The Imperialistic Policy of U.S. President William McKinley

(This write-up is identical to the article with the same title found on pages 166-176 of the book entitled "The Filipino Tragedy and Other Historical Facts Every Filipino Should Know," published by the author.  The sources and references indicated here are contained on pages 402-415 of the book.)

America was a latecomer in the age of imperialism when powerful nations of Europe looked down on tropical nations as objects of colonization. During this period, peoples of tropical regions were classified as lower races to be controlled by the supposedly higher races or those inhabiting the temperate regions. America entered this age with its more influential Wall Street decision-makers embracing this imperialist idea and dictating the course of American foreign policy.

As America looked beyond its shores in the late 19th century, it saw the Philippines as a prized possession for its unexploited natural resources, for its harbors well suited for coaling stations and repair of ships, and for its strategic location for control of the commerce in the east.

U.S. Republican President William McKinley effected the conquest of the Philippines under the guise of a humanitarian mission to uplift, educate, and prepare the unwilling Filipinos for self-government.

Policy of acquisition

Acquiring the Philippines as a possession, not as a new member of the American Union, was the underlying policy of the McKinley administration. Previous acquisitions of territories by the United States, such as Louisiana and Texas, were made through adhesions to the American Union, making the inhabitants American citizens. In the case of the Philippine Islands, the McKinley administration applied the traditional European imperialist model. There was no intention of making the Philippine islands part of the United States nor granting citizenship to the Filipinos. Rather, the acquisition aimed to hold the Philippine islands as a colony, which meant keeping its inhabitants in bondage.

However, this acquisition policy was in direct contravention of the Constitution of the United States and the Declaration of Independence, which upholds the right of all men to freedom, democracy, and liberty. McKinley managed to wiggle out of these constitutional restraints by assuming the profile of a disinterested party, claiming that the involvement of the United States in the Philippines was humanitarian - uplifting, educating, and preparing a savage race for self-government, and not for profit.

McKinley's defining policy

President McKinley publicly announced his acquisition policy in a melodramatic tone in an interview at the White House on November 21, 1899, when he said:

"When next I realized that the Philippines had dropped into our laps I confess I did not know what to do with them. I sought counsel from all sides Democrats as well as Republicans - but got little help. I thought first we would take only Manila; then Luzon; then other islands, perhaps, also. I walked the floor of the White House night after night until midnight; and I am not ashamed to tell you, gentlemen, that I went down on my knees and prayed Almighty God for light and guidance more than one night. And one night late it came to me this way - I don't know how it was, but it came:

"(1) That we could not give them back to Spain - that we would be cowardly and dishonorable;

"(2) That we could not turn them over to France or Germany - our commercial rivals in the Orient - that would be bad business and discreditable.

"(3) That we could not leave them to themselves - they were unfit for self-government - and they would soon have anarchy and misrule over there worse than Spain's was; and

"(4) That there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God's grace, do the very best we could by them, as our fellow-men from whom Christ also died.

"And then I went to bed, and went to sleep, and slept soundly, and the next morning I sent for the chief engineer of the War Department (our map-maker), and told him to put the Philippines on the map of the United States (pointing to a large map on the wall of this office); and there they are, and there they will stay while I am President." (Olcott, 110-111)

It is not true that President McKinley did not know what to with the Philippines when it "dropped" on America's lap as a result of the Spanish war. There are pieces of evidence to prove that the McKinley administration was keenly interested in the Philippine Islands as far back as October 1897, which is months before the USS Maine blew up at Havana harbor which the Americans blamed on the Spaniards and the reason for the Spanish-American war.

Perhaps President McKinley mentioned his invocation of Divine Providence because his audience at the time was ministers of Protestant Churches. 

But it cannot be denied that he wanted the message to sink into the minds of the American people—the humanitarian mission of the United States. And there was no question that his statements were the official pronouncement of his policy regarding the Philippines.

That being the case, the alternatives McKinley presented are being tested in the light of the facts obtaining at the time, as follows:

The first  option : "That we could not give them back to Spain - that we would be cowardly and dishonorable."

Fact: Aguinaldo had already crushed the Spanish army and held 9,000 prisoners of war. Spain had weakened; no reinforcements were coming. Practically all towns and cities outside Manila were in the hands of the Philippine government. The remnants of the Spanish army had sought refuge inside the innermost section of the city - the Intramuros - and are under siege by Aguinaldo's forces who controlled the water supply and entry of provisions.  McKinley knew this first alternative was acceptable not because it was cowardly or dishonorable, but rather, Spain was no longer in a position to hold the Philippines given Aguinaldo's growing strength.

Second option:" That we could not turn them over to France or Germany - our commercial rivals in the Orient - that would be bad business and discreditable."

Fact: The concern that other powers were interested in the Philippine Islands was not an overstatement. According to Dewey among the early arrivals of foreign men-of-war, besides the British ships Linnet (May 2) and Immortalite (May 7), were the French cruiser Brieux (May 5), the Japanese cruiser Itsukushima (May 10), and the German cruisers Irene (May 6) and Cormoran (May 9) (Dewey[George], 254). Assuming the United States turned over the Philippines to one of the powers, that power would meet a more difficult and arduous campaign than the kind of war that the American army faced. When the war with the Filipinos broke out, the Americans were already mobilized on land and strategically positioned. But if peaceable disembarkation and mobilization were not provided to the American army, such as they had under friendly terms with Aguinaldo if they had to mobilize troops and war materiel from the sea under conditions of belligerency, the story of the American intervention in the Philippines would have taken a different course. The same difficulty would certainly have applied to the succeeding power.

Third option: "That we could not leave them to themselves - they were unfit for self-government - and they would soon have anarchy and misrule over there worse than Spain's was."

Fact: This statement contradicted all impartial testimonies thus far expressed, most especially by the very representatives of the United States government.

The first to express admiration for the Filipinos was Admiral Dewey himself when he said:

"In my opinion, these people are far superior in their intelligence and more capable of self government than the natives of Cuba, and I am familiar with both races. "(Dewey, 312)

General Charles King, who fought the Filipinos, made the following comment:

"The capability of the Filipinos for self government cannot be doubted; such men as Arellano, Aguinaldo, and many others whom I might name, are highly educated; nine tenths of the people read and write; all are skilled artisans in one way or another; they are industrious, frugal, temperate, and, given a fair start, could look out for themselves infinitely better than our people imagine. In my opinion they rank far higher than the Cubans or the uneducated negroes to whom we have given the right of suffrage." (Leonidas, 129-130).

Two navy men from Admiral Dewey's squadron, Sargent, and Wilcox, toured northern Luzon and their report spoke favorably of the Aguinaldo government, as evident from these statements:

"As a tribute to the efficiency of Aguinaldo's government and to the law-abiding character of his subjects, I offer the fact that Mr. Wilcox and I pursued our journey throughout in perfect security, and returned to Manila with only the most pleasant recollections of the quiet and orderly life which we found the natives to be leading under the new regime." (Philippine Information Society [vol 1, no 03], 38).

Here is a discovery by an American officer revealing the machinery of the Philippine government after Santa Ana, a town near Manila, was overrun on the second day of the war by advancing American troops:

"When we reached the headquarters at Santa Ana another surprise awaited us, for here was found some of the machinery of Aguinaldo's government. Among the papers scattered about in confusion by the retreating officials were telegrams, letters, and commissions, showing something of their system. One letter was from a township governor asking relief from his duties; a surgeon's certificate was inclosed. It had been forwarded through official channels to Aguinaldo's secretary of state and returned with abundant indorsements approved. With it was an order to the governor of the province to have a new election. Another letter was a complaint made against another local governor for mal-administration. It stated the charges in real legal form, and was duly signed. The numerous papers concerning school teachers' appointments showed that the Filipinos had already perfected arrangements for the education of the youth on a large scale. I might also mention the deeds of property, records of births, deaths, etc., to show that Aguinaldo's organization is at least not a laughable farce. I might mention also meteorological and other scientific instruments and records to show that the Filipinos didn't neglect science during those busy, warlike times. Letters dated February 4 from Malolos showed that they had a good courier system. A book on tactics, engravings of the several uniforms, beautiful topographical maps, copies of the declaration of independence and the revolutionary constitution, military and state seals, and other articles all went to show that labor and intelligence were united in their production. " (Anti-Imperialist, 44-45)

And finally, in answer to McKinley's assertion that anarchy and disorder would prevail if the Filipinos were left to themselves, here is a report of a U.S. newspaper correspondent on the takeover by Filipino forces of Iloilo City on December 24, 1898, which the Spaniards abandoned after a siege of the city. He said:

"...they entered the city in the most perfect order, scattered their forces in various public buildings, policed the streets and maintained the peace and quiet of the town in a manner that would have done credit to a most highly civilized nation. There was no looting, no insult to men or women, no robbery, no drunkenness or disorder..." - (Kimball, 3)

Did all these affirmations of Filipino competence and capability for self-government fall on deaf ears at Washington, or was it reasonable to conclude that the administration of President McKinley was predisposed to acquiring the Philippines as a colony, regardless of the state and condition of the people? Obviously, the answer would be yes.

Fourth option: "That there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God's grace, do the very best we could by them, as our fellow-men from whom Christ also died. "

Fact: This fourth alternative masqueraded the colonization plan as a humanitarian mission - America was rich and therefore needed no colonies; the Filipinos were savages, and America was coming to educate, uplift, and civilize them. However, the succession of events confirmed that the acquisition of the Philippines was not an afterthought but consisted of well-studied actions of the McKinley administration that started earlier than it was possible for America to get involved in Philippine affairs. 

Enumerated below are the incidences of such well-studied actions dating as far back as the last quarter of 1897:

a. On October 21, 1897, or four months before the U.S.S. Maine incident, orders were issued to Commodore George Dewey as follows: "... to sail for Nagasaki, Japan, and there take command of the Asiatic squadron. Before he sailed, the policy of the administration was outlined to him and he was given instructions regarding the course to pursue in the contingency of a war with Spain. He began at once to collect information regarding the Spanish forces in the Philippines."(Olcott, 39)

b.  On the 24th day of April 1898, even before the U.S. Congress formally declared war on Spain, another order was given: "War has commenced between the United States and Spain. Proceed at once to the Philippine Islands. Commence operations at once, particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy them. Use utmost endeavors." (Brooks, 1).

c. During the framing of the August 12, 1898, Peace Protocol, which gave the United States the right to occupy the bay, harbor, and city of Manila (not the whole Philippine islands), the United States wanted to use the word possession in completing the third article referring to the Philippine question, revealing the intention of taking over the Philippines. But Spain insisted that the word disposition be used instead because Spain did not intend to relinquish control of the Philippine islands to the United States (Brooks, 4)

d. At the Paris Peace Conference in the last quarter of 1898, the United States peace commissioners demanded from Spain the cession of the whole archipelago with a payment of $20 million. Spain initially refused and cited the provisions of the Peace Protocol that limited the right of the United States to the bay, harbor, and city. Ultimately, the American demand succeeded in view of what Spain considered a threat of an imminent resumption of hostilities if she refused. (Brooks, 6-7).

e. As soon as the Peace Treaty was signed and without waiting for the treaty's ratification by the United States Senate, McKinley instructed General Otis to extend the military government maintained in Manila to the ceded territory. McKinley could not have been unaware that the Philippine Republic was already administering all the towns and provinces outside of Manila. Perhaps he underestimated the determination of the Filipinos. He probably thought Aguinaldo would meekly submit, roll over, and hand to General Otis the whole country on a silver platter.

f. The first attempt at a peaceful American takeover of the country was made in December 1898 when General Otis, under orders from Washington, sent an expedition of 2,500 men under the command of Gen. Marcus Miller with orders to occupy the city of Iloilo. The Filipino government in Iloilo resisted and refused to allow the disembarkation of American troops. The impasse was referred by General Otis to Washington, and the order was to hold the use of force and await further instructions. If Gen. Miller took the city after a fight, this action would be considered aggression, something McKinley did not want to project to the American people.

g. A second attempt at the same objective was made by General Otis himself when he presented to Aguinaldo early the following year a modified version of the same McKinley's proclamation omitting the strong words sovereignty. The Otis version of the proclamation required all the inhabitants to recognize American military authority in consequence of the Treaty of Paris, and those who did would have their life and property protected, and those who did not would face terrible consequences. The Filipinos rejected the proclamation and tore down the posters. Similarly, the American forces did not react but held their guns and artillery in check. Again, McKinley did not want to appear to the American people as the aggressor.

h. On February 4, 1899, an opportunity for McKinley to unleash the dogs of war came when hostilities between American and Filipino forces were opened, which the Americans blamed on the Filipinos. Aguinaldo pleaded to stop the hostilities and sit down to thresh out the conflict. Still, the Americans refused, confirming the claim that the war was actually forced on the Filipinos on the eve of the U.S. Senate vote to force the ratification of the Treaty of Paris. McKinley needed the treaty's ratification to give him the stamp of approval to colonize the Philippines.

i. A facsimile of a memorandum written in Mr. McKinley's handwriting and recording a conversation with Admiral Dewey. The piece of paper was of the White House stationery, and it bore the date of October 3, 1899. The notes read:

“SELF GOVERNMENT, - are they capable? No and will not be for many, many years. The United States must control and supervise giving Filipinos participation as far as capable.

"WHAT DOES AGUINALDO REPRESENT in population and sentiment? He has no more than 40,000 followers of all kinds out of 8 or to millions

"WHAT IS OUR DUTY? Keep the islands permanently. Valuable in every way

"HOW MANY TROOPS NEEDED? 50000

"HAVE WE SHIPS ENOUGH? Ought to send some more. Recommends that Brooklyn go and smaller vessels. 

"SHOULD WE GIVE UP THE ISLANDS? Never – never.” (Olcott, 96(a))

j. Finally, McKinley revealed the commercial purpose of retaining the Philippines in his September 16, 1898 instructions to the American Peace Commissioners who were to meet with their Spanish counterpart in Paris on October 1, 1898, viz:

“Incidental to our tenure in the Philippines is the commercial opportunity to which American statesmanship can not be indifferent. It is just to use every legitimate means for the enlargement of American trade.. “ (United States[Papers], 7)

                                                                                                                                                                                  Aguinaldo reechoed McKinley's reason for keeping the Philippines when he said:

"Oh, dear Philippines! Blame your wealth, your beauty for the stupendous disgrace that rests upon your faithful sons. You have aroused the ambition of the Imperialists and Expansionists of North America and both have placed their sharp claws upon your entrails!"(Aguinaldo, 56).

CONCLUSION

In his book, Imperialism and Liberty, Morrison Swift makes these bold assertions:

"The administration and the imperialist press have striven to convince our people that the Filipinos are responsible for the war. This is one of the lies that we must tell each other to save a last remnant of our self-respect. But it is nevertheless a lie with no mitigation. McKinley declared war in his Proclamation, and the Filipinos began hostilities. The feeble McKinley doubtless honestly hoped that they would honestly submit to his declaration that they were to be as a conquered and subject people to the United States, without the sad necessity of being obliged to forcibly conquer them. The subterfuge did not work. They had never acknowledged the sovereignty of the United States: for the United States to declare sovereignty was therefore for the United States to declare war.

"After the "criminal aggression" of McKinley's proclamation that a state of virtual war already existed, that they must submit or be killed, there was nothing for them to do but to fight. And every true American who resents this dastardly aggression by the president upon a harmless race of barbarians, should be deeply thankful that they did fight, and must hope that our arms will not be able to subdue them. No honorable American can uphold the criminal attempt of American potentates to deprive a weak race of its liberty in the name of liberty. As liberty-loving American citizens it is our duty to uphold the Filipinos in their righteous and patriotic attempt to keep our yoke from falling on them."- (Swift, 39-41)

McKinley succeeded in his grand design of acquiring the Philippines as an American colony, and the American people rewarded him with reelection. However, an assassin shot McKinley at the Pan-American Exhibition at Buffalo on September 6, 1901, and he died eight days later. Sarah Vowell, in her book Assassination Vacation, mentions that the assassin, Leon Czolgosz, found disparaging the fact that the Philippine-American war erupted over U.S. Occupation of the Philippines, saying “It does not harmonize with the teaching in our schools about our flag.” 

Who started the Filipino-American war?

(This write-up is identical to the article with the same title found on pages 183-200 of the book entitled "The Filipino Tragedy and Other Historical Facts Every Filipino Should Know," published by the author.  The sources and references indicated here are contained on pages 402-415 of the book.)

Generations of Filipinos have been taught that the bloody Philippine-American war broke out on the night of February 4, 1899, because a Filipino lieutenant and three of his men allegedly refused to heed the challenge to halt at the approach of the American post at the San Juan bridge in the outskirts of Manila and were fired upon and killed by the American sentry, Private Grayson.

A reliable source presented an entirely different story, exactly the opposite of the textbook version. Felipe Buencamino, a cabinet official of the Filipino government in Malolos, testified before the U.S. Senate that an American patrol forced its way into Filipino lines and provoked the unwary Filipinos into a fight. In the ensuing exchanges of fire that spread across a fifteen-mile stretch, three thousand Filipino soldiers whose officers were mostly on leave on that night fell dead on the first day of battle (Blount,193).

However, U.S. Republican President William McKinley took advantage of the resulting conflict to place the blame on Aguinaldo, secure from the U.S. Senate the ratification of the Treaty of Paris, and unleash the dogs of war. What followed next was now history - the 30,000 strong Filipino army was routed by the Americans; the towns and provinces held and administered by the newly independent Philippine government were forcibly taken; the Malolos Republic, the first in Asia, was dismantled, and the Filipino people were forced at gunpoint to submit to American rule.

Two versions of the incident

U.S. General Arthur MacArthur’s official report states that the Filipinos invaded American territory, viz:

 “At about half past 8 p.m. February 4^th, an insurgent patrol, consisting of four armed soldiers, entered our territory at Blockhouse No. 7, and advanced to the little village of Santol, which was occupied from the pipeline outpost of the Nebraska Regiment.  This, it will be observed, was precisely the point referred to in the correspondence above quoted.  The American sentinel challenged twice, and then, as the insurgent patrol retired to Blockhouse 7, from whence fire was immediately opened by the entire insurgent outpost at that point.”  (Philippine Information Society[1:6], 30)

This incident was amplified somewhat melodramatically in history textbooks  taught to generations of Filipinos as follows: 

"On the evening of February 4, Private Grayson, of the First Nebraska Volunteers, was standing on guard at the American end of this bridge; there was no moon, and the darkness was exceedingly dense, when there suddenly appeared on the bridge a Filipino lieutenant and three privates, all strongly armed, who advanced in perfect step toward him. In obedience to his instructions from the Officer of the Guard, he called, 'Halt!' The summons was deliberately unheeded. Crouching somewhat, with guns in hands, they stealthily moved forward. Again Grayson cried out in a challenging tone, 'Halt!' This second warning was also ignored. The Filipinos moved even more rapidly toward him than before. They were now within a few feet of him. He fired. The Filipino lieutenant fell dead." (Coursey, 72-73)

Compare the above with the following version, which has yet to find its way into the pages of Philippine history books, viz:

"On the 4th of February the towns of Santa Ana and San Juan del Monte were under the command of General Ricarte and Colonel San Miguel. On this day those two commanders abandoned their posts and went to a ball, leaving a major by the name of Gray [Major Fernando E. Grey y Formentos], about 26 years of age, very young and without experience, in command of about 1,800 troops. They extended along the eastern part of the outskirts of Manila and were about half a mile distant from the American troops. We took the deposition of this major, who said that about 9 o'clock p.m. the sergeant of the guard came to his headquarters and told him that a party of American troops desired to cross their lines or were attempting to cross their lines, which was opposed by the Philippine guards. At this time a shot was heard; that he could not say for certain whether the shot came from the American command or from the men under his command, but he ran to the place from which the shot appeared to come, and seeing the American troops in a belligerent attitude gave an order to fire. That is the way the hostilities began." (Buencamino, 3)

The preceding is an account of Felipe Buencamino, Sr., which was taken from the transcript of a hearing conducted by the U.S. Senate regarding the Philippine question and could be considered the official Filipino version of the February 4, 1899 incident.

In support of Buencamino's statement, here's the report of Serapio Narvaez, Commander of the Column of the Infantry Battalion of Morong Expeditionary that was submitted to a commission headed by General Mariano Trias, that was tasked to investigate the outbreak of hostilities:

“At about 9 p.m. Yesterday, while Corporal Anastacio Felix of the 4^th company, with two soldiers was at the door of Blockhouse No. 7, they were fired upon by two sentinel of the American soldiers who were passing on the road near the barrio Santol, close to the Blockhouse. In spite of this our people did not reply, and finally other companies of the former (Americans) fired other shots upon that blockhouse and even upon (blockhouse) No. 6. The urgency being great they began firing and continued until driven out...” (Legarda, 43; Taylor[IV], 540-541)

The report was confirmed by Major Fernando E. Grey of the Third Zone who took charge during the absence of Col. Luciano San Miguel.  According to Grey, he sent this telegram: 

"Captain Adjutant Grey to War Department, San Juan del Monte, February 4, 1899, 9:58 p.m. - At exactly nine o'clock tonight, American camp opened fire.  The reply was made by our troops.  All hold their positions without fear.  I await orders ..fire was first opened by the advance guard of the American forces, who were stationed in the barrio of Santol in the jurisdiction of Sampaloc, corresponding to the third zone of Manila; as according to a report received from the Commander of our forces who were garrisoning Blockhouse number 7, when the two soldiers left to patrol until they met those of blockhouse number 6, which is done every night in order to ascertain whether anything has occurred along the military cordon which separates the territory of the occupation from that of the Republican government, it was observed that the American sentinels appeared to be closer to ours than usual; and when said soldiers arrived opposite the said sentinel, the latter fired a shot; they, therefore, did not continue further but returned to their posts to report what had occurred.  Hardly had they arrived at blockhouse number 7, when more shots were fired at them.  They noticed at the same that from the direction of the Balsa bridge other shots were being fired of the same sound as the previous ones; for which reason they supposed that they also proceeded from the enemy.  It should also be noted that another circumstance which led the deponent to believe that there was an intention to make an attack by the American forces, was that their tents at Santa Mesa were that night completely dark and not illuminated, which was not the case on preceding nights." (Taylor, v4:559-560)

[Author's note: The National Historical Institute (NHI) of the Philippines removed on February 4, 2004 the historical marker that had been on the San Juan bridge for years and transferred it to a site at the corner of Sociego and Silencio streets in Sta. Mesa, Manila. Grayson mentioned Sta. Mesa and not San Juan as the village that the Nebraska regiment was ordered to occupy where the shooting incident happened.]

 

Who is the aggressor?

The textbook (or American) version tagged the Filipinos as the aggressors because they continued to approach the American sentry, notwithstanding the challenge to halt. In the Filipino version, the aggressors were the American soldiers because they crossed into Filipino lines, and the Filipino guards opposed it.

Charles E. Russell also cited the intrusion of the Americans into Filipino-held territory.  This famous  American writer-journalist, wrote that it was the Americans who violated the demarcation lines, viz:

"On February 4, 1899, after the American lines outside the city had been advanced a mile into what was indisputably Filipino territory, an order came to push them still farther. The Filipino officer in command of that sector made the usual protest. It was reported to the American commander, Colonel Stotsenburg, of the Nebraska contingent. In response, he advised another advance in the same direction." (Russell, 92)

In a letter cited by U.S. Senator Pettigrew, Private Grayson, the American soldier who fired the first shots of the war, said that it was 

"the damn bullheadedness of the officers in invading insurgent territory that was responsible for that shot."(Pettigrew, 270) 

Grayson’s statement contradicted the textbook version and confirmed that the American soldiers indeed crossed into Filipino lines and fired the first shots, resulting in an exchange of fire.

The loose alliance

Why would the Americans start a war with the Filipinos, who considered the former an ally in the war against Spain? McKinley wanted the Philippine islands as an American colony. However, the 30,000-strong Filipino Revolutionary Army stood as the main stumbling block. And a war that the Filipinos themselves would start was needed to justify the use of superior force against the upstart Filipino army. McKinley was very careful in pursuing this course lest he end up a conqueror and not the benefactor that he wanted himself viewed by the American people. He took advantage of the February 4 incident to drag Filipinos into a war, throw the blame on them, and achieve his dream of putting the Philippine islands on the map of the United States.

McKinley's dream of acquiring the Philippine islands did not occur to Aguinaldo when he was sought on April 24, 1898, by Spencer Pratt, the United States Consul in Singapore. An arrangement for a general cooperation with Admiral (then Commodore) Dewey was agreed with assurances that Philippine independence would be respected. Dewey had already sailed for Manila when informed of the arrangement with Aguinaldo, but nevertheless, he agreed and cabled Consul Pratt to send Aguinaldo in.

After Dewey destroyed the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay on May 1, 1898, the Americans controlled the bay and harbor of Manila and the Cavite arsenal that the Spanish marines surrendered to Dewey. Dewey needed land forces to drive the Spaniards out because the Spanish flag was still hoisted over the city. Aguinaldo came very handily for the purpose. Mr. Wildman, the American Consul in Hong Kong, facilitated the expatriation of Aguinaldo and thirteen of his staff to Cavite, assuring Aguinaldo that the United States was actuated by the same feeling for the Filipinos as it was in undertaking the war to free the Cubans from Spain.

On May 19, 1898, one of Dewey's ships, the McCullough, brought Aguinaldo to Cavite from Hong Kong. After being assured that the United States had no intention of keeping the islands and would undoubtedly recognize its independence, Aguinaldo undertook the task of renewing the revolution against Spain. He issued three proclamations on May 24, 1898, explaining why he had returned, the presence of the Americans, and the need to renew the revolution. Aguinaldo's call spread like wildfire, and leaders of the prior uprising rallied behind him and declared their adhesion to his cause. Donations and army enlistments flooded the headquarters of Aguinaldo in Cavite, enabling him to raise a fairly large army, including a small navy.

The initial cache of arms secured by Aguinaldo consisting of 200 Mauser rifles and a few cannons were taken from the Cavite Arsenal courtesy of Commodore Dewey after the Spanish marines manning the arsenal surrendered to the Americans.  A large shipment of 3,000 Remington rifles and ammunition, which were bought in Hong Kong through the help of American Consul, Mr. Wildman, also arrived.  The shipment was paid for out of the funds generated by the Biak-na-bato agreement, which Aguinaldo deposited in two banks in Hong Kong for use in the renewal of the revolution should the Spaniards fail to abide by the peace agreement. More arms were secured from captured Spanish soldiers and garrisons, and also additional shipments from abroad were shipped by the group of Filipinos in Hong Kong who styled themselves as the "Comite Central Filipino" and later served as the propagandists of the revolution.  Military uniforms were also fitted for the army sewn from imported blue drilling cloth.

Visayan men serving in the Spanish army, notably in the 74th regiment and another regiment, defected to the rebels in late March. Native militias organized by the Spanish authorities to fight the Americans and placed under the command of a former rebel General, Pio del Pilar, similarly joined Aguinaldo. These additions greatly raised the morale and fighting capability of the Filipino army. Dewey estimated Aguinaldo had about 25,000 troops, but "..they could have any number of men; it was just a matter of arming them." (Blount, 23)

By June 30, 1898, Aguinaldo had practically crushed the Spanish army, taken 9,000 prisoners, declared Philippine independence, established a government, and surrounded the city of Manila. In less than a month, all Spanish garrisons in the province of Cavite and its surroundings were quickly overrun. Expeditions were sent to the rest of Luzon, the islands of Mindoro, Palawan, Batanes, Samar, Leyte, Cebu, the provinces of Iloilo, Antique, and Agusan, Cagayan, Zamboanga, and with the help of local revolutionaries, they successfully hoisted the Filipino flag in those liberated provinces. Aguinaldo's achievement did not escape the notice of Dewey, who reported his admiration of Aguinaldo's accomplishment to Washington.

Disowning the alliance

While the Filipinos were celebrating their succession of victories, American troops started arriving and by the end of August, the number swelled to more than 20,000 men. Some suspicious Filipino generals began to question the presence of American troops because the Spanish army was practically defeated. Aguinaldo never entertained the idea that the American army would eventually be used against him. He kept his trust in the Americans, assisting them in securing supplies - ponies, oxen, carts, and fresh provisions. Aguinaldo even gave up large, newly liberated areas in the outskirts of the city of Manila for use as encampments of newly arrived American soldiers, including defenses and entrenchments that were built by Filipino troops in preparation for the assault of Manila. By this maneuver, the Americans gained a tactical advantage, taking positions between the Filipinos and the remnants of the Spanish forces in Intramuros.

The unwary Aguinaldo did not realize he was only being used by the Americans. One American author described this American treatment of Aguinaldo as follows:

"The cipher code used in all state cablegrams in the case of Aguinaldo was undoubtedly as follows - 'Play Aguinaldo for a sucker! String him along until Manila is captured - and then don't do a thing to him, but get out the Gatling guns.' This is inferential from the mutilated and asterisk bestrewed cablegrams set forth in the records of Doc. 62 and Mess. and Doc., Vols. 3 and 4. Furthermore, these records show that Aguinaldo and the insurgents up to the time of the capture of Manila were treated as allies to be made use of' by the representatives of our government with the full sanction of President McKinley, and in view of the facts clearly presented to him that they were fighting for independence and expected recognition of their cause from the United States." (Thomas, 87)

The seemingly deceitful treatment of Aguinaldo by the American naval and military commanders was clearly expressed by Colonel James Russell Codman of an old, wealthy and respected family of New England, viz:

"It is an undeniable fact, proved by unquestionable evidence, accessible to any citizen who will take the pains to obtain it, that Aguinaldo's assistance in the war with Spain was solicited by United States officials; that he and his friends were used as allies by the American naval and military commanders; that, until after the capture of Manila, to which they contributed, they were allowed to believe that the independence of the Philippine Islands would be recognized by the American government; and that it was not until after the American forces in the islands had been made strong enough to be able - as was supposed - to conquer the islanders, that the mask was thrown off. Independence was then refused them, and the purpose of the president to extend the sovereignty of the United States over them by military force was openly proclaimed. That the Filipinos resisted and that they took up arms against foreign rule, was something that ought to have been expected, for it is exactly what Americans would have done." (Codman, 1)

In the assault of Manila on August 13, 1898, U.S. General Wesley Merritt, the commanding officer of American forces, directed the operation under strict orders from Washington not to allow Filipino troops inside the city or enter into any unauthorized agreement with Aguinaldo. Through the Belgian consul, 191 Mr. Edward Andre, the Spanish authorities secretly arranged with the Americans that a token resistance would precede the city's capitulation to save the honor of Spain. The Filipinos, who were left out in the pre-arranged surrender, attacked from four points. The column of General Pio del Pilar took Sampaloc; that of General Gregorio del Pilar's, Tondo, Pritil and Paseo de Azcarraga (now Claro M. Recto Avenue); that of General Noriel's, Singalong and Paco; that of General Ricarte's, Sta. Ana, and pursued the Spaniards to Intramuros. (Aguinaldo[True Version], 39)

When Filipino troops attempted to enter the walled city, the American soldiers blocked the entry points. An agitated atmosphere ensued that was ready to explode into a firefight had it not been for Filipino Generals Noriel and Ricarte and U.S. General Thomas Anderson, whose friendly relations diffused the situation. Anderson telegraphed Aguinaldo in Bacoor, asking him to order his troops out of Intramuros in order to prevent a bloody confrontation, and the order was given. Reluctantly, the Filipinos moved out of the walled city. The other Filipino generals wanted to take the opportunity to strike at the Americans, but Aguinaldo stayed calm and refused to be pushed into a war. He continued to entertain the hope that the promises of Consul Pratt, Consul Wildman, and Admiral Dewey would be respected by the McKinley administration, if not by the United States Congress. With the surrender of Manila, the land area controlled by the Americans significantly increased.

U.S. General Elwell S. Otis, who took over from General Merritt on August 21, 1898, continued to do what his predecessor had done - maltreat Aguinaldo. General Otis demanded that Filipino troops evacuate the city of Manila and its suburbs by September 15 beyond the demarcation lines marked on a map that Otis presented to Aguinaldo. Otis claimed that the August 12 Peace Protocol signed in Washington D.C. between Spain and the United States gave the latter the right to occupy the bay, harbor, and city of Manila. Aguinaldo questioned the inclusion of some villages and tried to secure a written commitment that the same position of the troops would be restored to the Filipinos should the United States decide to leave the islands to Spain. But General Otis simply ignored him.

When Otis realized that the Filipinos were not showing signs of evacuating the city and suburbs, he gave an ultimatum on September 13, threatening to use force. Aguinaldo gave in, and on September 15, while the Congress of the first Philippine Republic was being inaugurated at Malolos, four thousand Filipino soldiers in their bright blue drilling uniforms and every man with his rifle marched out of the city of Manila to the cadence of the ninety piece Pasig band, amidst the enthusiastic shouts of a multitude that lined the streets. As Colonel Juan Cailles and his brigade passed by the Wyoming barracks near the city walls and were cheered by American soldiers, an observer remarked that ".. it sounded strange to hear one force cheering another which the day before was looked on as half an enemy." (Stickney, 296-297)

Like a cue from a prepared script, more incidences of maltreatment followed. The following incidents were enough reason to commence war against the Americans, but these failed to provoke Aguinaldo:

(1) On September 23, 1898, Dewey ordered the seizure of the 700-ton Filipino steamer, the Patria, disguised as the Abbey and registered as an American steamer. This vessel was clandestinely smuggling arms and ammunition for the Filipino army. The seizure of the steamer was protested by the Filipinos to no avail.

(2) Dewey suddenly seized all thirteen other Filipino vessels that constituted the Filipino navy the following month.  

[Author's note: The small navy was formed with captured small launches from the Spaniards and from the bigger ships of heavier tonnage that were donated by rich families like Apacible, Lopez, Villavicencio, and other families in the province of Batangas and were named TAALENO, BALAYAN, BULUSAN, TAAL, and PURISIMA CONCEPCION.  The 900-ton ship COMPANIA DE FILIPINAS was added after the Filipino crew led by Vincent Catalan killed the Spanish officers and surrendered the vessel to Aguinaldo.  The big ships were armed with cannons taken from sunken Spanish vessels, casualties of the battle of Manila Bay between Dewey and the Spanish Armada.  The armed ships were used to transport soldiers, supplies, and equipment to north Luzon, Visayas, and some parts of Mindanao.  The ship FILIPINAS (originally the COMPANIA DE FILIPINAS) was ordered by Aguinaldo to proceed to the Spanish fort in Subic to capture it.  While the bombardment was ineffective, the 500 Spanish marines thought their fate was sealed and raised the white flag of surrender.  The German ship IRENE interceded and challenged the FILIPINAS on the basis that the flag it was flying was not a belligerent.  The FILIPINAS hauled down the Philippine flag replaced it with a white flag, and went back to report to Aguinaldo, who complained to Dewey.  Accordingly, Dewey dispatched two gunships, the CONCORD  and the RALEIGH to go after the German vessel IRENE.  As soon the American ships appeared, the IRENE withdrew.  It can be seen from this incident that there was indeed some form of cooperation, if not an alliance,  between Dewey and Aguinaldo. (Van Meter, 91-97)]

 (3) After the Treaty of Paris was signed on December 10, 1898, but before its ratification by the U.S. Senate, McKinley ordered General Otis to effect the establishment of a military government that would administer the islands with him, Otis, as Governor-General. The formal protest of Aguinaldo, who took it as an affront to his position as president of the Philippine Republic, was ignored.

(4) Almost simultaneous with McKinley's order to Otis, General Marcus Miller sailed for Iloilo to occupy the city. The Ilonggo general, Martin Delgado, and his Tagalog aide, Ananias Diokno, opposed the disembarkation of American troops without prior authorization from Aguinaldo. General Miller could have used force to break the impasse, but he preferred to lay in wait in Iloilo harbor for a more opportune time because a forcible occupation of the Iloilo at that time, without a ratified treaty, would be considered aggression. The opportune time came in less than two months, i.e., on February 4, 1899, the date hostilities were opened, and Iloilo fell into American hands after a quixotic resistance by the Ilonggos.

Filipinos already administering the islands

It should be recalled that prior to February 4, the Americans were confined within the limits of the city of Manila, and the Filipinos held the rest of the country. An important document, the Memorial to the Senate of the United States, which was presented by Felipe Agoncillo to the State Department and copied to the U.S. Senate, articulated the situation, viz:

"America is in actual possession at this time [around October, 1898 - author] of 143 square miles of territory, with a population of 300,000, while the Philippine Government is in possession and control of 167,845 square miles, with a population of 9,395,000, and only a few scattered Spanish garrisons are to be found in islands having an area of 51,630 square miles, with a population of 305,000. The figures, as to the Spanish possessions, should be diminished, and those of the Philippine Government enlarged, by virtue of the fact that the inhabitants of the islands where Spanish troops yet remain have practically confined such troops to the narrow quarters of their garrison towns." (Atkinson, 4)

In other words, in terms of land area, the Philippine government held ninety-three percent of the country, while the United States, only seven percent. In terms of population, the Philippine government administered to ninety-four percent of the people, while the United States, to only three percent. Unfortunately, no weight was given to the memorial because no official acknowledgment was received from the U.S. State Department. A similar document in the form of a protest was also ignored by the American and Spanish peace commissioners at the Paris conference during their deliberations from October 1, 1898, to December 10, 1898, the date McKinley signed the treaty.

War needed to ratify the treaty

Unknown to Aguinaldo, General Otis was actually facing a problem. McKinley's orders, originally given to General Merritt, to establish immediately a military government that would administer American authority on all of the islands had not been accomplished. General Otis knew he could not comply with the order because the only territory that the Americans occupied was the city of Manila, which the Spaniards yielded in an act of surrender and later qualified by the Peace Protocol of August 12. The Treaty of Paris, which was supposed to cede the islands to the United States, although signed by McKinley, was not effective until the U.S. Senate had ratified it. It did not give the American forces the authority to forcefully evict the Filipinos from the territories they held, and doing so would have been considered criminal aggression.

However, the situation was not favorable to the Americans because the Filipinos had established a functioning government that administered the political, social, and commercial affairs of the islands, including the regulation of customs at all major ports except the port of Manila. General Otis knew that the only way to implement the instructions of McKinley was to get the Philippine government out of the way and raise the American flag over the dead bodies of Filipino soldiers. This, of course, meant opening hostilities with the Filipinos.

The treaty of peace between Spain and the United States was up for a U.S. Senate vote on February 6. The expectation was the treaty would not be ratified because the Senate was lukewarm to the idea of administering an archipelago 10,000 miles away from the U.S. mainland. John Foreman, the widely quoted English historian, said:

"A week before the vote was taken it was doubtful whether the necessary two-thirds majority could be obtained. It was a remarkable coincidence that just when the Republican Party was straining every nerve to secure the two or three wavering votes, the first shots were exchanged between a native and an American outpost in the suburbs of the capital." (Foreman, 486-487)

U.S. Senator Pettigrew supported the contention that the unilateral extension of American outpost lines was the primary cause of the outbreak of the war. He said that the Filipinos were patrolling what they thought was their side of the demarcation line when the incident occurred. Here is the statement of the senator:

"It appears that there was a town between the lines of the two armies, occupied by the forces of Aguinaldo - a town 150 yards in advance of the line of the American troops - and that Otis wished to obtain possession of it. He therefore entered into an agreement to have Aguinaldo withdraw his pickets therefrom and retire to a greater distance. This was done. On the night after this had been accomplished a patrol of the insurgents entered the abandoned town. A patrol is not a war party; a patrol is simply to pick up stragglers. They had occupied the place the night before, and they sent a patrol in the evening to see if any of their men had remained behind - if there were any stragglers in this village. We had occupied the place as a picket station, and when these Malays, who do not speak our language, came along, a Nebraska boy ordered them to halt, and they did not halt." (Pettigrew, 214)

The senator also read before the U.S. Senate a letter from a soldier named Abram L. Mumpher from Colorado, supporting the claim that Americans intruded into Philippine territory, viz:

"The Nebraska regiment had been sent to Santa Mesa. Aguinaldo had vigorously protested against this and pointed out to General Otis that Santa Mesa was outside the line of the protocol. General Otis looks it up and admits to Aguinaldo that such is the case (pages 20 and 21, General Otis's report), but holds fast to the position. Here, outside the limits of the protocol, in an effort to make the insurgents move back a sentry post, the first shot was fired. Grayson, the man who fired that shot, told me, on board the Hancock, as his regiment was ready to sail for America, that it was "the damn bullheadedness of the officers in invading insurgent territory" that was responsible for that shot. But we fired the second shot and third shot before we got a response. And this was two days before the Senate was to vote upon the peace treaty, and many of the insurgent officers away from the firing line! This is the way the insurgents made what the President calls a "foul attack" upon us. But the Filipinos returned the fire and the war was on." (Pettigrew, 270)

The statement of U.S. Senator Pettigrew is essentially consistent with the testimony of Filipino soldiers to the effect that they were patrolling the distance between their two blockhouses when a group of American soldiers approached and fired upon them.  

Filipinos did not want war

The Filipinos did not want a war with the Americans. If they did, the war would have broken out much earlier. Atkinson, a noted anti-imperialist of Boston, Massachusetts, cited a report of General MacArthur about an incident on February 2, 1899, or two days before the outbreak of hostilities, indicating that Filipino officers respected the demarcation line separating the two armies:

"The original note from these headquarters, which was prepared after conference with the department commander, was carried by Major Strong, who entered the insurgent lines and placed the paper in the hands of Colonel San Miguel. The answer of Colonel San Miguel was communicated in an autograph note, which was written in the presence of Major Strong, who also saw Colonel San Miguel write an order to his officer at the outpost in question, directing him to withdraw from the American side of the line." (Philippine Information Society[1:6], 28])

According to Aguinaldo, the Filipinos could not have started the war. On that day, being Saturday, many Filipino officers were on leave and only General Pantaleon Garcia was at his post at Maypajo. Here is Aguinaldo's statement:

"While I, the Government, the Congress and the entire populace were awaiting the arrival of such a greatly desired reply [proposal for an independent Philippines under American protectorate - author], ... there came the fatal day of 4th February, during the night of which day the American forces suddenly attacked all our lines, which were in fact at the time almost deserted, because being Saturday, the day before the regular feast day, our Generals and some of the most prominent officers had obtained leave to pass the Sabbath with their respective families. General Pantaleon Garcia was the only one who at such a critical moment was at his post in Maypajo, north of Manila, Generals Noriel, Rizal and Ricarte and Colonels San Miguel, Cailles and others being away enjoying their leave. …Filipinos could never be the aggressors as against the American forces, with whom we had sworn eternal friendship and in whose power we expected to find the necessary protection to enable us to obtain recognition of our independence from the other powers. General Otis, according to trustworthy information, telegraphed to Washington stating that the Filipinos had attacked the American Army. President McKinley read aloud the telegram in the Senate, where the Treaty of Paris of the 10th December, 1898, was being discussed with a view to its ratification, the question of annexation of the Philippines being, the chief subject of debate, and through this criminal procedure secured the acceptation of the said Treaty in toto by a majority of only three votes." (Aguinaldo, 51-52)

Senor Escamillo, Aguinaldo's private secretary, was arrested by the Americans in Manila the day after the outbreak of the war. If there was anyone who should know if the Filipinos would launch an attack on American positions would be Aguinaldo's private secretary. If there was really a plan to attack the Americans, Sr. Escamilo would perhaps have the better judgment of not loitering in the city.

That the Filipinos did not intend to commence hostilities is borne out by the official report of General Otis to the Department of War in Washington, which said in part: 

"It is not believed that the chief insurgent leaders wish to open hostilities at this time"(Storey, 92,). 

The fact is the Filipinos were forced into a war.  And in response, Aguinaldo issued a General Order to the Philippine army in Malolos on February 4, 1899, viz: 

“Nine o’clock p.m., this date, I received from Caloocan station a message communicated to me that the American forces, without prior notification or any just motive, attacked our camp at San Juan del Monte and our forces garrisoning the block-houses around the outskirts of Manila, causing losses among our soldiers, who in view of this unexpected aggression and of the decided attack of the aggressors, were obliged to defend themselves until the firing became general all along the line.

 

“No one can deplore more than I this rupture of friendly relations.  I have a clear conscience that I have endeavored to avoid it at all costs, using all my efforts to preserve friendship with the army of occupation, even at the cost of not a few humiliations and many sacrificed rights.

 

“But it is my unavoidable duty to maintain the integrity of the national honor and that of the army so unjustly attacked by those who, posing as our friends and liberators, attempted to dominate us in place of the Spaniards, as is shown by the grievances enumerated in my manifesto of January 8^th last; such as the continued outrages and violent exactions committed against the people of Manila, the useless conferences and all my frustrated efforts in favor of peace and concord.

 

“Summoned by this unexpected provocation, urged by the duties imposed upon me by honor and patriotism and for the defense of the nation entrusted to me, calling on God as a witness of my good faith and the uprightness of my intentions, I order and command:

 

“1.  Peace and friendly relations between the Philippine forces and the American forces of occupation are broken, and the latter will be treated as enemies, within the limits prescribed by the laws of war.

 

“2.  American soldiers who may be captured by the Philippine forces will be treated as prisoners of war.

 

“3.  This proclamation shall be communicated to the accredited consuls of Manila, and to Congress, in order that it may accord the suspension of the constitutional guaranties and the resulting declaration of war.”

The day after the outbreak of war, Aguinaldo sent General Torres to General Otis to discuss the temporary cessation of hostilities and the establishment of a neutral zone to separate the two armies while negotiations were undertaken to resolve the conflict. General Otis refused and gave this stern reply: 

"The fighting having once begun must go on to the grim end" (Philippine Information Society [vol 1 no. 6], 38). 

This inflexible position of General Otis betrayed the true motives of the Americans and reflected the imperialist policy of McKinley when he said:

"The insurgents struck the first blow.  They reciprocated our kindness with cruelty, our mercty with Masuers ... there will be no useless parley until the insurrection is suppressed and American authority acknowledged and established. The Philippines are ours as much as Louisiana, by purchase, or Texas, or Alaska." (Sawyer, 120)

McKinley knew that the cessation of hostilities would give the American public and his enemies - the anti-imperialists - the opportunity to investigate and learn more about the character of the Filipinos and the truth about the conflict in the Philippines that could put his dream of retaining the Philippines and his chances of reelection in jeopardy.

McKinley's intervention in the Philippines became controversial in the United States. The 1900 U.S. Presidential elections saw Democrat candidate William Jennings Bryan espousing the immediate independence of the Philippines as among the principal programs of the Democratic party. Bryan's campaign rode on the declaration that McKinley was leading the United States toward imperialism. But McKinley won, and his victory signaled the death of Philippine independence. It also placed the Filipinos in an awkward position of having to prove wrong McKinley's misrepresentations: first - that the Filipinos were savages distributed among several tribes, second - that McKinley embarked on a humanitarian mission to uplift the Filipinos and prepared them for self-government, and third - that the insurgency was waged by the Tagalog tribe alone, and the rest of the other tribes were not opposed to American sovereignty. Liberal members of the U.S. Congress and prominent American citizens sharply criticized McKinley for double talk, citing his self-declared, lofty principle:

"Forcible annexation, according to our American code of morals, would be criminal aggression." (Olcott, 289)]

Conclusion

General Otis clearly understood McKinley's predicament. Dutifully, he delivered to his chief a moderate-sized war and charged it to the account of Aguinaldo. Subsequent events would show that McKinley was the principal beneficiary of the outbreak of the war. Aside from being reelected, he succeeded in acquiring the Philippine islands as an American colony with the full backing of the United States Senate and the American people, notwithstanding the prohibition in their constitution and their proud libertarian heritage. All these came about because Private Grayson fired on the Filipino lieutenant due to General Otis's maneuver to provoke the Filipinos into a war.  If there was no shootout at Sta. Mesa, the American military would have no reason to proceed beyond the city of Manila, the Treaty of Paris would have been rejected by the U.S. Senate, and the Filipinos would have proven their capacity for self-government. Obviously, given McKinley's mandate, if Grayson did not fire the first shot, another American soldier would have done it anyway.

The Cebuano Resistance to American Occupation

(This write-up is identical to the article with the same title found on pages 267-271 of the book entitled "The Filipino Tragedy and Other Historical Facts Every Filipino Should Know," published by the author.  The sources and references indicated here are contained on pages 402-415 of the book.)

Cebu was a hotbed of Filipino guerrilla activities during the war of resistance against the imposition of American sovereignty in the Philippine Islands at the close of the 19th century.

Before the arrival of the American troops in Cebu, a Filipino revolutionary government was already established on December 27, 1898, after the Spanish governor of the province, Montero, abandoned the island and sought refuge in Zamboanga. Juan Climaco and Arcadio Maxilon were responsible for the establishment of the local government and its adhesion to the Filipino government in Malolos, assisted by emissaries sent by Aguinaldo, namely: Pantaleon E. Del Rosario, Melquiades Lasala, a Cebuano of Bogo, Andres Jame, Lorega, and an Ilocano named Mateo Luga who had served in the Spanish army. The military arm was placed under the supreme command of General Arcadio Maxilon, with Juan Climaco as second in command.

In late February 1899, the American expeditionary force arrived in Cebu and the commander of the American gunboat Petrel demanded the surrender of the fort and city. The Filipino governor of the province, Luis Flores, wary of the superiority of American arms but remaining very loyal to the Filipino government under President Emilio Aguinaldo, yielded, but filed the following protest:

"In view of the verbal intimation made by the commanding officer of the U.S.S. Petrel, of the U.S. Squadron, to this government, demanding the surrender of the garrison and city of Cebu, to be accompanied by the hoisting of the American flag in the peremptory term of fourteen hours, the assembled magma, convoked for its consideration, and the members of which are representative of all the vital forces of the country, agreed unanimously to accede to said demand in view of the superiority of the American forces; but without omitting to point out that neither the government of the province nor any inhabitants thereof have the power to conclude decisive acts prohibited by the honorable president of the Filipino republic, Senor Emilio Aguinaldo, our legitimate ruler, recognized as such by virtue of his indisputable capabilities of just government and illustrious generalship and universal suffrage.

"Sad and painful is the situation of this city, without means to defense and obliged to act contrary to its own convictions: in view of which it declares before the whole world that the occupation of this town is not based on any of the laws which form the code of civilized nations, which could hardly expect to behold such scenes at the end of a century called the enlightened one.

"We are told of conquests, of protectorates, of cessions made by the Spaniards; as if the Archipelago, and especially our souls, were merchandise subject to barter, when a single one is worth more than a thousand worlds of that metal called vile, perhaps for the reason that it fascinates as the eyes of a serpent.

"But be that as it may, of all this the commanding office must treat as already stated, with Senor Aguinaldo, without whose acquiescence the act which is demanded from this government cannot be legal.

"A copy of this manifesto will be given to each of the consular agents established in this city, the greatest possible publicity will be given it, and we shall communicate with Aguinaldo, remitting him a copy of this document.

"Given in Cebu, the 22nd of February, 1899.
"Louiz Flores,
"The Commander in Chief". (Philippine Information Society 1.8: 8-9)

Eventually, the Americans ran out of patience and resorted to extreme and harsh measures. According to John Foreman, a vigorous policy of devastation was adopted. Towns, villages, and crops were laid waste; Pardo, the Filipino military center, was totally destroyed; peaceful natives who had compulsorily paid tribute to the Filipino government at whose mercy they were obliged to live, were treated as enemies; their homes and means of livelihood were demolished, and little distinction was made between the warrior and the victim of the war.

To prevent further desolation and suffering of the people, the Filipino provincial governor arranged with the American authorities for a cessation of hostilities, paving the way for the surrender of the leaders of revolutionaries after two years of a heroic stand.

Here's an account by John Foreman, in his book, The Philippines:

“In July 24, 1899, Juan Climaco and Arcadio Maxilon, chafing at the diminution of their influence in public affairs, suddenly disappeared into the interior and met at Pardo, where the military revolutionary centre was established. Aguinaldo's emissary, Pantaleon E. Del Rosario, Melquiades Lasala, a Cebuano of Bogo (known as Dading), Andres Jame, Lorega, and an Ilocano named Mateo Luga who had served in the Spanish army, led contingents under the supreme command of theinsurgent General Arcadio Maxilom. In the interior they established a fairly well-organized military government. The Island was divided into districts; there was little interference with personal liberty; taxes for the maintenance of the struggle were collected in the form of contribution according to the means of the donor; agriculture was not altogether abandoned, and for over two years the insurgents held out against American rule. The brain of the movement was centered in Juan Climaco, whilst Mateo Luga exhibited the best fighting qualities.

“In the meantime American troops were drafted to the coast towns of Tuburan, Bogo, Carmen, etc. There were several severe engagements with slaughter on both sides, notably at Monte Sudlon and Compostela. Five white men joined the insurgent leader Luga, one being an English mercenary trooper, two sailors, and two soldiers; the last two were given up at the close of hostilities; one of them was pardoned, and the other was executed in the cotta for rape committed at Mandaue.

“The co-existence of an American military administration in Cebu City conducting a war throughout the Island, and a Philippine provincial government with nominal administrative powers over the same region, but in strong sympathy with the insurgent cause, was no longer compatible. Moreover, outside the city the provincial government was unable to enforce its decrees amongst the people, who recognized solely the martial-law of the insurgents to whom they had to pay taxes. The Americans therefore abolished the provincial council, which was not grieved at its dissolution, because it was already accused by the people of being pro-American. Philippine views of the situation were expressed in a newspaper, El Nuevo Dia, founded by a lawyer, Rafael Palma, and edited conjointly by Jayme Veyra (afterwards a candidate for the Leyte Island governorship) and an intelligent young lawyer, Sergio Osmena, already mentioned at p. 521. This organ, the type and style of which favorably compared with any journal ever produced in these Islands, passed through many vicissitudes; it was alternately suppressed and reviled, whilst its editors were threatened with imprisonment in the cotta and deportation to Guam.

“Meanwhile the Americans made strenuous efforts to secure the co-operation of the Filipinos in municipal administration, but the people refused to vote. Leading citizens, cited to appear before the American authorities, persistently declined to take any part in a dual regime. The electors were then ordered, under penalties, to attend the polling, but out of hundreds who responded to the call only about 60 could be coerced into voting. Finally a packed municipal council was formed, but one of its members, a man hitherto highly respected by all, was assassinated, and his colleagues went in fear of their lives.

“The war in Panay Islands having terminated on February 2, 1901, by the general surrender at Jaro (vide p. 518), General Hughes went to Samar Island, where he failed to restore peace, and thence he proceeded to Cebu in the month of August at the head of 2,000 troops. A vigorous policy of devastation was adopted. Towns, villages and crops were laid waste; Pardo, the insurgent military centre, was totally destroyed; peaceful natives who had compulsorily paid tribute to the insurgents at who mercy they were obliged to live, were treated as enemies; their homes and means of livelihood were demolished, and little distinction was made between the warrior and the victim of the war.

“Desolation stared the people in the face, and within a few weeks the native provincial governor proposed that terms of peace should be discussed. The insurgent chief Lorega surrendered on October 22; Mateo Luga and Arcadio Maxilom submitted five days afterwards and at the end of the month a general cessation of hostilities followed. A neutral zone was agreed upon, extending from Mandaue to Sogod, and there the three peace commissioners on behalf of the Americans, namely Miguel Logara, Pedro Rodriguez, and Arsenio Climaco met the insurgent chiefs Juan Climaco and Arcadio Maxilom. As a result, peace was signed, and the document includes the following significant words, viz: putting the Philippine people in a condition to prove "their aptitude for self-government as the basis of a future independent life." After the peace, Mateo Luga and P.E. del Rosario accepted employment under the Americans, the former inspector of Constabulary and the latter as Sheriff of Cebu.

“A few months later, the Americans, acting on information received, proceeded to Tuburan on the government launch "Philadelphia," arrested Arcadio Maxilom and his two brothers, and seized the arms which they had secreted on their property. On the launch, one of the Maxiloms unsuccessfully attempted to murder the Americans and was immediately executed, whilst Arcadio and his other brother jumped overboard; but Arcadio being unable to swim, was picked up, brought to trial at Cebu, and acquitted. Thus ended the career of General Arcadio Maxilom, whom in 1904 I found living in retirement, almost a hermit's life, broken in spirit and body and worried by numerous lawsuits pending against him.

“ On April 17, 1901, Governor W. H. Taft went to Cebu accompanied by a Filipino, H. Pardo de Tavera, whose views were diametrically opposed to those of the Cebuano majority. Governor Taft established civil government there, although the law of habeas corpus had to be suspended because the war was still raging throughout the Island outside the capital. The provincial government as established by Governor Taft comprises a provincial board composed of three members, namely the Philippine Provincial Governor, the American Supervisor, and the American Treasurer; hence the Americans are in permanent majority and practically rule the Island. The executive of this body is the provincial governor and his staff. The first provincial governor appointed by Governor Taft was Julio Llorente, who resigned the magistracy in Manila and returned to Cebu to take up his new office until the election took place in January, 1902, when, by popular vote, Juan Climaco, the ex-insurgent chief, became provincial governor, and on the expiration of his term in January, 1904, he was re-elected for another two years.” (Foreman, 524-526)

The Patriot and the Elite

(This write-up is identical to the article with the same title found on pages 237-242 of the book entitled "The Filipino Tragedy and Other Historical Facts Every Filipino Should Know," published by the author.  The sources and references indicated here are contained on pages 402-415 of the book.)

An interesting exchange of letters between Benito Legarda, former cabinet member of President Aguinaldo, in whose honor one of the streets near Malacanang is named after, and Aguinaldo himself, which clearly differentiates the thinking of an elite and a patriot.

Legarda wanted the Filipinos to give up the fight and submit to American rule, while Aguinaldo defiantly stood for the continuation of the struggle.

In his reply to Legarda, Aguinaldo expressed his frustrations, which, apparently was directed towards the elite of Philippine society, when he said:

“What is life to us if we are to be the slaves of the foreigner? It is a pity that all the enlightened Filipinos do not employ their knowledge and experience in the defense of their country.”

The Legarda and Aguinaldo letters presented below were lifted verbatim from the pamphlet "The Luzon Campaign", Vol. 1, No. 7, published by the Philippine Information Society, Boston, 1901, Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Library 2005 (Philippine Information Society[1.7], 26-30).

Here is the letter from Legarda:

“Manila, July 7, I899.
“SR. DON EMILIO AGUINALDO:

“MY DEAR DON EMILIO:

“Mr. Olimpio Guamson has delivered your message to me, asking for my frank and honest opinion concerning our present political situation, and the probable future which awaits us. I shall give it with pleasure, not only because it is my duty as a Filipino, but because of the sincere friendship which binds me to you. I will refrain from making a critical judgment of all your actions prior to the 4th of February, the date of the Outbreak of Hostilities, taking them simply as data upon which to base my deductions, and will presuppose in all of them good faith from the point of view of the patriotic motives which impelled you to perform them.

“We have commenced hostilities; we have had our wish, for remember perfectly well that war was the desire of the majority in Malolos, the military element, however, being prominent in this majority, and raising its voice upon the subject, dragging after it the rest of the people. And what has been gained? Nothing but ruin, death, and desolation.

“We have not been able to prevent the Americans from going anywhere they pleased, and it has been plainly evident that the valor upon which we depended was not enough, but to conquer it is necessary to have many things which the Americans possess in abundance, and which we lack.

“As time goes on our chances for victory grow less, and the further the American troops advance so much worse is our condition for asking concessions for our unhappy country.

“Up to the present time the American troops, in my opinion, have had no other object in view than to show their bravery, a quality which had unjustly and erroneously been denied them both privately and in the public press. So far, either on that account or for other reasons, America has not sent here an army capable of a military occupation of all our territory, nor has a formal campaign been commenced; that America can do so we are unable to doubt, and that it will be done if we persist in our present attitude we may feel certain. And what will then remain to us?

“What could we ask for?

“We are in error, and yet we persist in that error, impelled by those who dream of a triumph of a party which is to-day in a minority in the United States, without perceiving that this party is also American, and that they are not going to give us our independence out of hand as a matter of sentiment at the expense of the honor of America and in spite of the grave responsibility, both international and domestic, contracted under the Treaty of Paris. Others dream that because part of the press of Europe copies from American anti-imperialist papers the criticisms of that party against the Government of President McKinley a European intervention in our favor is to take place, without reflecting that the Treaty of Paris was made before all the civilized world and with its assent.

“The war so far has only laid bare our insufficiency and our shortcomings.

“In my judgment, giving these conditions, the time has arrived for your policy to change in a radical manner, unless you wish to see forever annihilated the hope that our people may some day take its place in the concert of the civilized world, unless you wish to see the complete ruin of our race and of all our country, and unless you are willing to accept the grave responsibilities which will fall upon you. To-day then I address you as a friend and as a Filipino and say "Peace is an imperative necessity.

"Nothing can prevent the triumph of America.. Do not struggle against the inevitable.

“Peace must come some time, and the man who restores peace to the Philippines will win the admiration of the world, and the gratitude of his country. Be that man. Since 1896 you have been the soul of the people, and have merited their blessings for your wonderful and providential wisdom. Be now the peace-maker that your glory may be perpetuated. As you are the man who, when brought here by the Americans, roused the people as one to the work of our emancipation from Spain, be now the one to say 'Enough of conflict.'

“We have seen that our ideals cannot be realized by this means; let us make peace, and let us work and learn. For by working and learning with a free people, such as the Americans, we shall cast from us the vices of our old masters, and will some day win the independence we so much desire.

“This is what I believe you are called upon to do, and I think that you will never repent it. There is no other remedy - no other path open. Do not forget that many Filipinos are losing their lives every day in the defense of the impossible: that every day the ruin of property sacrificed in vain is greater, and that, if finally there is no help other than to submit to American sovereignty, it is not just to sacrifice more lives and property, whereby you will contract before God and man responsibilities of such proportions that they alarm me.

“Stop while you may, and believe me that now is the appointed time: a little later the policy of the American Government will change completely the sentiment of that free and noble people, which loves its own liberty as much as it desires that of other nations, and then a race war will come which will end in our extermination.

“I believe that with what I have said I have performed my duty and complied with your wishes. I must, however, state that I have done so freely, without suggestions or coercions of any kind, and also that I have made no special political studies, nor have I had preparation for speaking upon matters of this nature. The only merit of this opinion is that it is the manifestation of the intimate conviction of a citizen who is inspired by the best of good faith and the desire of his people.

“I am, as ever, your affectionate friend and obedient servant,

“B. LEGARDA.”

And here is Aguinaldo's reply:

“Personal.
“REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
“OFFICE OF THE PRSESIDENT,
“Tarlac, September 14, 1899.

“SR. BENITO LEGARDA, Manila.

“MY DISTINGUISHED FRIEND:

“Your two kind letters have reached my hands and I have informed myself of all you say in them. Many thanks for the information you give me. I beg that you will pardon me for my delay in making reply, but I must tell you that sometime elapsed before they reached me.

“I believe what you tell me as to the re-enforcements of the enemy which will not be long in arriving. Not only do I believe this, but I am convinced of this fact, and even before the outbreak of hostilities was sure that with their wealth and their innumerable and powerful elements of war, they could, whenever they so desired, send as many as they need.

“In reply to this I must tell you that it is impossible for me to turn back from the enterprise which I have undertaken -that of defending our country, and especially as I have sworn that as long as life lasts I shall labor until I gain the acknowledgment of the independence of the Philippines. Do not attribute this declaration to my vanity, but to my desire to fulfill a former promise. This, aside from the fact that the struggle for the independence of our country is just and based upon our perfect rights.

“We are not alarmed by the numerous arms nor the valor of our enemy. What is life to us if we are to be the slaves of the foreigner? It is a pity that all the enlightened Filipinos do not employ their knowledge and experience in the defense of their country. I repeat, we will not give up the struggle until we gain our longed-for independence: death is of but little moment to us if we are but able to ensure the happiness of the people and of future generations.

“We must no longer allow ourselves to be fascinated by the flattering promises of the enemy. You know that they first solemnly assured me that they would acknowledge our independence. Nevertheless, the attempt is now being made to force autonomy on us by superior strength. They have been using explosive bullets since the 9th of August last, and have bombarded defenseless forts, contrary to the precepts of international law. But it matters not that they use these elements of destructive warfare. Resistance and firmness of our resolution will be sufficient to wear them out. If this is not enough to induce our enemies to desist from their endeavor, we will go, if necessary, into the mountains, but never will we accept a treaty of peace dishonorable to the Philippine arms and disastrous to the future of the country, such as that which they seek to impose.

“For this reason I advise all those who do not feel themselves strong enough to accept this sacrifice, and whose services are not indispensable to our Government, to return to Manila and the towns occupied by the enemy, reserving themselves to strengthen the organization of our Government when our independence is gained, replacing those who, wearied by the struggle, are in need of rest.

“I am not displeased that some Filipinos have consented to hold office under the Americans; on the contrary, I rejoice that they have done so, for thus they will be enabled to form a true estimate of the character of the Americans. I also rejoice that our enemies having had recourse to the Filipinos for the discharge of the duties of high positions in the public service in its various branches, have shown that they recognize the capacity of our people for self-government.

“Before closing I take the liberty of addressing you the following question: To what is due that policy of attraction employed by our enemy if not to the resistance of our army?

“One should never repent of a just determination.

“Kind regards to your family, and to Messrs. Arellano, Pardo, Torres, and other friends.

“Command at will your most affectionate friend,

“E. AGUINALDO.”