under this condition, a government like the Katipunan had come to life as Haring Bayan or a sovereign nation.
Emilio Jacinto expanded the scope of this Katipunan government when he said:
“Sa salitang tagalog katutura'y ang lahat nang tumubo sa Sangkapuluang ito, sa makatuid, bisaya man, iloko man, kapangpangan man, etc, ay tagalog din.” (Santos[Jacinto], 60)
And translates to English as:
. . . In the word Tagalog it meant all who were born in these islands, a Bisaya, an Iloko, a Kapampangan, etc., they are also Tagalog.
Thus, the Katipunan became Haring Bayang Katagalugan or Sovereign Tagalog Nation, which included practically all the inhabitants of these islands.
Question: Is the above argument valid?
Answer: No, it is erroneous. Haring Bayan as a concept is very restrictive. There is no question that the Katipunan is a government because it has the governing authority, with its rules and regulations, which bind the members of the society. However, extending this authority beyond the membership by merely expanding the meaning of the word “Tagalog” would not work. The Bisayans, Ilocanos, or Kapangpangans who are not members of the Katipunan are beyond the reach of the authority of the Katipunan.. The exclusive nature of the Katipunan would not allow itself to be transformed into the Sovereign Tagalog Nation (or Haring Bayang Katagalugan) because the jurisdiction of this Katipunan government was limited to those bound by common characteristics previously defined as the standard, i.e., identical race, language, culture, history, and aspiration. It follows that the authority of the President of this government could not operate among the Bisayans, Bikols, Ilokanos, etc., who were not members of the Katipunan.
Even if Jacinto had expanded the scope of the word Katagalugan, it would not apply to the Katipunan as a sovereign nation because, first, not all of those born in the Philippines can be included, but only those who speak the common language, which is Tagalog. Secondly, the divergent political and loyal viewpoints and aspirations prevented the Visayans and Macabebes from being included because they preferred to serve in the Spanish colonial army. The same is true with the non-Christian people of Mindanao, who have different languages, cultures, histories, and aspirations.
For the other inhabitants to be considered part of this government, the Katipunan should have been a state or a republic, having control over the territory on which non-members reside. The Katipunan did not have control other than in Cavite for a while. Hence, the Katipunan or Haring Bayan remained in concept merely as a sovereign nation; it failed to transform itself into the more inclusive state structure as redefined by Jacinto for the Haring Bayang Katagalugan. Therefore, the presidency of Bonifacio was limited to the Katipunan as Haring Bayan or sovereign nation and was not for the whole archipelago.
The structural defects of the Katipunan
However, the more damaging criticism about the Katipunan (also known as the Haring Bayan) as a sovereign nation is the condition of the different Katipunan councils, which form the basic organizational structure. From the onset, the various councils of the Katipunan were independent of each other. These councils were separated. Each one had a head and did not coordinate with the other. An author has this to say:
“... there was still no estrangement or conflict between the Magdiwang and Magdalo leaders as such. They both kept their respective towns at peace, each side was justifiably proud of its successes in the field, and each dealt with its weaknesses by strengthening itself against the enemy – not against each other.” (Corpuz, 99)
The Katipunan broke up and scattered after the failed attack on San Juan on August 30, 1896. For four months, Bonifacio lived the life of an outlaw in Balara and the mountains of San Mateo. He and his men moved from one hideout to another, attacking a town but failing to hold it. Unsurprisingly, inaccepting the invitation to visit Cavite, he mentioned he was unsuccessful in capturing a town to use for his defense or headquarters. (Corpuz, 96)
In this desperate situation, why did not one of the several councils of the Katipunan or some of the 30,000 or so members extend help or take him into their care and protection? The casualties during the battle of San Juan were not significant enough to render the Katipunan helpless, and its councils were still intact. But it seems the Katipunan as an organization suddenly vanished. The so-called Sovereign Nation, or what was considered the Katipunan government, never really came to life, even if it was already exposed because the organization was still divided. The Supremo president had no firm hold or control over the chiefs of the different councils. The Sovereign Nation, or Haring Bayang Katagalugan, had a new lease of life only after Bonifacio moved and stayed in Cavite, where reference to it again appeared. But even in Cavite, the so-called Katipunan government that Bonifacio created was never accepted or recognized.
Therefore, Taylor’s statement - "lodges into battalions," the "grandmasters into captains," and the "Supreme Council of the Katipunan into the insurgent government" - was mere hyperbole. There is no question that the Katipunan changed, but the change was simply from a secret organization to a hostile and open one. The Katipunan remained as initially constituted, a sovereign nation, no better than an association with its governing rules and regulations, but inadequate to qualify as a government of the Philippines.
Imus meeting – proof that a revolutionary government did not exist
The meeting of the Magdalo and Magdiwang councils held in Imus on December 28, 1896 (29, according to Santiago Alvarez) confirmed that the Katipunan was not a revolutionary government. In this meeting, Baldomero Aguinaldo, the president of the Magdalo council, proposed to merge the two councils under one government, one army, and one leader. Here are essential details of the meeting that were lifted from pages 2033-2036 of the book of Zafra (also found in Corpuz, 98-100 and Saulo[Aguinaldo], 122-123):
"Ariston Villanueva, minister of war of the Magdiwang, said that
his people were agreeable to the creation of a revolutionary government, but he suggested that the high position should be reserved for Andres Bonifacio, the acknowledged Supremo of the Katipunan. (Underlining supplied by Author)
"Edilberto Evangelista, however, opposed Villanueva’s suggestion. He called attention to the fact that a great number of the townspeople who were not members of the Katipunan had joined in the revolutionary struggle.
"It is not right or fair," he said, "to presume that the revolution is an affair of the Katipunan only. The union of our forces will be useless if we do not recognize the role of our countrymen in the bid for freedom".
"The minister of the interior of the Magdiwang stood up and said, “We are in favor of electing the ministers but not the head of the revolutionary government”.
The arrival of Rizal’s brother, Paciano, and siblings, together with Josephine Bracken, who brought the bad news of the imminent execution of Rizal, aborted the meeting. The subject of the discussion changed to a plan to rescue the hero, but Paciano disagreed because he believed his brother would not allow the sacrifice of two or more lives to save the hero.
It is clear from what had transpired during the aborted meeting that the revolutionaries did not recognize the Katipunan in Cavite as a legitimate government. Instead, the panel agreed on merging the Magdalo and Magdiwang councils under one army and one government. The meeting also took up the matter of electing the officers. The Magdiwang’s proposal to reserve the presidency to Andres Bonifacio, considering he was the Supremo (or President) of the Katipunan, was not given due course, which strengthened the fact that the proposed new revolutionary government had nothing to do with the Katipunan.
Moreover, Bonifacio knew and acknowledged that he only had clout among Magdiwang members. Why would he agree to the attempt to unify the two groups if he considered himself already the head of one established government?
Haring Bayan ng Magdiwang
When Bonifacio arrived in Cavite before Christmas in 1896 (Ricarte[Himagsikan], 31), the people welcomed him with a pompous reception, and they shouted, “Long live the king” (Corpuz, 97). The revolutionaries of Cavite received him as head of the revolution and recognized his authority as Supremo of the Katipunan. But instead of taking a neutral stance, he sided with the Magdiwang council, where he received the title of Haring Bayan (Sovereign Nation or King of a nation? ), and the former chief, Mariano Alvarez, was relegated to second in command, Pangalawang Haring Bayan or Virrey (Ronquillo,140)
Why would the townspeople look at Bonifacio as a king? And why did the Magdiwangs call him Haring Bayan? The answer: The concept of a state or a republic was not in the people's consciousness or their leaders. They only knew a government similar to a monarchy headed by a king, like the Spanish monarchy. This ignorance is cited by Taylor when he said:
“The idea of forming a republic or of adopting the titles appropriate to a republic to designate the functionaries of Malay despotism was an afterthought. The men who, in August 1896, raised the standard of revolt, the fighting men like Bonifacio and Aguinaldo, did not know enough of the outside world to realize its expediency. Aguinaldo learned it when he was joined by men who had read the history of France and Spain. They found it was expedient to cover their system of absolutism with the name of a republic. It was probably a republic as they understood it, but there seems no reason for doubting that in September 1896, Vito Belarmino, . . . called himself Vito, viceroy of Silang . . . and to the very end of the so-called Filipino republic the ‘royal family’ was a common form of reference . . . and over again the orders of the President of the Republic were spoken of by his followers as “royal decrees” (Taylor[I], 68)
The title of Bonifacio as Supremo or King of the nation (Haring Bayan) did not equate to the position of a President of a state or republic as the term is understood today. The president of a country is always elected, whether a revolutionary, a sovereign nation, a state, or a republic. Authority could be claimed, and one could proclaim himself president or a group could hand him the title, but these are actions of a monarch, a dictator, or a warlord, not of a president.
Bonifacio was indeed elected president of the Katipunan in 1893, but this did not automatically make him president of the Philippines because if that were so, then the title of the first president should go to Deodato Arellano. That was why the revolutionary government was established at the Tejeros Convention on March 22, 1897, because, according to Severino de las Alas, the Katipunan was neither a republic nor a monarchy (Corpuz, 120). Affirming the preceding statement, Antonio Montenegro declared that if they disagreed on the kind of revolutionary government, they were to have and that if they were to let the status quo prevail, then they who were in the revolution would be no better than a pack of bandits or wild, mindless animals. This comment caused an uproar (Alvarez, 84).
But note that even Bonifacio did not claim he was President of the Philippines and the revolutionary government. Recall that when he declared the convention and all that had been agreed null and void, this is what he said:
“In my capacity as president of this convention and also as president of the Supreme Council of the Katipunan, of which all of you are aware, I declare this convention terminated, and all that was taken up and agreed upon null and void.” (Author’s translation of Tagalog text in Ronquillo, 54)
Bonifacio did not mention that he had authority as president of the revolutionary government, the Sovereign Nation, or the Philippines. He knew that no revolutionary government existed or a Philippine government may be called such, and he could not be a president of a government that had not been established yet.
But in the end, Bonifacio started calling himself president of the Sovereign Tagalog Nation (Pangulo ng Haring Bayang Katagalugan). The new title of Bonifacio could be seen in an order that he issued on April 19, 1897, several days after he lost the election for the presidency of the revolutionary government to Aguinaldo, appointing Emilio Jacinto as the chief of the forces north of Manila. (Ronquillo, 79)
This happened after the Tejeros elections. It can be inferred that the government of the Sovereign Tagalog Nation was a concoction of Bonifacio, something he thought of using as an alternative to the revolutionary government established in Tejeros.
The Tejeros Elections
The first-ever election to elect a Filipino President was held on March 22, 1897, amidst the revolution against Spain at the Casa Hacienda in Tejeros, San Francisco de Malabon, Cavite, the only liberated province at that time. Emilio Aguinaldo of the Katipunan Magdalo council was elected in absentia, the President of the Revolutionary Government established during the convention. The secret balloting results showed Aguinaldo 146 votes, Andres Bonifacio 80, and Mariano Trias 30 (May, 105).
The election was marred by disorder because Daniel Tirona questioned the qualification of Bonifacio for the lowest position of Director of Interior he was eventually elected to, which from indications, was a show of condescension and appeasement for his successive loss in the previous two or three higher positions. Angered by Tirona’s actions, Bonifacio pulled out his revolver and aimed at Tirona, who quickly lost himself in the crowd. The significant role played by Santiago Rillo, head of the Batangas delegation, in this tumultuous election should also be mentioned. Thinking perhaps he had invalidated the results of the election, Bonifacio prepared to walk out with his men. But before his group could leave, he was approached by Rillo, who requested that he accept his election and continue with the convention. Bonifacio refused. At that point, Rillo said to Bonifacio that he had no power or right to render null and void the election of the general assembly, and declared that he was taking over the chairmanship of the convention with the consent of the assembly, which was granted (Ronquillo, 58). Accordingly, the convention resumed and ended with a decision to seek Aguinaldo and invite him to take his oath of office as elected president of the revolutionary government.
Bonifacio saw that his null and void declaration of the convention was not respected. So, he took steps to invalidate the results of the elections and regain his authority which was slowly slipping away through his fingers. Here are the steps he took:
FIRST ATTEMPT: The day after the elections, he ordered all those elected to vacate their posts because, according to him, the elections were marred by cheating. He caused the order to be written in a document called Acta de Tejeros (Richardson, 320-327), signed by Bonifacio and more than forty members of the Magdiwang council. But the order was ignored. (May, 108; Ronquillo, 66)
It is puzzling that Bonifacio raised the issue of cheating only after the elections. He was already forewarned by Diego Mojica, and likely, by Artemio Ricarte also, that some of the ballots were already filled up when these were distributed. Why did he not investigate right then while the election was going on? This shortcoming of Bonifacio proves that the claim of cheating was an afterthought and his idea.
The claim that there was cheating is dubitable, considering that Bonifacio’s group, the Magdiwang council, initiated the convention on their turf; Bonifacio presided; Ricarte, a Bonifacio avid supporter, was the secretary of the convention who distributed the ballots. Most of the delegates were members of the Magdiwang council. Only eight delegates represented the Magdalo council because their members were all gathered on the battlefield, assigned to defend Pasong Santol in the town of Dasmarinas to ward off the impending attack by the Spaniards. In addition, all the seats were won by Magdiwang, except for the presidency, which Aguinaldo won because Trias, the elected vice president, was formerly a Magdiwang before he moved over to the Magdalo council.
SECOND ATTEMPT: Bonifacio accused Aguinaldo of intending to surrender the revolution when the cheating charge failed to accomplish anything. He launched a coup d’etat through a document called Acta de Naic (Richardson, 355-377), which was signed by more than 40 Magdiwang members, including two generals of Aguinaldo, namely, Generals Mariano Noriel and Pio del Pilar. Unfortunately, Aguinaldo got wind of it by some stroke of fate and proceeded to the meeting place to investigate. He found out that several of his troops were being detained under orders of Bonifacio, and as soon as Aguinaldo had them released, Bonifacio and all his companions scampered away. (Saulo[Aguinaldo], 143) Instead of going after the plotters, Aguinaldo forgave them and tried to win them back to join the new government. Jacinto Lumbreras, Mariano Alvarez, Severino de las Alas, and Pascual Alvarez did. (Saulo[Aguinaldo], 144)
THIRD ATTEMPT: The last and final attempt Bonifacio made to regain power was to establish a separate army. Included in this action was the designation of Emilio Jacinto as the president of the forces in the north of Manila, as previously mentioned above.
However, in his headquarters in Limbon, Bonifacio could not recruit soldiers to constitute his army except for his old buddies from Balara, and not one general from the Magdiwang or Magdalo joined him. When Severino de las Alas complained to Aguinaldo about the threat Bonifacio made to burn the town of Indang and the firefight that occurred between Bonifacio’s group and the arresting government soldiers, Aguinaldo was forced to issue the arrest order for Bonifacio, which led to his trial, guilty a verdict of treason, death sentence, and execution. (Corpuz, 124)
It is important to note that no one from the Magdiwang council or other Katipunan councils tried to help Bonifacio. The ordinary townsfolk also refused to help Bonifacio, as shown in the case of the people of Indang, who refused to provide him with food and supplies, which was the reason for the complaint of Severino de las Alas. The officers of the Magdiwang council who used to support Bonifacio accepted positions in the new government offered by Aguinaldo (Alvarez, 95).
No prior election on record gave the title of President of the Philippines except the one at Tejeros. This matter strengthens the contention that Aguinaldo is genuinely the first elected President of the Philippines. Those who continue to push for Bonifacio as the first President of the Revolutionary Government are trying to change history, and this act is coming from those uneasy sectors of our society that have self-serving, selfish interests to propagate.
Recognition of Aguinaldo as First President
The present generation should be made to understand that the decisions of our ancestors can no longer be disturbed. They have the right to choose who should lead them, and any attempt by the present generation to alter past events is a dishonor to their memory and a travesty to our heroes who sacrificed so much to gain the freedom we enjoy today.
Aguinaldo was elected as President four times, and his presidency was recognized and lasted from March 22, 1897, to March 23, 1901 – from Tejeros to Biak-na-Bato, to Hong Kong, to his return to the Philippines to renew the revolution, to Malolos, to the war against the Americans, to the mountains of Cordillera, unto Palanan, Isabela, where the Americans captured him.
President Aguinaldo is officially recognized as the first President of the Philippines. Isagani R. Medina, the editor of the book of Carlos Ronquillo entitled Ilang Talata Tungkol sa Paghihimagsik nang Taong 1896-1897, says that this was the position of authoritative government historical institutions, viz:
The stand of the National Historical Institute and National Committee on Historial Research of the National Commission for Culture and Arts in 1993 about the recognition of General Emilio Aguinaldo as the first President of the Philippine Republic (Haring bayang Katagalugan) and not Andres Bonifacio as President of Haring Bayan only proves that honor is given to the President of the Philippines who was the subject of innumerable slanderous accusations. It is the stand of both the National Research Institute and National Committee on Historical Research that we could no longer alter the events regarding the said killing by shooting of Andres Bonifacio, which was done through a death sentence handed down by a court process that Aguinaldo convened a hundred years ago. (Author’s translation of Tagalog text in Ronquillo, 8)
The following excerpts are some remarks that showcase Aguinaldo as the recognized first President of the Philippines: 1.
1. “Carrying out this resolution, he (Aguinaldo) soon raised a native force strong enough to invest Manila by land, while Dewey blockaded it with his warship. And, late in June, though without any official recognition from the Amerian admiral, the fiery Filipinos formally declared the islands free and independent and elected Aguinaldo as their first President.” (Bruce, Addington, “The Romance of the American Expansion,” Moffat Yard & Co., New York, 1909, p. 200)2. “. . . from the story of General Emilio Aguinaldo, the first President of the shortlived Philippine Republic, whose power as a dictator developed in the following manner.” (Diamonon, Victoriano D., “The Development of Self-Government in the Philippine Islands,” University of Iowa, 1920 p. 155)
3. “Aguinaldo, Emilio, Filipino general and statesman, first president of the Philippine Republic; his military gifts. . “ (Russell, Charles Edward, “The Hero of the Filipinos,” The Century Co., New York, and London, 1923, p. 383)
4. “A general assembly of revolutionary leaders was called for March 12, 1897 (sic), to form a provisional government. It is likely that Bonifacio expected he would be chosen first President of the Philippine Republic. Instead, young General Aguinaldo was elected President, and Mariano Trias VicePresident.” (Russell, Charles Edward, “The Outlook for the Philippines,” New York, 1922, p. 103)
5. “The Spaniards successfully defeated, Aguinaldo had without protest from the Americans proclaimed himself First President of the Philippine Republic, appointed the great officers of the State formed a National Assembly and levied a poll tax on the whole population throughout the islands. Further, his troops, which were officially declared to number 50,000, hemmed in Manila on every side with a chain of offensive outposts. The Americans, on the other hand, held only Manila and Cavite with 21,000 men and were, except in name, practically shut up in those places.” – (Younghusband, G.C., “The Philippines and Round About with some account of British Interest in these Waters,” McMillan & Co., Ltd., London & New York, 1899, p. 158)
1. Aguinaldo, Emilio: "Mga Gunita ng Himagsikan", National Centennial Commission and
Cavite Historical Society, Manila, 1998
4. Foreman F.R.G.S., John: "The Philippine Islands. A political, geographical, ethnographical, social and commercial history of the Philippine Archipelago and its political dependencies, embracing the whole period of Spanish rule," London: S. Low, Marston Co., ltd.,1899; http://name.umdl.umich.edu/AFJ2134.0001.001
8. Santos, Jose P.: "Buhay at Sinulat ni Emilio Jacinto," paunang salita ng Kkg. Rafael Palma, copyright by Dr. Jose P. Bantug, 1935, found in Modesto Castro’s book, “Pagsusulatan nang dalauang binibini na si Urbana at ni Feliza https://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/philamer/AQA1997.0001.001/126?rgn=full+text;view=i mage
9. Saulo, Alfredo B.: "Emilio Aguinaldo, Generalissimo and President of the First Philippine Republic -First in Asia," Phoenix Publishing House, Quezon City, 1983
