The Controversial Pratt-Aguinaldo Agreement

(This write-up is identical to the article with the same title found on pages 129-141 of the book entitled "The Filipino Tragedy and Other Historical Facts Every Filipino Should Know," published by the author. The sources and references indicated here are contained on pages 402-415 of the book.)

The American involvement in the Philippines was initiated by then Commodore George Dewey while the American Asiatic fleet was anchored in Mirs Bay in China near Hongkong in March 1898,  awaiting orders,  in anticipation of the declaration of war against Spain (war was declared on April 24, 1898). At that time also, Emilio Aguinaldo and several leaders of the revolution of 1896-1897 were residing in Hongkong as exiles, in compliance with the provisions of the Pact of Biak-na-bato.

The First Meeting with Aguinaldo

According to Aguinaldo, the commander of the U.S.S. Petrel, Captain Wood, acting as an emissary of Dewey, called on him on March 16, 1898, to urge him to return to the Philippines, to renew hostilities against the Spaniards, with the object of gaining independence. He was assured of American assistance in terms of armaments and supplies, and protection of the U.S. fleet.  Another meeting on the subject was held on the 6th of April. (Aguinaldo[True Version], 6)

When asked by Aguinaldo what the United States would concede to the Filipinos, the Commander replied: “The United States is a great and rich nation and needs no colonies.” (Aguinaldo[True Version], 7)

The series of meetings was interrupted because Aguinaldo had to leave Hongkong to escape the suit filed by Isabelo Artacho on April 15, 1898, for the division of the money that Aguinaldo deposited in two Hongkong banks, which was paid by the Spaniards in consideration of the peace pact of Biak-na-bato.

Aguinaldo left Hongkong on the 7th of April for Saigon and proceeded to Singapore, traveling incognito to evade Spanish spies who were tracking his whereabouts. He was accompanied by Gregorio del Pilar and Jose Leyba. The group arrived in Singapore on the 21st of April. They stayed in the house of a Filipino resident dentist by the name of Dr. Marcelino Santos.

The Meeting in Singapore

The American Consul-General in Singapore, Edward Spencer-Pratt, was alerted by Admiral Dewey of Aguinaldo’s arrival. That same day Aguinaldo received a visitor, Howard W. Bray, an Englishman, a long-time resident of the Philippines, who left his business and property in the islands to escape the Spanish misrule. He was known to Aguinaldo in the Philippines as a family friend. Bray made the arrangement for Mr. Pratt and Aguinaldo to meet at “The Mansions” on River Valley Road in April 24th. Also present during the meeting were Mr. Bray, Dr. Santos, Gregorio del Pilar, and Jose Leyba.  A second meeting was held at Raffles Hotel the day after.

According to Aguinaldo, Consul Pratt told him:

“That the United States would at least recognize the Independence of the Philippines under the protection of the United States Navy. The Consul added that there was no necessity for entering into a formal written agreement because the word of the Admiral and of the United States Consul were in fact equivalent to the most solemn pledge that their verbal promises and assurance would be fulfilled to the letter and were not to be classed with Spanish promises or Spanish ideas of a man's word of honour. In conclusion the Consul said, “The Government of North America is very honest, just, and powerful government.” (Aguinaldo[True Version], 10)

On the 28th of April, Mr. Pratt telegrammed Washington, viz:

“On the evening of Saturday, the 23rd instant, I was confidentially informed of the arrival here, incognito, of the supreme leader of the Philippine insurgents, General Emilio Aguinaldo, by Mr. Howard W. Bray, an English gentleman of high standing, who, after fifteen years residence as a merchant and planter in the Philippines, had been compelled by the disturbed condition of things resulting from Spanish misrule to abandon his property and leave there, and from whom I had previously obtained much valuable information for Commodore Dewey regarding fortifications, coal deposits, etc., at different points in the islands.

“Being aware of the great prestige of General Aguinaldo with the insurgents, and that no one, either at home or abroad, could exert over them the same influence and control that he could, I determined at once to see him, and, at my request, a secret interview was accordingly arranged for the following morning, Sunday, the 24th, in which, besides General Aguinaldo, were only present the general’s trusted advisers and Mr. Bray, who acted as interpreter…. I telegraphed the commodore the same day as follows, through our consul-general at Hongkong:

“Aguinaldo, insurgent leader, here. Will come Hongkong. Arrange with commodore for general cooperation insurgents Manila if desired.

Telegraph. Pratt.”

The commodore’s reply reading thus:

“Tell Aguinaldo come soon as possible. Dewey.”

I received it late that night, and at once communicated it to General Aguinaldo, whom, with his aide-de-camp and private secretary, all under assumed names, I succeeded in getting off by the British steamer Malacca, which left here on Tuesday, the 26th.

“E. Spencer Pratt,

U.S. Consul-General at Singapore.” (Robinson, 42-43, citing U.S. Senate Document No. 62, Part I, Fifty-fifth Congress, Third Session, Despatch 212)

The meeting between Aguinaldo and Consul Pratt was big news in Singapore. The Singapore Free Press published an article on May 4, 1898, citing the historic event and the agreement of cooperation between Aguinaldo and Dewey, detailing the policy of Aguinaldo in collaborating with the Americans, as follows:

“General Aguinaldo’s policy embraces the independence of the Philippines, whose internal affairs would be controlled under European and American advisers. American protection would be desirable temporarily, on the same lines as that which might be instituted hereafter in Cuba. The ports of the Philippines would be free to the trade of the world, safeguards being enacted against an influx of Chinese aliens who would compete with the industrious population of the country. There would be a complete reform of the present corrupt judicature of the country under experienced European law officers. Entire freedom of the press would be established, as well as the right of public meeting. There would be general religious toleration and steps would be taken for the abolition and expulsion of the tyrannical religious fraternities who have laid such strong hands on every branch of civil administration. Full provision would be given for the exploration of the natural resources and wealth of the country by roads and railways, and the removal of hindrances to enterprise and investment of capital. Spanish officials would be removed to a place of safety until opportunity offered to return them to Spain. The preservation of public safety and order and the checking of reprisals against Spaniards would, naturally, have to be a first care of the Government in the new state of things.” (The Singapore Free Press, May 4, 1898, p. 3)

Consul Pratt did not question the publishers of the newspaper about the items of commitments mentioned in the article, more particularly, on the subject of independence. He even sent clippings of the newspaper to Washington.

The Filipino Serenade of Pratt

On or about three weeks after the Pratt-Aguinaldo meeting, the Filipino community in Singapore led by Dr. Marcelino Santos serenaded Consul-General Pratt at his residence. In his message of congratulation and expression of gratitude  Dr. Santos said this:

“Our countrymen at home, and those of us residing here, refugees from Spanish misrule and tyranny in our beloved native land, hope that the United States, your nation, persevering in its humane policy, will efficaciously second the programme arranged between you, Sir, and General Aguinaldo in this port of Singapore, and secure to us our independence under the protection of the United States.” ((Singapore[Pratt and Philippinos], 3, emphasis supplied)

Consul Pratt gave this reply:

“Gentlemen, the honour you have conferred upon me is so unexpected that I cannot find appropriate words with which to thank you, with which to reply to the eloquent address you have just read to me. Rest assured, however, that I fully understand and sincerely appreciate the motives that have prompted your present action, and that your words, which have sunk deep in my heart, shall be faithfully repeated to the President, to Admiral Dewey, and to the American people, from whom I am sure that they will meet with full and generous response.”

The Filipino side was clear in their attestation of independence.  Again, there was no qualification from the side of Mr. Pratt, nor a comment about the matter of independence.  Mr. Pratt's reaction can only be interpreted as acquiescence that that was the arrangement with Aguinaldo, which the Consul later denied.

Aguinaldo Back in Hongkong

Aguinaldo and his two aides returned to Hongkong on the 1st of May but he was unable to meet with Commodore Dewey because the Asiatic fleet had already sailed for Manila. In the meantime, Aguinaldo received an invitation from Consul Rounsevelle Wildman to meet at the U.S. Consulate. In this meeting, he was told that Commodore Dewey had made arrangements for a gunboat to take him across to the Philippines. They also agreed on the matter of purchase and shipment of arms to the islands. The sum of $50,000 was handed to Consul Wildman which was used to purchase a steam launch, 2,000 rifles, and 200,000 rounds of ammunition. (Aguinaldo[True Version], 14)

On the same day, a meeting of the Filipino junta was immediately convened with the following in attendance: Felipe Agoncillo, Mariano Llanera, Miguel Malvar, Andres Garchitorena, Severo Buenaventura, Anastasio Francisco, Teodoro Sandico, Maximo Kabigting, Faustino Lichauco, Antonio Montenegro, and Doroteo Lopez. The issue to resolve was the insistence of Aguinaldo that it would be reckless to go to the Philippines in the absence of a written agreement with Admiral Dewey.

Agoncillo recommended that Aguinaldo should go home because of the “advantages which would come to the Philippines if the president (Aguinaldo) should go there in the present critical circumstances and the great injury could which was sure to be done if his departure was postponed any longer”. It was also the consensus that if Washington was true to the fundamental principles of its constitution, “there was no doubt that it would not attempt to colonize the Philippines, or even to annex them.” In any case, “the President with his prestige in the Philippines would be able to arouse those masses to combat the demands of the United States if they colonized that country, and would drive them, if circumstances rendered it necessary, to a Titanic struggle for their independence, even if they should succumb in shaking off the yoke of a new oppressor.” (Taylor[I], 505-510)

Thus, the proposal to send Aguinaldo home to renew the revolution was approved by the Junta which paved the way for the return of Aguinaldo to the Philippines.

Aguinaldo’s Return to the Philippines

On the 17th of May, the U.S. gunboat McCulloch left Hongkong with Aguinaldo on board and arrived off Cavite on the 19th of May. A steam launch came alongside the gunboat to fetch Aguinaldo and a companion, Mr. Leyba, for a meeting with Commodore Dewey abroad the flagship Olympia.

Aguinaldo narrated the meeting with Admiral Dewey (promoted after his victory on May 1, 1898, over the Spanish armada) as follows:

“The Admiral ushered me into his private quarters, and after the exchange of the usual greetings I asked whether it was true that he had sent all the telegrams to the Consul at Singapore, Mr. Pratt, which that gentleman had told me he received in regard to myself. The Admiral replied in the affirmative, adding that the United States had come to the Philippines to protect the natives and free them from the yoke of Spain. He said, moreover, that America is exceedingly well off as regards territory, revenue, and resources and therefore needs no colonies, assuring me finally that there was no occasion for me to entertain any doubts whatever about the recognition of the Independence of the Philippines by the United States. Then Admiral Dewey asked me if I could induce the people to rise against the Spaniards and make a short, sharp, and decisive campaign of it.

“I said in reply that events would speak for themselves, but while a certain arms expedition … was delayed in China we could do nothing, because without arms every victory would assuredly cost us the lives of many brave and dashing Filipino warriors. The Admiral thereupon offered to dispatch a steamer to hurry up the expedition. Then he at once placed at my disposal all the guns seized on board the Spanish warships as well as 62 Mausers and a good many rounds of ammunition which had been brought from Corregidor Island by the U.S.S. Petrel.” (Aguinaldo[True Version], 16-17)

Aguinaldo immediately set himself to organize an army. In less than a month he liberated the province of Cavite, defeated the Spaniards, declared independence, laid siege on the city awaiting its surrender, and established a republican government in September of 1898.

In the June 30, 1898 issue of the Singapore Free Press, it is mentioned that Consul Pratt of Singapore received a letter from Aguinaldo dated June 11th. The letter gave an update on the progress of the campaign – the victory of the insurgents in Cavite. It also mentioned that Filipino forces were less than a mile from the old walled city and that the Spanish forces were now surrounded. The letter was sealed with General Aguinaldo’s official seal, a representation of the rising sun, surrounded by the phrase “Gobierno Dictatorial Filipinas.” (Singapore Free Press, June 30, 1898 issue, p. 5)

Official U.S. Government Position

Consul Pratt did not reply to Aguinaldo’s letter. Perhaps he did not want to have anything further to do with him because on or about June 16, 1898, he received an admonishment from Washington that he should not attempt to commit the U.S. government in his dealings with Aguinaldo. The cable reads:

“It is assumed that you did not attempt to commit this government to any alliance with the Philippine insurgents. To obtain the unconditional personal assistance of General Aguinaldo in the expedition to Manila was proper if in so doing he was not induced to form hopes which it might not be practicable to gratify … If, in the course of your conferences with Aguinaldo, you acted upon the assumption that this government would cooperate with him for the furtherance of any plan of his own, or that, in accepting his cooperation, it would consider itself pledged to recognize political claims which he may put forward, your action was unauthorized and cannot be approved.” (Robinson, 46)

The above cablegram lays out the official position of the U.S. government. However, Pratt did not mention this to Aguinaldo, who continued to entertain the idea that the Americans would recognize Philippine independence once the Spaniards were driven out of the islands through the combined efforts of Aguinaldo’s army and the American navy.

Washington’s warning was not also sent to Admiral Dewey, perhaps in deference to the sensibilities of the hero of the naval battle of Manila Bay. Or, if he was similarly advised, he did not communicate the position of the United States government to Aguinaldo. And so, Aguinaldo was unaware that the United States government did not wish to have any dealings with him although he did not suspect that such was the policy from the American military and consular officials who continued to deal with him.

Meanwhile, Aguinaldo was busy fighting the Spaniards. The American Navy that had recently destroyed the Spanish armada laid anchor in Manila Bay, blockading the islands against any possible Spanish reinforcement from Madrid. There were no American land troops present at the time because the American army was still recruiting volunteer soldiers to be sent to the islands.

As the Filipinos were taking significant steps to establish their government, the administration of President William McKinley and its representatives on the islands were silent about American intentions. Aguinaldo was never told that he was only supposed to defeat the Spaniards and that his duty was to hand over the country to the Americans. Thus, Aguinaldo continued to entertain the idea that the Americans were standing by their commitment in Singapore and that they would recognize the independence of the Philippines.

When a large contingent of American troops arrived, Aguinaldo was still trusting in the supposed promise of the Americans. He willingly gave away large Filipino encampments to house new American troop arrivals and provided them with the supplies that they requested. However, after the Treaty of Paris was signed and McKinley had issued a proclamation requiring all Filipinos to submit to American rule, Aguinaldo protested. However, the Americans ignored his protest, and war broke out on February 4, 1899, which influenced the wavering United States Senate to ratify the Treaty of Paris that sealed the fate of the Philippines.

The John Foreman Book Injunction

The controversial agreement between Consul Pratt and Aguinaldo broke into international limelight after John Foreman F.R.G.S, (Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society), a British historian, published his book, “The Philippine Islands” in 1899.

Pages 567-568 of the book contain what purportedly was the draft of the agreement between Consul Pratt and Aguinaldo in Singapore. The alleged draft agreement provided for the proclamation of Philippine independence, the establishment of a federal republic, and other provisions relating to commerce and investments and control and protection of foreign nationals.

The purported agreement was essentially identical to Aguinaldo’s stated policy which was contained in the article published in the May 4, 1898 issue of the Singapore Free Press that covered the meeting between Consul Pratt and Aguinaldo as previously mentioned. The Foreman book confirmed that there was indeed an agreement between Pratt and Aguinaldo to the effect that the independence of the Philippines was the underlying factor in Aguinaldo’s decision to cooperate with Dewey. And that this draft agreement needed only the signature of Dewey and confirmation by President William McKinley.

Consul Spencer Pratt was about to be retired from service when the Foreman book was published in 1899. After getting hold of a copy of the book, Pratt filed an injunction against the publishers, Kelly and Walsh, to prevent the publication and circulation of the book.

During the consideration of the case, the judge concluded that the contents of the book cited in the suit were not only false and defamatory but a prima facie case of libel. However, a compromise agreement was reached wherein the libel case was dropped but the injunction was ordered on the publishers, “perpetually restraining the defendants from selling, circulating, or distributing, or causing to be sold, circulated, or distributed any copies of the “The Philippine Islands”. (Newspaper Article - MR SPENCER-PRATT AND AGUINALDO., Straits Budget, 23 June 1899, Page 16 (nlb.gov.sg))

Interestingly, in the reprint of the third edition of John Foreman’s book that was published in Manila in 1980 by the Filipiniana Book Guild, the same incident was mentioned in the preface, viz:

“The first edition of his book originally appeared in 1890 printed by the firm of Kelly & Walsh of Hongkong and reprinted two years later in London. A second edition, revised and enlarged, was issued in 1899, and this has an interesting story. In the first impression of the edition, there appeared certain statements in regard to the relations of Edward Spencer Pratt, the United States Consul-General in Singapore, with General Emilio Aguinaldo which were objected to by that consular official. Pratt brought court action against the publishers of the book, won the case and its Shanghai publisher fined and ordered to withdraw from sale all copies of the book. As a result of the case, the author deleted the materials objected to pages 567 and 568 in the first impression-necessitating the issuance of a second impression without the offending statements. It seems that the offending passage attributed to Pratt statements that he had inveigled Aguinaldo into returning to Manila to collaborate with Commodore Dewey on the consul's assurance that the United States would allow the Filipinos to gain their independence. T. H. Pardo de Tavera, creole scholar in his Biblioteca Filipina, believed that it was Consul Rounsevelle Wildman of Hongkong who deceived Aguinaldo and who claimed that Foreman's documents "were false and a calumny on the American government." Significantly, the names of Pratt and Wildman do not appear in the 1906 edition. Pardo also believed that Foreman later took the vows of a priest in the Augustinian convent in Mexico.” (Foreman, xi-xii)

The denial

While in retirement, ex-Consul Spencer Pratt denied he made any promise of independence to Aguinaldo. However, in his affidavit supporting his complaint against the publishers of the book “The Philippines,” he admitted that he refrained from questioning the article in the Singapore press on May 4 and 5, 1898, containing Aguinaldo’s independence policy that was purportedly among the items agreed upon in his meeting with Aguinaldo. If Mr. Pratt did not seek clarification on the truthfulness of the article's contents in the Singapore press, Pratt probably agreed with it. But after Pratt received the reprimand from Washington, he changed his position to one of denial.

Admiral Dewey similarly denied he made any promises to Aguinaldo. In an interview with the Frisco Examiner, Dewey gave this statement:

“I never in any way promised Aguinaldo anything, nor have I given him the slightest recognition as an ally, I was importuned by the American consul at Hongkong and by several others to allow Aguinaldo and several of his leaders to come to Cavite on one of my dispatch boats. My first reply was decidedly in the negative, and afterward, thinking that he might be of use in harassing the enemy, I gave my consent, which allowed the insurgent General and eleven of his people to come down here on the Zafiro (McCullough?).”(Singapore[Aguinaldo’s], 11)

Admiral Dewey's position on the subject of Aguinaldo's independence policy was in line with the position of the consular officials who Washington reprimanded. But it is undeniable that Dewey initiated the first contact with Aguinaldo when he sent Captain Wood to confer with Aguinaldo on March 16, 1898. Dewey was also instrumental in inviting Aguinaldo to return to Hongkong from Singapore to discuss a collaboration arrangement.

Dewey did not question Aguinaldo’s declaration of Philippine independence on June 12, 1898, although he did not accept the invitation to come as a guest. On Dewey’s order, Aguinaldo and his comrades were brought back to the Philippines on board his dispatch boat, and he supplied them with the initial cache of arms. Dewey allowed the free passage of arms and ammunition purchased in China and delivered to the Philippines through arrangements made by no less the Consul-General of Hongkong, Mr. Rounsevell Wildman. He also allowed the Filipino flag to fly in buildings and ships of the small nascent Filipino navy.

During the Subic incident, when the Filipino gunship, Filipinas, bombarded the Spanish fort and the Spaniards raised the flag of surrender, the German ship Irene challenged the Filipinas. After Aguinaldo told Dewey what happened, Dewey sent Raleigh and Concord's gunboats to go after Irene, who fled. The Americans accepted the surrender of the Spanish fort, and Dewey handed over the 500 prisoners to Aguinaldo.

While it was the official policy of the U.S. government not to deal with Aguinaldo, and the fact that the American military and consular officials were not authorized to enter into any political agreement with him, Washington should have advised their representatives to make the policy known to Aguinaldo so that he was forewarned of the change in arrangements. The fact that he was kept uninformed of the policy, which he only inferred from military actions of American intention to annex the Philippines, the behavior of the Americans was deceitful, if not treacherous.

In defense of Aguinaldo, Howard W. Bray said this:

“I have known the Philippines intimately for 17 years, probably better and more thoroughly than most people, and I must confess I was surprised at this unstinted and unselfish devotion, which I submit is indeed a charming trait in the character of these much-maligned people, against whom the “free people’ of the United States are committing one of the greatest crimes in history, in the name of what McKinley with Methodistical cant and revolting hypocrisy terms “benevolent assimilation.” (Singapore[True account], 14, emphasis supplied)

Similarly, the American Consul in Hongkong, Mr. Rounsevelle Wildman, who was also relieved of his post, was more sympathetic to the Filipinos when he said:

“I wish to put myself on record as stating that the insurgent government of the Philippines cannot be dealt with as though they were North American Indians, willing to be removed from one reservation to another at the whim of their masters. If the United States decides not to retain the Philippine islands its 10,000,000 people will demand independence, and the attempt of any foreign nation to obtain territory or coaling stations will be resisted with the same spirit which they fought the Spaniards.” (Singapore[American], 10)

In a letter to the Chicago Record of May 13, 1899, U.S. General Charles King, writing of the Filipinos then, said:

“The situation was a strange one. We were allies at the start, and became enemies through force of circumstances.” (Van Meter, 236)

Given these considerations, to say there was no alliance and there was no promise of recognition of Philippine independence is ludicrous.

The Two Faces of Apolinario Mabini

(This write-up is identical to the article with the same title found on pages 227-232 of the book entitled "The Filipino Tragedy and Other Historical Facts Every Filipino Should Know," published by the author. The sources and references indicated here are contained on pages 402-415 of the book.)

At a closer look, there were two Apolinario Mabini's.  The first was the Mabini before the Americans exiled him to Guam, and the second was the Mabini who returned from exile.  The first Mabini was pro-Aguinaldo, but the second Mabini was anti-Aguinaldo.  The first Mabini was in favor of the execution of Bonifacio, but the second Mabini criticized Aguinaldo saying his greed for power caused Bonifacio’s death. 

These are conflicting views of the same person.  How could a reputed intellectual and so-called “brain of the revolution” entertain opposing opinions at the same time without reconciling them?  How could this happen? What could have caused the change?

No one knows what happened to Mabini during his exile.  He was in Guam with Artemio Ricarte, a loyal supporter of Andres Bonifacio. Was Ricarte possibly instrumental in converting the first Mabini to the second Mabini?  Were the Americans involved in his conversion? Did the Americans allow Mabini to return from exile in exchange for favors he had to pay in exchange? Hopefully, new historical facts would shed light on this mystery.  Meanwhile, everyone should know that the attacks by Mabini on Aguinaldo was made through the former’s book,  “La Revolucion Filipina,” which the second Mabini wrote while in exile in Guam.

In his criticism of Aguinaldo regarding the case of Andres Bonifacio, the second Mabini says in his book, viz:

“The death of Andres Bonifacio had plainly shown in Mr. Aguinaldo a boundless appetite for power.” (Mabini, 62-63)

However, back in June 1898, after the declaration of Philippine independence, when Aguinaldo appointed the first Mabini as an adviser,  he decried the cold treatment accorded to Bonifacio, saying that if it happened to him (Mabini), he would have immediately applied summary judgment (Juicio Sumaresimo) or shot without the benefit of trial on Bonifacio and his companions. (Ronquillo, 27)

In the case of the killing of General Antonio Luna, the second Mabini attacks Aguinaldo in his book, viz:

“…instead of killing Luna (allowing Luna to be killed),  had supported him with all his power, the Revolution would have triumphed, would be presumption indeed, but I have not the least doubt that the Americans would have had a higher regard for the courage and military abilities of the Filipinos. ….the Revolution failed because it was badly led; because its leader won his post by reprehensible rather than meritorious acts; because instead of supporting the men most useful to the people, he made them useless out of jealousy. Identifying the aggrandizement of the people with his own men, he judged the worth of men not by their ability, character, and patriotism but rather by their degree of friendship and kinship with him; and, anxious to secure the readiness of his favorites to sacrifice themselves for him, he was tolerant of their transgressions.  Because he thus neglected by people, the people forsook him; and forsaken by the people, he was bound to fall like a waxen idol melting in the heat of adversity.  God grant we do not forget such a terrible lesson, learnt at the cost of untold suffering.” (Mabini, 63)

And yet, back in December 1898, when Aguinaldo caused the printing of an appeal to his Filipino brothers to allow him to retire and be replaced by someone educated and more capable, it was the first Mabini who secretly ordered the seizure and burning of Aguinaldo’s resignation letter knowing its adverse effect at a time when the fate of the revolutionary government was hanging in the balance. (Saulo, 285).

The first Mabini was also very critical of General Antonio Luna.  In the book of  Jose P. Santos titled  “Si Apolinario Mabini Laban Kay Heneral Antonio Luna” (Apolinario Mabini Against General Antonio Luna),  the first Mabini secretly wrote President Emilio Aguinaldo expressing his hatred and hidden resentment against General Antonio Luna. He called Luna a despot, issuing orders to kill without trial.  He accused Luna of not understanding the limitations of his position in the army and interfering in government administration. The first Mabini even went as far as secretly recommending Luna's replacement.

 

And yet, the second Mabini praised Luna, he says in his book:

 

“All of Luna’s acts revealed integrity and patriotism combined with a zealous activity that measured up to the situation.  If he was sometimes hasty and even cruel in his decisions, it was because the army was in a desperate position due to the demoralization of the troops and the lack of munitions; only acts of daring and extraordinary energy could prevent its disintegration.” (Mabini, 62)

 

But when Luna was killed, the first Mabini wrote his friend, Galicano Apacible, telling him that losing Luna was beneficial because it prevented the coming of the threatening upheaval.  The first Mabini even said that Luna was mistaken in perceiving Aguinaldo as a weakling like a mannequin because, knowing Aguinaldo,  he said if by chance Luna's plan materialized, there would have been a fragmentation that would be the end of all.

In all these conflicting narrations of the two Mabini's about the characters of Luna and  Aguinaldo, which should be believed and considered the truthful one?

 

According to Santos, the first Mabini’s opinion about the actions of Luna in his letter to Apacible should prevail.  It could also be mentioned that the secret letters of the first Mabini to Aguinaldo will also stay over the praises the second Mabini gave Luna in the book he has written for public consumption. Santos should be right because words said to one's intimate friends (or kaututang dila, as the Tagalogs say) are closest to one's heart as compared to statements prepared for the public or for a big audience to hear or know.

It is also mentioned by Gregoria de Jesus  (Oryang), the widow of Supremo Andres Bonifacio, in her opening lines in the book of Santos that Mabini should not be considered the “brains of the revolution” (that title should belong to Emilio Jacinto - Author) because  Mabini was a late-joiner of the revolution. Oryang further expounded that the food was already cooked and served on the table when Mabini came; he tasted it and feasted it (Santos, 9). 

So, here is the question: if, in the perception of  Mabini, both Luna and Aguinaldo were bad, who should then be considered good? The answer, perhaps, will not be far from what can be gleaned from the short narration of Oryang about Mabini. She said:

I remember when we once visited him (Mabini) I, Bonifacio and Emilio Jacinto, were together with others. While we were walking on our way home, I heard Emilio Jacinto say to Andres Bonifacio: 'This Mabini is weird, criticizing Rizal which he should not say in front of us,  to which,  Bonifacio replied, ‘That's true, but Mabini wanted to show us he was greater than Rizal’, and the two had a good laugh. (Author’s translation of Tagalog text in Santos, 9)  

Here is the author’s translation of the Tagalog text of the third section of Jose Santos's book dealing with the supposed contradiction in Mabini’s position on Aguinaldo and Luna, viz:

Who would say that Mabini, the famous paralytic and recognized as the brains of the revolution had two contradicting opinions? 

If this was merely told to the writer of this book I might not believe it at once.  But that is the truth.  I have the evidence with me, that is why I do not have to hesitate.

In his widely circulated book,  La Revolucion Filipina which he wrote in Spanish in Guam and also translated into English, he severely criticized Aguinaldo with very bitter accusations.  Let me read to you Chapter X of the English version, viz:

Andres Bonifacio’s death had plainly shown Mr. Aguinaldo’s immeasurable ambition for power, and the use of clever intrigues by the personal enemies of  Luna to exploit this weakness to ruin him.  If Aguinaldo, instead of killing Luna, had supported him with all his might, it should be too much presumption to say that the revolution would have triumphed; but I have not the least doubt that the Americans would have had a higher idea of the courage and military capacity of the Filipinos.  If Luna were living, I am certain that the death blow given by General Otis would have been checked or at least avoided in time, and Aguinaldo’s incapacity in the military command would not have been demonstrated.  Moreover, to get rid of Luna, Aguinaldo availed himself of the same soldiers the former had punished for breach of discipline; then Aguinaldo killed the discipline, destroying his army.  With Luna its firmest support, the revolution fell, and the ignominy of the fall, weighing entirely upon Aguinaldo, caused his moral death, a thousand times bitterer than the physical one; then Aguinaldo ruined himself, condemned by his actions.  That is why Providence punishes the great crimes. 

In this opinion of Mabini, it is clear that he regrets the death of Luna.  That is for one work that he wrote which he wanted many people to read.  But in solitude, in one letter he wrote to Mr. Galicano Apacible, who was formerly the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and a close friend of Mabini, who was then in Hongkong, he had a different perception of the death of Luna.  Let me read the third paragraph of his long letter which was written in Rosales on July 25, 1899, and this is what he said: 

“… while I regret and disapprove of the violent death of Luna, his disappearance banished a menacing danger.  Luna aspired a great deal,  convinced perhaps that he was better educated than Puno (Aguinaldo); and if he had not done anything, it was because he had not yet acquired the necessary prestige to put himself face to face with Puno.  It was for this reason that he aspired to the presidency of the Council as Secretary of War.  The confidence that Puno had in him contributed a great deal to feed his ambition; for since Puno (Aguinaldo) gave him a free hand, he thought that he could manage the president as an automaton.  But as I know Puno (Aguinaldo) it would not be a risky thing to suppose that if Luna had secured what he wanted there would have occurred a division which would have annihilated us.” 

Given the two contradictory opinions of Mabini, it does not come as a surprise that there would be hesitancy in accepting which one should be taken as true: whether it should be the one which is intended for the public, or the one that he purposely wrote in confidence 

This is again another complicated puzzle that had to be referred to the famous oracle, Lola Basiang. (Author’s translation of Tagalog text in Santos, 23-26) 

[Author’s note: Lola Basiang was the namesake of the anchor of  a defunct popular radio program where listeners from across the islands could get answers through broadcast on practically anything.]