Was Bonifacio Cheated in the Tejeros Elections?

(This write-up is identical to the article with the same title found on pages 58-63 of the book entitled "The Filipino Tragedy and Other Historical Facts Every Filipino Should Know," published by the author.  The sources and references indicated here are contained on pages 402-415 of the book.)

The allegation that Bonifacio was cheated at the Tejeros elections is baseless and has no truth. Bonifacio lost the presidency and the vice presidency in a succession of nomination and votation and was eventually elected to the lowest position as Director of Interior, perhaps, a condescension, but more likely a manifestation of the kind of trust and confidence that the revolutionaries had in Bonifacio. Those elected to the higher positions had proven themselves in battle, and Bonifacio had not.

According to Aguinaldo:

"...the Magdiwangs really prepared for the Tejeros elections because the Magdalos were not aware of it being too engrossed with fighting at Dasmarinas and adjoining areas. They did not have any inkling about the plan to unify the forces of Magdiwang-Magdalo for the success of the struggle against the Spaniards under the leadership of General Jose Dominguez Lachambre. Bonifacio and Ricarte really set the election date at the time when the Magdalos had their hands full in the battle which explains why only eight delegates were able to attend from their group while the Magdiwangs had more than one hundred." (Author's translation of Tagalog text found in Ronquillo, 29)

[Author’s note: The original Tagalog text is as follows: "... talagang pinaghandaan ang halalang ito sa Tejeros ng mga Magdiwang, dahilan sa ito'y lingid sa kaalaman ng mga Magdalo na noo'y kasalukuyang nakikipaglaban sa Dasmarinas at mga kanugnog. Sila ay walang kamalay-malay sa balak na pag-iisa ng puwersa ng MagdiwangMagdalo para sa ikatatagumpay ng pakikipaglaban sa mga Kastila sa ilalim ng pamumuno ni Heneral Jose Dominguez Lachambre. Talagang itinaon nina Bonifacio at Ricarte ang petsa ng halalan dahilan sa abalang abala noon ang mga Magdalo sa pakikipaglaban kaya wawalo lamang sa kanila ang nakadalo samantalang "naroon sa teritoryo ng Magdiwang taglay ang kanilang mahigit sa isang daang tauhan nila." (Ronquillo, 29.)]

Note that Bonifacio was not a stranger in Cavite. His wife, Gregoria de Jesus Y Alvarez, is the daughter of Balarzara Alvarez Francisco, a niece of Mariano Alvarez (Ronquillo, 47 and 124), the head of the Katipunan Magdiwang council that controlled half of Cavite. Bonifacio was also accepted into the fold of the Magdiwang Council by being installed as the "Haring Bayan," relegating Alvarez, the traditional head, to the position of Vir Rey, or second in command (Ronquillo, 140).

That cheating was a scheme conceived and carried out by the Magdalos to favor Aguinaldo is so fallacious judging from the following facts:

 1.    Artemio Ricarte, also a Magdiwang and a close associate of Bonifacio, acted as secretary (Alvarez, 85; Corpuz, 120; May, 87);

 2.    Ricarte, acting as secretary, with the help of Daniel Tirona,  distributed the ballots and canvassed the results (Alvarez, 85; May 97);

 3.    The convention was held at the Hacienda house at Tejeros, San Francisco de Malabon, Cavite, a territory under the control and administration of the Magdiwang (Corpuz, 118;  Alvarez, 82);

 4.    The Magdalos were practically outnumbered in the convention, having sent only eight delegates, as they were manning the trenches against the Spanish offensive to retake their territory (Ronquillo, 29 and 33);

 5.    The convention was an initiative of the Magdiwang – Jacinto Lumbreras, a Magdiwang,  sent the invitations (Alvarez, 82-83; Corpuz, 119; May, 85; Richardson, 324) ; 

6.    Andres Bonifacio chaired the meeting after the convention was opened by Jacinto Lumbreras (Alvarez, 85; Corpuz, 120; May, 87);    

7.   Aguinaldo himself was unable to attend but elected president in absentia (Ronquillo, 33; Alvarez, 85; Corpuz, 121).  The results were Aguinaldo – 146 votes, Bonifacio -80, and Mariano Trias – 35 (May, 105; Ronquillo, 35). 

Aguinaldo could not have done any cheating because he was not present at the convention, and only eight representatives of the Magdalos were there.  It was the group of Bonifacio and the Magdiwangs who initiated and administered the elections, and they also constituted a significant majority.  Given the circumstances, cheating could not have been perpetrated by Aguinaldo or any of the Magdalos.

And then there was Diego Mojica, who whispered to Bonifacio about certain filled-up ballots, but Bonifacio ignored him (Alvarez, 85).  So the fair question is:  if there were filled-up ballots, according to Mojica,  was it not the proper thing to do for Bonifacio, as chairman of the convention, to stop the voting process so that he could initiate an investigation of the alleged filled-up ballots?  Why did he not investigate?  Is it possible that the names on the filled-up ballots were not in favor of  Aguinaldo, which explains why Bonifacio ignored Mojica?

Before he and his followers walked out, Bonifacio declared the convention and the elections held null and void, based on what he alleged was the failure to abide by the majority's will. He was, of course, referring to Daniel Tirona and questioning his qualifications for the position of Director of Interior. As convention chairman, Bonifacio could have called Tirona out of order, ignored Tirona’s motion to elect a new Director of Interior to replace him, and proceeded with the meeting.  Instead, he pulled out his revolver and attempted to shoot Tirona, who quickly lost himself among the crowd (Ronquillo, 54; Alvarez, 86; Corpuz, 121;).

At that point, Santiago Rillo, head of the Batangas delegation, asked Bonifacio to continue with the convention and accept his election, but he refused.  Rillo chastised him, saying:

“Sir, you have no right nor power to render null and void the election of our General Assembly. If you refuse to accept your election in the position or reconsider your decision to leave, I, Colonel Santiago 61 Rillo, with the consent of this assembly, am taking over your chairmanship to continue with the meeting.” (Author’s translation of Tagalog text in Ronquillo, 58)

After Bonifacio left, Rillo addressed the delegates, viz:

“Everybody knows . . . our loyalty to the founder of the Katipunan and Magdiwang; but if against all reason, the result of an election so thoroughly agreed upon between all is to be invalidated, we, the Batanguenos, will impose it by force, and we will do it alone if the sons of Cavite will not respect it.” (De Los Santos, 53)

The delegates from Central Luzon supported the position taken by Rillo.  As a result, he was granted the authority to take over the presidency of Bonifacio and preside over the convention.  This paved the way for confirming what had been agreed upon, namely, the establishment of the revolutionary government and the election of the officers. (May, 103) 

On the following day, Bonifacio changed his position. This time, he said there was cheating and that irregularities marred the election. His allegation was seconded by Artemio Ricarte, who claimed in a signed document that some ballots were already filled out when distributed, glossing over the fact that Ricarte himself was the secretary of the convention tasked with the responsibility of distributing ballots and collecting and canvassing of the votes. 

Bonifacio caused the issuance of a document called the "Acta de Tejeros,” signed by more than forty Magdiwang leaders, to formalize his accusation of cheating. The document demanded the resignation of the elected officials of the new government (Richardson, 320-337; May, 98; Ronquillo, 69; Delos Santos, 46-47). Then, he called the Magdalo council's head to present his demands. Still, the Magdalos refused to give in. They countered that the elections were conducted fairly and honestly and validated by the majority of the delegates who remained in the assembly after Bonifacio and his followers walked out (Ronquillo, 66; May, 108).

But Bonifacio did not stop there. He took another step further. He and the Magdiwang officials and two of Aguinaldo's generals launched a coup d'etat aimed at unseating all the elected officials by force, written in a document called "Acta de Naic" (Richardson, 355-377; Delos Santos, 47; Ronquillo, 104-112). Fortunately, the plot of Bonifacio came to Aguinaldo’s knowledge, who proceeded to the meeting place and confronted the coup plotters.  After Aguinaldo found and released the Magdalo soldiers, who were held captive by Bonifacio, the coup plotters fled in a rush in each one’s separate ways. 

Unfazed by the failure of his declaration that the election was null and void and the futile results of his two actas, Bonifacio continued to defy the revolutionary government.  He and his men left Naic and set up fortifications in Limbon,  raided the town of Indang to obtain provisions, and exchanged fire with government soldiers (Corpuz, 124; Alvarez, 95; Kalaw-Teodoro[Court-Martial], 4-5). He also designated Emilio Jacinto as the head of the Haring Bayan army north of Manila.  Ultimately,  Aguinaldo ordered Bonifacio's arrest. He was court-martialled, found guilty of treason, and sentenced to death.

Looking back, what could have been the reason why Bonifacio and the Magdiwangs initiated the convention at Tejeros?

Recall that in the meeting at Balintawak on August 24, 1896, Bonifacio appointed Mariano Alvarez of the Magdiwang council as the overall leader of the combined forces of the Magdiwang and the Magdalo in the province of Cavite (Ronquillo, 138). However, it came to pass that after three months, Alvarez had not assumed the position, and the two Cavite councils remained independent and continued to operate separately.

And then came the invitation for Bonifacio to visit Cavite. It was Alvarez who sent the invitation. He said he wanted Bonifacio to go to Cavite to see for himself the success of the revolution in the province. It is vital to take cognizance of the purpose of Bonifacio's visit carefully. Cavite was then a showcase, and the Magdiwangs wanted to impress Bonifacio with their success.   The purpose of his visit to Cavite was not mediation between the two divided councils, as claimed by many historians. In reply, Bonifacio regretted that he could not go to Cavite yet because they had not taken even a single town they could use for assembly or defense.  Later, in accepting the invitation, Bonifacio said he wanted to “exchange fraternal embrace with the brethren and see for himself the new developments that could further promote the revolution;” and that he would not stay long and would not interfere with the affairs of the two councils (Corpuz, 96; Alvarez, 66-67).  But this was not so. Bonifacio stayed longer than was necessary and interfered with the internal affairs of the two councils.

What could have prompted Bonifacio to change his plans during his visit? A document or account has yet to surface that will explain his change of plans.  The author believes that Bonifacio changed his plans at the prodding of Alvarez, who wanted his appointment as head of the combined forces of the Magdiwang-Magdalo councils implemented. It is very probable that between the two, they contrived the idea of a convention that would seat Bonifacio as president of a new government and, at the same time, install Alvarez as the head of the combined Magdiwang-Magdalo forces. They were perhaps too confident that the election results would be favorable to them because Bonifacio was still the recognized Supremo of the Katipunan, and his election would have favored Alvarez over Aguinaldo's leadership of Cavite.

Unfortunately, Bonifacio failed to realize that the revolution in Cavite was no longer a monopoly of the Katipunan.  Instead, many people who were not Katipunan initiates joined the cause.  Bonifacio must have failed to recognize that his prestige as Supremo of the Katipunan had waned because of reports of his dismal performance during the August 1896 uprising in Manila. The Katipuneros, who fought with Bonifacio and sought refuge in Cavite with their families, helped spread stories about this failed Manila attack. And it was already known in Cavite that Bonifacio could not be located because he moved from one hiding place to another to evade capture by the Spaniards and had not taken over a town he could use for his headquarters. These factors contributed to the erosion of Bonifacio's prestige as a capable leader. Unsurprisingly, the Tejeros elections turned against him, which he violently refused to accept. His defeat and eventual downfall were, therefore, his undoing.