(This write-up is identical to the article with the same title found on pages 64-80 of the book entitled "The Filipino Tragedy and Other Historical Facts Every Filipino Should Know," published by the author. The sources and references indicated here are contained on pages 402-415 of the book.)
The Katipunan, more popularly known by its initials KKK (Kataastaasang Kagalangalang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan), was wracked by leadership crises from inception in 1892 up to the time it was replaced by the Revolutionary government in 1897.
The Katipunan was established in July 1892, when Dr. Jose Rizal was banished to exile in Dapitan. In October of that year, an election was held, and the following constituted the first Supreme Council and officers:
Deodato Arellano – President
Andres Bonifacio – Secretary
Valentin Diaz – Treasurer
Ladislao Diwa, Teodoro Plata, and Briccio Pantas – Councilors
Arellano was the brother-in-law of Marcelo H. Del Pilar, having married his sister Hilaria (Yayang). His election as the first President of Katipunan must have been in deference to Del Pilar, who is credited with having inspired the organization of the Katipunan.
On the involvement of Marcelo H. Del Pilar, St. Clair writes:
“…Marcelo H. del Pilar, from Madrid, in July 1892, advised the creation of another association, which was to be similar thereto (La Liga Filipina), but which was to include the agricultural laborers and persons of little or no education, but who directed in the localities by the caciques and chiefs, were to form an enormous nucleus which should, at the proper time, give forth the cry of rebellion. He (Pilar) provided minute instructions concerning the organization and forwarded a project of regulations. Deodato Arellano (brother-in-law of Marcelo) Andres Bonifacio, Ladislao Diwa, and Teodoro Plata were those commissioned to carry into practice the project of Pilar; they discussed the regulations and added to them making them still more terrifying, agreeing that they should all immediately proceed with the preparatory works.” (St. Clair, 38-39)
Jose Dizon testified before the Olive Commission regarding the formation, purposes, and regulations of the Katipunan, viz:
“… on the same day in which General Despujol ordered the deportation of Rizal, there gathered in a house in calle Ilaya, Bonifacio, Arellano, Valentin Diaz, Teodoro Plata, Dian, and the witness, and they agreed to form a society to be known as the Katipunan, the object and ends of which were to be filibusterism, or, in other words, the liberty of the country from Spanish rule; the six persons present immediately proceed to perform upon themselves the incision of the pacto-de-sangre, signing with their own blood a blank paper, placing after the signature, the symbolic name each chose for himself. They then drew up the program of the Society. This program was composed of 6 articles, viz: 1st: to constitute a secret society known as the Katipunan; 2nd: that the organization was to be by triangles, to the end that no more than three members should know one another; 3rd: that the initiated should pay one real entrance fee, and a half real as a monthly subscription; 4th: that as the number of the members increased they should found one or more balangay in each district; 5th: to try to gather funds to carry out the purposes of the society; 6th: that when the opportunity occurred they should reform these articles. They also agreed upon the form of oath which should be taken by the initiated, which was to promise to shed even the last drop of blood for the liberty of the Philippines. The Katipunan was founded upon masonic usage adapted to the character of the association. Its formation was one of triangles, each new Katipunero being bound to attract to the association, two others to occupy the opposite angles. This formation was eventually changed on account of the extent to which the society extended, it management becoming very difficult. The particular triangles were broken up and the association formed in three degrees. The first degree was composed of the recently initiated members. These each possessed a mask and some form of arm, either fire-arm or bolo, the cost of which was borne by the member possessing it. The members who enjoyed the second degree also possessed masks and wore as a regalia a ribbon to which was attached a medal bearing a letter (equivalent to K) of the old-time form of script of the pre-Spanish Filipino; also a sword and banner crossed. The third-degree members possessed red masks, the color being distinctive of the degree, in the same way as the color of the second-degree was green and that of the first, black. These colors were symbolic: green signified hope, and red, war. Black was but a general color common to bandits all the world over. The masks of the third degree bore a triangle with three K's in the upper part, in the ancient Filipino script, and at the base the letters Z.'. LI.'. B.'…. The inferior inscription signified ‘sons of the people.’ Each degree had its pass words and the members only knew those of their own degree.” (St. Clair, 225-228)
Andres Bonifacio initiated the recruitment of members by the Katipunan through the triangle method, and he recruited his brother, Procopio, and Restituto Javier. Ladislao Diwa recruited Roman Basa and Teodoro Gonzales. Teodoro Plata recruited Briccio Pantas and Valentin Diaz. (Santos[Himagsikan], 14)
First Conflict of Leadership
The following year, the consensus was that the triangle recruitment method did not bring in as many members as desired, and it was decided to do away with the system and instead allow anyone to bring in as many recruits. Andres Bonifacio also asked to remove Deodato Arellano from the office of the President because he was a coward and did not dare participate in meetings (Taylor[I], 230). So, in the election of February of 1893, a new set of officers was elected as follows:
Roman Basa – President
Andres Bonifacio – Fiscal
Jose Turino – Secretary
Teodoro Gonzales and Ladislao Diwa – Councilors
A certain Tomas Remigio startled the Supreme Council after he accused Andres Bonifacio, the Treasurer, of mishandling the funds. President Basa arranged for a meeting among the parties involved, and at that point, Bonifacio showed a tobacco box full of receipts of advances to him and other members of the organization. Remigio remarked that the fund's purpose is to further the objective of attaining liberty for the country, not to lend the funds to the members. The enmity between Remigio and Bonifacio blew wide open with Remigio claiming that he received information he had been ordered assassinated by Bonifacio through the Camara Secreta and proclaimed before a group in the presence of Bonifacio that he would write a letter saying that in the event he is killed, the assassin was Bonifacio. (Tomas Remigio’s open letter kept by Jose P. Santos)
This incident was the cause of the replacement of Basa by Bonifacio. Pio Valenzuela narrated this event clearly in his testimony to the Olive Commission, viz:
"The President, Roman Basa, having examined the books of Andres Bonifacio, treasurer of the society, saw that he was keeping his accounts very badly, and was robbing Society. For this reason they both resigned and insulted each other. Andres Bonifacio called a general meeting of the Society in which he stated that Basa had said that all the initiates in the Katipunan were thieves and that the Katipunan was an association of robbers. The members of the assembly were incensed by this insult and elected Andres Bonifacio president..” (Taylor[I], 230-231)
After the election of Bonifacio as president, the Supreme Council was constituted by the following:
Andres Bonifacio – President
Emilio Jacinto – Secretary of State
Teodoro Plata – Secretary of War
Briccio Pantas – Secretary of Justice
Aguedo del Rosario – Secretary of Interior
Enrique Franco – Secretary of Finance
(KalawMaximo[Development],75)
Alienation of Pio Valenzuela
On May 3, 1896, Bonifacio called a meeting of the Katipunan, which was held at the house of Valentin Cruz in Pasig, to announce that he wanted the revolution to commence. He likened the Katipunan to a pregnant woman who would have a baby before its time. Emilio Aguinaldo and two others – Benigno Santi and Santiago Alvarez, objected saying that the society was ill-prepared to rise against the well-equipped and armed Spanish army. After an exchange of opinion on the matter, it was decided to consult and seek the consent of Dr. Jose Rizal. Pio Valenzuela in the company of a blind man, Raymundo Mata, was delegated the task. Upon his return, Valenzuela reported directly to Bonifacio and the two were tight-lipped, creating apprehension among the members on whether Rizal was for or against the revolution. (Alvarez, 10-14)
In his testimony to the Olive Commission, Valenzuela said that at first Bonifacio did not want to believe in the unsatisfactory result he had obtained, “but when he was convinced he began to insult Dr. Rizal, saying that he was a coward, and using other injurious expressions,” and prohibited him from telling anyone what Rizal had told him, that the revolution was untimely and inadvisable. But Valenzuela “communicated it to Captain Roman of Pandacan, Emilio Jacinto and others, whom he does not remember, and the news having once gotten out was spread abroad, especially by those who had offered to contribute money in the meeting at Pasig.” (Taylor[I], 229-230) “This breach of confidence on the part of Valenzuela brought about the separation of himself and Bonifacio, and the former presented his resignation as doctor and fiscal of the society. Bonifacio opposed the idea of his resignation, but it was finally accepted, and the former friends parted company each to work in his own sphere.” (St. Clair, 269-270)
Alienation of Teodoro Plata
Teodoro Plata was not only a ranking member of the Katipunan. He was also Bonifacio's brother-in-law, having married Bonifacio’s sister Petrona (Nonay). After the discovery of the Katipunan, Plata was given the impossible task by Bonifacio to kidnap the Spanish Governor-General and other officials with the intent to hold them hostages as security for granting their demands. Plata refused to comply with the order and decided to stow away and disappear. Bonifacio was angered and threatened to have the head removed from the shoulders of anyone who dared to disobey him and issued orders for Plata’s capture, commanding his death wherever he should be found. (St. Clair, 134-135)
Plata was not killed or captured as Bonifacio had ordered, but he presented himself to the Spanish authorities under the amnesty program. However, he was tried and convicted of treason and shot at the Bagumbayan field (Luneta) on February 6, 1897, together with Vicente Molina, Apolonio Dela Cruz, Hermegildo Reyes, Jose Trinidad, Pedro Nicodemus, Felciano del Rosario and Gervasio Samson (page 26, “Alamnaque Manila Galante para el ano 1912, edited by D. Juan Fajardo), the same fate that befell a month earlier to Roman Basa on January 11, 1897, together with Domingo Franco, Moises Salvador, Numeriano Adriano, Antonio Salazar, Jose Dizon, Luis Enciso Villareal, Faustino Villareal, Ramon A. Padilla, Manuel Abella, Cristobal Medina, and Francisco Rojas. (Russell, 310-311)
Squabble Over Two Tin Cans of Gold CoinsAfter the first major engagement between the Katipuneros and the Spaniards at Pinaglabanan, where the Katipuneros were repulsed, the rebels dispersed, and each one sought his own safety. Bonifacio and his close associates and supporters fled to Balara and then to the mountains of San Mateo. While at his hiding place, he received an invitation from General Mariano Alvarez of the Magdiwang Council of Cavite for him to make a visit to the province. Bonifacio thought it was his duty to visit the places where the revolution had spread and decided to accept the invitation. He designated Julio Nakpil officer-in-charge of Pantayanin and appointed him deputy President Supremo of the Katipunan on a provisional basis. As he was prepared to leave, an ugly scene developed between him and General Luis Malinis over the custody of two tin cans of gold coins. (Alvarez, 169)
In Santiago Alvarez’s memoirs is included an account of Colonel Genaro delos Reyes about this incident, the substantive portion of which is quoted below;
“He (Bonifacio) prepared to leave for Cavite and when he was ready to go, an incident soured the relations in the Katipunan ranks. Gen. Luis Malinis suddenly came up and demanded that one of the two tin biscuit boxes filled with gold coins they had excavated while building the defenses at San Mateo be turned over to him. Many Katipuneros chided General Luis, saying that the trove should not be despoiled for private purposes, but should be used to help finance the Revolution. Individual members should not profit from it, on the other hand, they should try to augment Katipunan coffers through solicitations and contributions. This was the prevailing opinion among the rank and file, and they tried to dissuade Malinis from pursuing his demands. But just as the Supremo and his party were about to leave, General Malinis called his men to his side and grabbed a small cannon to aim at the Supremo’s group.
“’I was asking you to give me one of the cans of gold and you refused,” Mailinis shouted sternly; ‘now you cannot go if you do not leave both cans.’
“’Don’t you respect anybody anymore?’ I (Colonel Delos Reyes) asked quickly.
“’I still give my due respect, why not? But you must give us what is due us. You must acknowledge that we were the finders of the treasure and that we risked our lives doing so. And can you bear to leave us, your brethren, without any means even to buy our food?’
“To avoid further trouble, Sec. Emilio Jacinto advised the Supremo to accede and leave one box of the gold coins with General Luis. I myself handed the box to the general.” (Alvarez, 169-170)
An account still has to surface that tells the story of what finally happened to the tin can of gold coins. Did Bonifacio take it to Cavite, or did he entrust it to someone at Pantayanin? There are accounts about Colonel Intong trying to extort information from Gregoria de Jesus while she was tied to a tree on the whereabouts of the funds of the Katipunan. Was the Colonel after the gold coins? There was also an accusation by the prosecutors during the trial of Bonifacio that he bribed some officers and men of the Magdalo and Magdiwang armies to join the army he was organizing in Limbon. At that time, Bonifacio had 35 men under him, mainly his entourage from San Mateo, armed with 30 Remingtons, 2 Mausers, and 13 percussion Muskets (Taylor[I], 307). If it was true that Bonifacio indeed gave the bribes, where did he get the funds? Did it come from the gold coins? No definite answer can be given now, and this tin can of gold coins that General Luis Malinis allowed Bonifacio to have will remain a mystery.
Bonifacio’s Unheeded Order to Arrest Vicente Fernandez
Vicente Fernandez was one of four generals appointed by Andres Bonifacio to lead in the assault of Manila during the August 29, 1896 uprising. The others were Aguedo del Rosario, Ramon Bernado, and Gregorio Coronel (Corpuz, 48). According to Corpuz, the assignment given to Fernandez was revised. He was supposed to lead a command in Morong and Laguna to support the August 29 attack in Manila. In any case, Fernandez never showed up, raised no troops, and led no uprising (Corpuz, 97). And so when Bonifacio visited Cavite at the invitation of General Mariano Alvarez, he unexpectedly found Fernandez there.
Bonifacio arrived in Cavite in the late afternoon of December 17, 1896 (Alvarez, 67). He was received with pomposity – brass band, flags, fireworks, and honor guard. People along the way shouted, “Long live the King!” (Corpuz, 97). “The following morning,” writes Alvarez, “Messrs. Emilio Aguinaldo, Baldomero Aguinaldo, Daniel Tirona, Vicente Fernandez, and others visited him. Upon seeing Katipunero Vicente Fernandez, the Supremo invoked his authority as Supremo and ordered Fernandez arrested and rigorously interrogated. He accused Fernandez, a lawyer, of negligence that had led to the defeat of the People’s troops in an encounter on 29th August 1896. But the Supremo’s order was taken as a joke and ignored right then and there in the center of the revolutionary struggle, so he stopped talking and kept his thoughts to himself.” (Alvarez, 67)
Cavite Revolutionaries Divided
The first Katipunan council that was established in Cavite was the Magdiwang council. This was done during a visit to Noveleta at 9 o’clock in the morning of Good Friday of April 1896 by Andres Bonifacio, accompanied by Dr. Pio Valenzuela, Emilio Jacinto, and Pantaleon Torres. Mariano Alvarez was named president. At five o’clock in the afternoon of the same day, the Katipunan officials, accompanied by Santiago Alvarez, proceeded to Kawit and organized another council, which came to be known as the Magdalo council, with Baldomero Aguinaldo as president. During a visit by Baldomero Aguinaldo to Mariano Alvarez in Noveleta, the former was told that the Magdalo council “should belong to the category of a local community chapter instead of a provincial level, since the supreme president of the Katipunan gave it no sanction as such.” (Alvarez, 7-8)
Mariano Alvarez unilaterally divided the towns of Cavite between the Magdiwang and the Magdalo councils. Magdalo was assigned Kawit, Bakood, Imus, Dasmarinas, Silang, Mendez, and Amadeo. On the other hand, the Magdiwang council took over the towns of Noveleta, Salinas, San Francisco de Malabon, Tanza, Naic, Ternate, Maragondon, Indang, Magallanes, Alfonso, Bailen, and Mainam. (Ronquillo, 309-310)
Right at the beginning, Mariano Alvarez was already assuming leadership of the province of Cavite. His actions were probably made on the strength of his appointment by Bonifacio as head of the combined Katipunan forces in Cavite during the meeting on August 24, 1896, to discuss the details of the plans for the August 29th uprising. However this appointment was never announced nor shown to the Magdalo officials and was not implemented. This unimplemented appointment could explain why Alvarez invited Bonifacio to come to Cavite to formally install him as the official head of the Katipunan in Cavite.
And Bonifacio did exactly that during his stay in Cavite – install Alvarez as head of Cavite. His partiality to the Magdiwang council was probably not only because his wife, Gregoria de Jesus, was the niece of Mariano Alvarez but more likely because he probably felt more comfortable siding with the Magdiwang leadership. First, he accepted the position of Haring Bayan in the reorganized Magdiwang council, relegating Mariano Alvarez to Vir-rey (Virrey) or second in command (Ronquillo, 140). Then he announced to Aguinaldo that the two councils were to be merged into one government and leadership, and appointed Mariano Alvarez as President, Baldomero Aguinaldo as Vice President, and he (Emilio Aguinaldo) as Lieutenant General. Ronquillo writes that Aguinaldo declined the appointment and courteously asked Bonifacio, “Was this, sir, the will of the people?” Bonifacio quickly answered, “No, I just did that on my own.” and continued Bonifacio, “Don’t they know, including yourself, that I am the Supremo who has the sole authority to make decisions?” Aguinaldo answered that he would not agree to the decision and would only recognize the people's will, adding that Bonifacio should have consulted the Magdalo officials before making the decision. Bonifacio retorted, “Why, did I make the wrong decision?” Aguinaldo did not respond to the question but told Bonifacio they should stop arguing about the issue because time was already against them, considering the Spaniards had massed their troops in Las Pinas, ready to march to Cavite. And if the matter of merging the councils had to be pursued, continued Aguinaldo, those who will occupy the leadership positions must be elected by the people. (Ronquillo, 552-553)
Conflict in Military Strategy Between Bonifacio and Aguinaldo
Bonifacio and Aguinaldo had disparate views of organizing the troops in the defense of Cavite. Bonifacio did not want to combine the forces of Magdiwang and Magdalo into one fighting force. Instead, he thought it better to separate the two armies, each defending his turf. On the other hand, Aguinaldo believed Magdiwang and Magdalo armies should merge and face the enemy together. Bonifacio’s approach prevailed, considering that he was then the Supremo of the Katipunan.
Corpuz describes this impasse between Aguinaldo and Bonifacio in his book, “Saga and Triumph”. He writes:
“.. when he (Aguinaldo) read in the Diario de Manila of the coming offensive against Cavite, he immediately went to Bonifacio in the latter’s quarters in San Francisco de Malabon. He asked the Supremo … to assign some Magdiwang troops to help the Magdalo forces against the enemy. (Aguinaldo’s news on strength of the enemy was garbled; he said the attack forces under Gen. Lachambre numbered 40,000 troops.)
“According to Aguinaldo, Bonifacio declined to grant his request, on the ground that the Magdiwang was equally in danger, vulnerable to an enemy strike from the beach or seacoast. To this reply, Aguinaldo explained that in all their engagement with the enemy, the latter had never attempted any beach or coastal landing; Aguinaldo left.
“Aguinaldo relates a second meeting with Bonifacio, also, in San Francisco de Malabon. In January 1897, he affirms, he observed movements of large enemy forces in Las Pinas, north of Bacoor; the enemy troops were being deployed to Alabang and to Sto. Domingo near Silang. Only then he says did he believe in the newspaper reports of an enemy drive against Cavite. He swallowed his pride and went to Bonifacio anew. He supported his request with the opinion that the Magdiwang were safe and in no danger of being engaged in action, and with the appeal that they all join forces for the sake of the Motherland.
“As before, Bonifacio replied that the enemy could strike at the Magdiwang any time, which no one could anticipate or predict, and he could not, therefore, assign any troops to the Magdalo. Aguinaldo persisted, explaining that the enemy would never reach the Magdiwang lines without first overrunning and annihilating the Magdalo. This was because, he added, the Magdalo towns faced the enemy, while the Magdiwang towns were at the rear. The Aguinaldo account goes on with Bonifacio sticking to his basic position that the Magdiwang could not afford to weaken its forces by lending part of its troops. Moreover, Bonifacio anticipated that the Magdalo’s chances of beating back the strong and fresh enemy troops were low, but the latter would retreat and fall back to the Magdiwang lines; at this point, their joint forces would defeat the enemy.
“It was an important exchange of strategy concepts between the two leaders. Aguinaldo says that he replied to the effect that it would be wiser to join forces earlier at the Magdalo lines, thus preventing the enemy from breaking through and reaching the Magdiwang lines. But Bonifacio did not budge, and Aguinaldo ends his account by stating that he left Bonifacio ‘full of sadness and misgivings;” (Corpuz, 114-115)
Being the Supremo, Bonifacio had the last say. Aguinaldo’s proposal was not considered, and as history now records, the result was a disaster - the Spaniards overran Cavite, and the decimated Revolutionary Army dispersed to nearby provinces, with Aguinaldo and remnants of his troops making their escape towards Biak-na-bato in Bulacan. This was perhaps the basis of Aguinaldo making the remark about Bonifacio’s military capability when he said: “If the Supremo commands all the forces of the revolution, he could if elected as president, lead the Revolutionary Army to destruction in just one engagement! And that would cause the downfall of the revolution.” (Ronquillo, 139)
Conflict at the Aborted Imus Meeting
On December 29, 1896, the Magdalo council invited the Magdiwang to a meeting at the friar estate house in Imus. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the merging of the two councils into one army, one government, and one leadership. While the host was Magdalo, Bonifacio took it upon himself to chair the meeting. The meeting prepared for the election to all the posts in a unified government council except the office of head of the revolutionary government which was to be reserved to Bonifacio as Supremo of the Katipunan.
Edilberto Evangelista of the Magdalo council objected to the Magdiwang proposal that Bonifacio be automatically designated head of the Filipino revolution. He explained that the revolution was no longer the revolution of the Katipunan but, in truth, was truly a Filipino revolution, considering that the fighting force was composed not only of Katipunan initiates but largely of ordinary people. Therefore, according to Evangelista, the election to the post of head of revolution should be done by popular vote. (Corpuz, 300)
Nothing was achieved in the meeting because of the dispute over which faction should prevail, with each group insisting on “mine” rather than “our” point of view. (Alvarez, 70) Bonifacio and Aguinaldo tried to conceal their deepening rift, but the unfolding events exacerbated their differences. Santiago Alvarez writes:
“The loose talk tend to smear each other’s reputation until things came to a head one evening in January 1897. It was nearing full moon when Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo and Sec. Mariano Trias, on one hand, and the Supremo Bonifaco and his brother Procopio, on the other, departed that night from the house of Mrs. Estefania Potente in San Francisco de Malabon. Mrs. Potente’s house was then being used as the headquarters of the Magdiwang government. The four men going down the stairs were each armed with a gun. They walked to an alley inside the town and positioned themselves two feet apart from the other pair, under the foliage of a tree. At first, the parties exchanged some heated words and then aimed their guns at each other. At this point, General Apoy (Santiago Alvarez) suddenly appeared, stood between the adversaries, and said sternly, ‘Shoot me first before you proceed with what you intend to do!’
“General Apoy, who had been secretly watching the goings-on from the house where the four men had come from, rushed out in time to stop a mishap that should never be allowed to happen. Shortly afterwards, General Vibora arrived on the scene and helped to mediate. The antagonists were persuaded to talk things over at the home of the Secretary of the Treasury Diego Mojica. Then, they fetched the parish priest, Fr. Manuel Trias, uncle of Sec. Mariano Trias. The priest tried his best to restore amicable solutions: he had them embrace each other and afterwards thanked God and prayed for peace and love among them. Finally, he kissed each one on the cheek and blessed them in the name of God and the Trinity.” (Alvarez, 76)
As seen in succeeding events, the rift between the two leaders was carried over in terms of each one’s concept of military strategy and the contest for leadership of the revolution.
Conflict at the Tejeros Convention
Much has been written about the Tejeros elections in San Francisco Malabon of March 22, 1897, but the matters usually being highlighted are (1) the claim that Bonifacio was cheated and (2) that Bonifacio walked out and declared the election null and void. The more important issues that were revealed during the election are simply glossed over and not given due consideration, viz: the rejection of the Katipunan as a form of government, the loss of prestige of Bonifacio, and, finally, his conflict with Colonel Santiago Rillo.
The election at Tejeros resulted from the meeting called by the Magdiwang chaired by Jacinto Lumbreras, with the Magdalos attending. As announced by the Magdiwang, the agenda was to discuss the best way to defend the areas still under control by the Magdiwang. Severino de las Alas proposed that it was necessary to first establish a government, and the matter of how to defend the territory would fall into place. The Magdiwang countered that the Katipunan is already the government that holds authority over the islands. The Magdalos pointed out, however, that the Katipunan is neither a monarchy nor a republic and what they aspire for is to establish a government of the Philippine republic. Antonio Montenegro gave a snide remark that “To let the status quo prevail, they who were in the Revolution would be no better than a pack of bandits or of wild animals.” His remark caused an uproar among the attendees, which took time for the order to be restored. After this incident, Lumbreras gave up the Chairmanship, and Bonifacio took over. He said that while he believed the Katipunan already met the needs of the revolution, he was yielding to the assembly’s resolve to establish “another and different supreme and sovereign Katipunan.” There was unanimous approval, cheers, and jubilation at the “founding of the Government of the Filipino Republic.” And the assembly proceeded to elect the officers. (Alvarez, 84-85; Corpuz, 120)
The apparent loss of prestige of Supremo Andres Bonifacio became more pronounced during the election. Aguinaldo was not present in the meeting because he was in command of the Magdalo troops defending Pasong Santol in Dasmarinas that the Spaniards were attacking, but he was elected in absentia as President, beating Bonifacio by a wide margin. To make matters worse for Bonifacio, the assembly rejected the proposal to make him the Vice President, having garnered the next highest number of votes. In the ensuing balloting that Bonifacio allowed to proceed, he again lost, this time to Mariano Trias for the Vice Presidency. (Corpuz, 121)
Ultimately, Bonifacio was elected to the lowest position of Director of Interior over Mariano Alvarez. Bonifacio’s election brought the assembly to another crisis. Daniel Tirona took the floor and questioned the qualification of Bonifacio to serve in the position he was elected and instead proposed to have Jose del Rosario, a lawyer and a Magdiwang, occupy the position. This violation of the rules angered Bonifacio who drew his revolver to shoot Tirona. Fortunately, Bonifacio was restrained and Tirona lost himself among the crowd.
After this incident that Tirona triggered, Bonifacio walked out and declared the election results null and void, bringing the leadership to the next crisis, the conflict between Bonifacio and Colonel Santiago Rillo.
Before Bonifacio could leave the assembly, Rillo, the head of the delegation from Batangas, asked him to reconsider his decision and accept the position to which he was elected. Bonifacio refused and made the motion to leave. Rillo then told Bonifacio that he had no power or authority to declare null and void elections that were already agreed upon by the assembly and that he was assuming the chairmanship of the meeting with the approval of the assembly, which was granted to him, and the assembly continued the proceedings and confirmed the results of the election. The assembly also sent a delegation to Pasong Santol to ask Aguinaldo to come to take his oath of office. (Corpuz, 121-122)
Crises After the Tejeros Elections
After his defeat at Tejeros, Bonifacio distanced himself from the newly established revolutionary government. The day following the elections, he issued a demand known as the “Acta de Tejeros”, signed by forty or so officials of the Magdiwang, asking all elected officials to vacate their positions because of what he claimed were irregularities that marred the elections. The Magdalos rejected the demand, saying that the elections were conducted properly according to procedures and they proceeded to organize the government. The first act of Aguinaldo was to circularize the chiefs of the towns to send reinforcement to Pasong Santol. Several groups, including some officers and men of Magdiwang, answered the call. But before the reinforcement could reach Pasong Santol, Bonifacio and Artemio Ricarte blocked their way, and the reinforcement did not proceed to its destination but was detained in a large yard (Aguinaldo[Talambuhay], 113). By the evening of that day, Aguinaldo received the news that the enemy had overran Pasong Santol and that his brother, Crispulo, who took over command of the Magdalo troops in Aguinaldo’s absence, was killed.
Realizing that his demand for the resignation of elected officials was ignored, Bonifacio organized a coup d’etat among the Magdiwang officers, with two Magdalo generals – Noriel and Del Pilar participating, in what is known as the “Acta de Naic,” or the Naic Military Agreement. Bonifacio claimed in the document signed by the forty or so plotters that Aguinaldo intended to surrender the revolution to the Spanish authorities, and it was necessary to take over the reins of government by force and annihilate the opposition, if necessary. Aguinaldo learned of the plot from Major Lazaro Makapagal who escaped from his captivity at the Casa Hacienda in Naic, where the plot was being hatched. When Aguinaldo arrived at the meeting place, Bonifacio invited him to participate in the parley, but he declined and instead went downstairs to look for the Magdalo soldiers who were being held captive. He saw them locked up in several rooms, and when the soldiers were freed and thankfully expressed their freedom jubilantly, Bonifacio and his co-conspirators were heard rushing down the stairs to flee, each one to his own separate way. (Ronquillo, 560-564)
Resolution of the Leadership Conflict
Aguinaldo did not go after the coup plotters and even invited them to join the government. He forgave his two generals and asked them to tend to their soldiers in their quarters. Except for Bonifacio most of the Magdiwang officials responded to Aguinaldo’s reconciliatory call and in early April 1897 the leadership of the Filipino Republic was constituted as authorized in Tejeros with the six officers coming from the Magdiwang, viz:
Emilio Aguinaldo – President
Mariano C. Trias (Magdiwang) – Vice-President
Pascual Alvarez (Magdiwang) – Director of Interior
Jacinto Lumbreras (Magdiwang) – Director of State
Baldomero Aguinaldo – Director of Finance
Mariano Alvarez (Magdiwang) – Director of Welfare
Severino de las Alas (Magdiwang)– Director of Justice
Emiliano R. de Dios – Director of War
Artemio Ricarte (Magdiwang) – Captain General
(Corpuz, 132)
On the other hand, Bonifacio fled to Limbon, set up fortifications, organized a government, and started raising an army. De las Alas complained to Aguinaldo that the troops of Bonifacio raided the town of Indang for provisions, and Aguinaldo responded by issuing an arrest order for Bonifacio. After a brief encounter between government troops resulting in the death of Ciriaco, a brother of Bonifacio, two government soldiers and the wounding of Bonifacio, the two brothers, Andres and Procopio Bonifacio, were brought to trial for conspiracy and sedition and sentenced to die by shooting.
Conclusion
In his book, “Saga and Triumph”, Onofre D. Corpuz sums up the leadership conflict of the revolution, viz:
“Generation after the event, and even into the 1980s-1990s during the decade of the official centennial celebration of many important events during the revolution, some Filipinos persisted in the view that Bonifacio’s death was the fruit of a personal Aguinaldo-Bonifacio conflict. This indicates that: the histories had not adequately clarified the true circumstances of Bonifacio’s death; or that the event itself is beyond clarification; or that, perhaps, many Filipinos have an unshakeable propensity to simplify complicated questions in terms of personal conflicts.
“It only remains to at least refer to two assessments, both written long after 1897. Both view Bonifacio’s execution within the context of the revolution. The first is that of Teodoro A. Agoncillo in his The Revolt of the Masses (1956), Chapter XVI. It is flawed by errors of colonial social history and questionable sociological analysis; but it has the well-argued proposition that Bonifacio was ‘betrayed.’ The second is that of Jose Alejandrino in his La Senda del Sacrificio, Episodios y Anecotas de Nuestras Luchas por la Libertad (1933), Chapter II. Alejandrino acknowledges Bonifacio’s patriotism and contribution as the initiator of the revolution; he stresses the legality of Aguinaldo’s assumption of leadership; he affirms that Bonifacio’s death was not in vain because it was necessary to national unity; and he credits Aguinaldo with the forging of national unity among the diverse elements of the revolution. Alejandrino was close to the events he writes; Agoncillo was not.
“Summing up, Bonifacio was an authentic hero long before his tragic death. The launching of the revolution was due to him and to no other man. But Bonifacio was not the revolution. The revolution continued without him.” (Corpuz, 130-131)
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