To the American People - an appeal

(This item is identical to Appendix IV with the same title found on pages 376-384 of the book entitled "The Filipino Tragedy and Other Historical Facts Every Filipino Should Know," published by the author.)

“PLEASE READ AND CIRCULATE 

“To the American People – an Appeal

“By: GALICANO APACIBLE

“God Almighty knows how unjust is the war which the Imperial arms have provoked and are maintaining against our unfortunate country! If the honest American patriots could understand the sad truth of this declaration, we are sure they would, without the least delay, stop this unspeakable horror. And, that they may have a just understanding of it, we entreat them to hear our voice, to meditate on our exhortations and to weigh our statements against the misrepresentations under which Imperialism seeks to conceal its designs. Turn not away from our prayer, Americans, but listen, and give judgment according to reason and conscience.

“We, the Filipinos, are a civilized, progressive and peace-loving people. Many impartial writers and speakers have testified that we are advanced in civilization, that we are capable of improvement, that many of our people for two centuries have enjoyed the advantages of university education, that the number of illiterates among our people is small, and that as artists, scientists, magistrates, generals and dignitaries of the Church, the sons of the Philippines, have distinguished themselves greatly and have achieved many positions of eminence, especially so in Spain. That we are progressive, was well shown by the conduct of our whole country when, at the time of the capitulation of the city of Manila, the inhabitants of our islands, supposing themselves to have entered upon a career of national independence that was to be assured to them by the United States Government, instead of abandoning themselves to any revolutionary fever and excess, established with careful thought and scrupulous regard for justice a prudent government which respected all rights created legitimately; they convoked a Congress whose legislative work has not been justly criticized by anybody; they re-organized the administrative machinery which had been disturbed by recent struggles: telegraphs, railroads and means of communication began to work. regularly; we had adopted the electric light in some of our towns; and we had established a new university, four high and several primary schools. In brief, the new nation had entered upon a path of progress which already promised a bright future. All this progress the Imperialists have disturbed; all this progress have they destroyed. 

“For proof that we love peace, we ask you to remember the story of our relations with Spain. For three hundred years our country has been at the mercy of Spanish domination; we were the subjects of that monarchy; the government of that nation denied us any voice in the enactment of remedial legislation: they denied us representation in the Spanish Cortes. They allowed themselves to be directed by the most reactionary elements and took counsel chiefly from the friars who sought to estrange the mother country from us and to deny us the blessings of liberty, so that they might the more completely exploit us at their will. They denied us freedom of the press, restricted the right of peaceable assembly and violated the security of our homes. They created the so called administrative process (expedientes gubernativos); so that, often, without hearing and without trial the most peaceful citizen was snatched from his house and condemned to the miseries of banishment. In brief, the Spanish- government, whose despotic cruelty American Imperialism now imitates, and in some respects surpasses, denied to us many of the liberties which you were already enjoying when, under pretext of oppression, you revolted against British domination. Notwithstanding these great wrongs we submitted quietly, confining our protests to earnest prayers for reparation; such was our love of peace. Only when we became convinced that our requests were absolutely disregarded, that the most worthy officials were removed from office, even those of' eminent character, when it was made known that they had manifested even a slight sympathy for us, when we had lost every hope of peaceful remedy and all faith in the oft promised liberal reforms, only then it was that the armed protest, the Philippine revolution, the most justifiable of all revolutions, began. It was an uprising void of every feeling of hatred and revenge toward Spain, the country that we respected and loved; it was a revolt against her bad government, just as we now revolt, not against America, whose power and greatness we recognize, and whose justice we still hope to see proven, but against her unworthy rulers. Those who tell you that we are an adventurous and seditious people, ready to go to war at the least pretext, basely deceive you in this as in many other calumnies invented by the Imperialists. If, yesterday, we fought against Spain, and, to-day, are resisting your powerful arms, even though sure to be vanquished, it is because we have been forced as a last resort to an unequal and bloody war for the attainment of an aspiring people's legitimate ambitions. Thus we can repeat proudly and with the firmness of one who carries the truth on his lips and in his heart, that if our character and culture entitle us to independence, still more do we show ourselves entitled to it by the high motives which have always inspired our resistance. Why, then, do you deny us liberty? Why, forgetful of all your history and the noble precepts of your illustrious forefathers, are, you fighting against the cause of Independence, of Progress and of Justice, which is our cause? What has come to pass between you and us that should cause you to permit this incredible and monstrous war to be waged against us?

“When you declared war against Spain you proclaimed to the world at large that you had appealed to arms only in order to free oppressed peoples; and when your flag waved before the coasts of the Philippines on powerful vessels which easily destroyed the weak fleet of the enemy it was an emblem of liberty then. Your diplomatic representatives invited the most famous of our Filipino leaders, Hon. E. Aguinaldo, to an offensive alliance against those whom you represented to us as a 'common enemy," in order that by vanquishing them, we might achieve our aspirations for peace and happiness. It was then that your idol, Admiral Dewey, and your distinguished generals. Merritt and Anderson, treated us as friends and allies, saying sincerely that we were fit for independence, even more so, as the admiral asserted, than the Cubans to whom you have with equity promised to give it. It was then that the flag of the new Philippine nation waved in the shadow of the Stars and Stripes at Manila Bay. It was then that the independence of the Philippines was proclaimed at Cavite, within range of your cannons, without any opposition, and in almost the very words of your immortal Declaration. It was then that your soldiers hailed the new nation, while ours were cheering the American liberators. It was then, to save your cause, since you had assured us that your cause embraced our freedom, that the Filipinos gave their blood for you in your fight against valiant and obstinate enemy, and at the same time placed in your reach all available resources and aid. You were at that moment almost at the point of breaking into hostilities with another nation which had manifested her sympathy for Spain by attempting to bar at Subig Bay the course of what you yourselves had called "an army of liberation." That was the hour of the beautiful fiction: now we seem to have come to the time of the bitter reality, the cruel disenchantment. Then we were received and treated as allies; now we are scourged back into the mountains and denied every right except that of fighting the very flag in whose beneficent shadow we had expected to find freedom and happiness. From the outset our country took sides with the United States in the war with Spain, and we marched proudly with your sons as comrades in arms, as soldiers in the same cause, to victory. At all times during that war, and for months afterward, the civil, military and naval authorities of the United States caused us to hope for Independence. Papers and pamphlets advocating this ideal were published in Manila under the protection of the United States authorities: with their consent the revolutionary army had been conquering the Spanish positions and establishing in them provincial governments dependent on that of the Filipine Republic. America was then a great republic, releasing the Cubans and the Filipinos from the iron grasp of an imperial government and conducting them to emancipation and freedom; and our people hailed the Stars and Stripes as an emblem of freedom, as the token of liberty for the living and the badge of honor for the patriots dead. With renewed energy, with proud alacrity, with fearless determination they pressed on, side by side with your noble sons, to the end. What reward did we get? Did the expected freedom come to us? No! As a requital for our sacrifices and as a reward for our loyalty, subjugation is offered to us instead of freedom. We may have a colonial government of the United States, administered in a foreign language, instead of the colonial government of Spain, which, at least, was administered in a language already known to us and which we have made ours. We are to have a colonial government which will deny us the citizenship of its nation. In spite of their imperialistic tendencies, the Spanish government never went so far as to deny us citizenship!

“When, on a day of sad recollections, we declined to accept this shame, when we protested against this iniquitous ingratitude, then the guns of the United States were turned upon us; we were denounced as traitors and rebels; you destroyed the homes to which you had been welcomed as honored guests, killing thousands of those who had been your allies, mutilating our old men, our women and our children, and watering with blood and strewing with ruins the beautiful soil of our Fatherland. Behold. therefore, Americans, and consider not only our right to independence but what your conduct has been, and what your plain duty is towards us in good faith, and then judge, in view of these antecedents, whether the crusade of extermination which the Imperialists have inaugurated against our unfortunate country is a worthy one, whether it is just, and whether it is in the least degree excusable. These and only these are the true terms of the simple problem. Do not give ear to the specious arguments of those who, in order to excuse a political crime and in order to disguise their greed and covetousness, tell you the contrary by means of assertions whose falseness is as great as the bad faith of their author. They tell you that we are incapable of self-government, as if the accomplished facts had not proven the contrary; and as if, also, all the Americans who had calmly judged us, previous to this war of conquest, had not unanimously asserted otherwise. They assure you that there exist deep divisions among us and that the withdrawal of the American troops would create anarchy and misgovernment in our country, as if it were not evident that the most complete order prevailed there until the Imperial troops had with their unjust war, brought confusion. They tell you that the government of the Philippine Republic had never been recognized by the whole country. This is a manifest falsehood, because it had been recognized even by the Mohammedans in the South, whom the Imperialists, their friends and allies, boast so much of having reduced to submission; and by the mountain races of Luzon, who always refused to recognize the Spanish Government and who will do the same to the American Government. The Philippine government is the only one which can conciliate and redeem them, for in that government only have their confidence a success for civilization which Imperialism could never accomplish. They assert that the existence of these mountain races makes the Philippine Independence impossible. This is an absurd assertion, which would be equal to maintaining that you are incapable of self-government simply because there are Indians on your soil in a proportion almost equal to that which the Ingorrotes, Aetas, etc., represent among us. They mislead you with the idea that because the Tagalogs, the Visayos, the Ilocanos, etc., speak different dialects, it is not feasible for us to constitute a national unity. This is an objection of gross ignorance which forgets that in the most civilized European nations people speak different dialects and even different languages, as in the highly civilized Switzerland; it is also a sophistical objection which overlooks the fact that in all the provinces of the Archipelago, in the Tagal, the Visayan, and the Ilocos provinces, etc., whose inhabitants are of the same ethnical condition and culture, the only language officially spoken is the Spanish. They allege that the majority of the Filipinos are in favor of the American sovereignty, and that they would rather be colonials of America than be independent. This is a base falsehood, which belies the fact of the thousands of soldiers which the Imperialists have had to put on the islands, and of the regime of military tyranny, more terrible than was ever known before by us, of which they were compelled to avail themselves, imprisoning thousands of honest people, suppressing serious newspapers, and other endless abuses against all law, in order to smother the cries for independence. They also tell you that we were the aggressors in the present war, as if it were not evident how much we have done in order to prevent the outbreak of hostilities with which we were daily provoked, and how many times we proposed a cessation in the fight in order that we may come to an agreement, a demand which your rulers nave always refused to grant us. They further tell you that our country has great and unexploited riches and that with it America would gain. This is a new deception of Imperialism, because such treasures, even the mines, have already been carefully exploited by Spaniards, Germans, and English, and they never obtained the marvelous success of which Imperialism now dreams; on the contrary, the record of these exploitations shows more failure than success. They go on to say that there are in our country rich lands to distribute and cultivate. To this the deceived American immigrants who, believing such promises, shall go and succumb to the rigors of the climate, so fatal to their race, will answer accursing those who made them leave their rich and habitable land. That the highest interests of Christianity demand the retention of the Islands, is another deception, because if our subjugation becomes a reality, we could never forget how much religious fanaticisms have had to do with it, and our present Christian belief would, stagger and perhaps we would look with distrust on the creeds of our subjugators. Finally, the Imperialists say that God trusted in their hands the government of the future destinies of the Philippines, as if the Supreme Spirit could have been incarnated in the gold of the twenty millions of dollars which were paid to Spain, and in the steel of the quick-firing guns which are mutilating the unfortunate Filipinos.

“No, do not listen to the false assertions of the Imperialists, listen only to the voice of reason and justice. Heed not the suggestions of those who pretend to excite your national self-love and your innermost feelings, in order that you may convert yourselves into docile instruments of their cupidity and ambition, of their immoralities and scandals which are peculiar, to every colonial administration, and which have already dishonored the until now immaculate name of America and her foreign policy. Do not be deceived by false charges, nor allured by false promises. Give judgment without hypocrisy and without self-deception. On the one hand your honor and your glorious traditions are calling upon you to accord to us our rightful and well-earned independence. On the other hand the distorted dreams of avarice, the dark conspiracies of greed and remorseless ambition, nurses of Imperialism throughout all time, these counsel you to uphold the war of subjugation which your rulers, but not your people, have authorized and forced upon us. Choose, then sons of Washington, of Jefferson and of Lincoln, between these two alternatives: Freedom for the hapless peoples who are in your power, and thus, under God's just laws, the recompense to you of a larger freedom for yourselves, or, tyranny and destruction for your struggling but helpless victims, whose wrongs the Great Ruler of all will in due time avenge by the mournful destruction of your own liberties. Shall it be generosity, or colonial greed? Shall it be right, or wrong? Give ear to your own conscience, and we are sure you will incline yourselves toward mercy, toward justice, and toward the only honorable course that will restore peace to our ransacked homes and to our devastated fields, stopping at once and forever this horrible war which has already cost so much in treasure and blood, and which, if not abandoned, will yet cost much more, because our resolution is fixed: Liberty or death; independence or annihilation.

“Why do the Imperialists wish to subjugate us? What do they intend to do with us? Do they expect us to surrender to yield our inalienable rights, our homes, our properties, our lives, our future destinies, to the absolute control of the United States? What would you do with our nine millions of people? Would you permit us to take-part in your elections? Would you concede to us the privilege of sending Senators and Representatives to your Congress? Would you allow us to erect one or more federal states? Or, would you tax us without representation? Would you change your tariff laws so as to admit our products free of duty and in competition with the products of your own soil? And thus would you allow the American trusts to utilize our cheap labor in the manufacture of goods that would compete with the products of your own factories? Would you permit the trusts to bottle up our people to sub serve their own ends, depriving us even of those liberties which you are enjoying Would you admit our artisans, mechanics, laborers, and servants to take employment in your country on an equal footing with American citizens, Indians and Negroes? Would you allow us to prohibit Chinese immigration? Would you permit us to retain our own language and not force us to adopt yours? Would you let us elect our own local officers? Would you allow us to share your offices, your honors and your privileges? And, as for the saloons (which were almost unknown in Manila before) would you allow them to go on multiplying at the appalling rate at which their number has increased there within the past two years? Would you allow the lands in the Philippines to remain at all untaxed, as formerly, simply because some religious corporations have acquired enormous and fraudulent properties in them? Would you remove your American soldiery and permit us to create an army of our own? Or, if you were determined to maintain a powerful army and fleet in order to protect your newly acquired "property" from foreign ambitions, aid from our natural and perpetual anxieties for liberty, would you do this solely at your own expense, because the revenues of a poor country like ours could not do so? You who so ardently protest against the destruction by England of two small republics which challenged her to war, would you continue to remain indifferent whilst your rulers are engaged in annihilating a weaker republic which is much more helpless than those of South Africa, and which, far from declaring war against you, was your obliging friend, your successful ally? What would you do with the Philippines and with the Filipinos if you refused to allow them to become a new American state, if you refused to allow them to enjoy your citizenship?

“Imperialism knows not how to answer these questions. It is inspired only by greed, by a vile thirst for gold and by the lust of spoliation. But, ever misled by its ruthless impulses, it cannot determine which would be its better plan, which should be its settled purpose for the future, or how far it may safely indulge its insatiable appetites. For the dilemma is inexorable: either the retention of the Philippine Islands, if it is realized with a noble purpose, will result in great harm to your industries and your commerce, or, it will become a system of merciless and shameful colonial spoliation which will forever blot out the honor of whatever there is that is lofty and noble in your history. Can it be possible, sons of America, that you will allow us to become subjects or slaves? Should this happen, how will you reconcile it with the wise and noble principles set forth in your Declaration of Independence: 'That all men are created equal: that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.' Will you transform these beautiful and honorable sentiments into specious deceits, fraudulent promises, and high-sounding but hollow words? No! You cannot belie your whole history. You cannot tolerate the violation which Imperialism is so evidently working against your most venerable and fundamental principles. Until Congress succeeds in redressing the illegal aggressions of which we are the victims, and shall suppress these violations of reason, of solemn contracts and of the elementary conceptions of gratitude, we shall rely upon and appeal to the high sense of justice which has hitherto so honorably characterized the free American conscience. We do not believe you will allow us to be enslaved; it would be a dishonor to yourselves.

"Influence, then, as soon as possible your legislators and rulers to give us self-government, which by right belongs to us, and peace will be restored immediately, to your benefit and ours, ending the now incessant and fruitless bloodshed entailed upon us by the present war.

“We are ready to make peace, and, in order to facilitate this end, we propose:

“First: That we will pay back to the United States the twenty million dollars paid by them to Spain.

“Second: That the most amicable and perpetual commercial relations shall exist between us for our mutual benefit and for the greater progress of our country.

“Third: That we will grant to the United States whatever space is reasonably necessary for coaling stations outside of our established cities.

“Fourth: That we will not allow monopolies of any kind in the Islands, and that we will give to your citizens all the guarantees and protection accorded to our own citizens for the security of life and property.

“Fifth: That we are ready to entertain whatever terms you may -desire for yourselves, so long as they do not infringe upon our individual and political liberties, or upon the integrity of our nationality.

“After these offers, it only remains that you, the free citizens of America, for the glory of your name throughout the world and for the honor of your flag, shall do justice. Thus shall the hands of your noble sons be no longer stained with innocent blood. Thus shall it not be said that the vile inspirations of greed have banished from your hearts those lofty traditions of liberty and philanthropy which you have inherited from your honest forefathers.

 

“Toronto, June, 1900.

“For the Central Filipino Committee,

“G. APACIBLE”

"Emilio Aguinaldo - Rectifying an Omission"

(This item is identical to Appendix V with the same title found on pages 385-389 of the book entitled "The Filipino Tragedy and Other Historical Facts Every Filipino Should Know," published by the author.)

Emilio Aguinaldo – Rectifying an Omission 

On the twenty-second of this month, over a century ago, a man was born in this province, a man who became in the words of an adversary who respected him, the “incarnation of his people’s aspiration.”   He was a man whom we honor by naming this institution of higher learning after him.  But he was also a man whom we have not honored enough.  The full measure of his worth, of his importance to his nation and its history, lies obscured by controversy and legend. 

It is time that we, the beneficiaries of his early exertions, rectify this omission.  How many times we have celebrated our independence and the historic events that led to it – the proclamation of the First Republic at Kawit, Biak-na-bato, the event at the Barasoain Church in Malolos, not to mention the accession to independence on July 4, 1946 – which only a passing reference to the man who made all these possible.  Generalissimo Emilio Aguinaldo, the first president of the first Filipino republic, father and founder of the Filipino nation. 

Is it because after his capture in Palanan in 1901 by American forces he ceased to personify the aspirations of the Filipino people?  Or is it because after that date, those aspirations ceased to have any meaning for Filipinos?  Either because they had been fulfilled, or, there was no prospect of their fulfillment? 

More than three generations of Filipinos have been born since those events of which I speak.  It has been seventeen years since he died.  It is time that our nation rectify its neglect of this man.  For his true worth is now emerging in our consciousness.  

In 1964, just after his death, the then president of the Senate, President Ferdinand E. Marcos, said in his eulogy:

 

“He and his comrades had been forgotten so long by an ungrateful people.  Not only had he been forgotten.  The soldier had been laughed at and his dreams derided.  He had been pilloried and maligned.  But he had kept his silence in quiet dignity.  And this he knew: that while his body suffered, his cause had triumphed.  For he had moulded with his hands and watered with his blood the First Republic established by a brown people.” 

This is what truly mattered to General Aguinaldo: his cause had triumphed.  This is what we must honor him for.  Our nation, ever more grateful as the years go by must do more to keep his memory alive, more than it has ever done before.  

For  Emilio Aguinaldo was a truly remarkable man.  Quite apart from his importance in history, he personified, as General J. Franklin Bell rightly recognized, “the legitimate aspirations of the Filipino people.”  He was, as another American admirer (General Arthur MacArthur), the very “incarnation of the revolution.”  Only a step removed from the common man, although his family was of the principalia of Kawit, Emilio Aguinaldo did not belong to the ilustrado, that class of western-educated intelligentsia that played such an important role in fomenting revolutionary aspirations and at the same time negating their fulfillment not only in the Philippines but also in other colonized countries.  Byu not belonging to that class, but recognizing its potential, Aguinaldo did not fall afoul of its hesitancy – not to mention its vested interest – but he was able at the same time to call on them, bring them into the movement, thus bridging the gap between them and the masses, who followed Aguinaldo’s leadership instinctively and unhesitatingly.  Simply put, Aguinaldo had the charisma of leadership of all claases of men. 

It was a moment in history when the Filipino people did not want for heroes, martyrs, and models.  There were many: the martyr-priests, Rizal, who provided the literature of the revolution, Mabini, who voiced its ideology, Bonifacio, who set the masses in motion.  There were lawyers, engineers, doctors, and other educated minds who were available if their intellects were needed to guide a movement and a government.  But above all the revolution needed the steadying hand, the courage, and the organizational genius of a leader.  It needed a leader who could bring all these scattered elements together, and whip them into a disciplined and effective force.  It needed a leader who could weld disunited and often antagonistic factions into a unified and coherent movement.  It needed a leader who could lead an army into battle, wage a war, organize a government, and establish a Republic for the first time in the history of that people.  The Filipino people found such a man in Emilio Aguinaldo. 

The full extent of the neglect by us of that part of our history is only now emerging, and we have missed the opportunity to recognize great service to the nation by a leader while he was still with us.  If a revolution devours its sons, he was surely one of its victims.  He did what he could best do, and that was to lead a revolution, overcome a colonial oppressor, establish a revolutionary government, and wage war against a new colonizer, all in the space of five short years, with pitiful resources and no foreign aid, in the end, ranged against one of the most powerful countries on earth.  If, after all, his achievements, he did not become something of a leader, that was not his fault.  Neither was it the fault of the American regime that it did not accord the recognition that he so richly deserved, for he was the embodiment, in the eyes of that regime, of resistance.  Thus, he was glossed over in the search for symbols for the Filipino people.  The true record of his achievements is now available to us, lately in a work of Mr. Aflredo Saulo, and it will, I am certain, set the record straight. 

In our search for symbols, we are likely to romanticize history at the expense of the less flamboyant, quiet, but solid achievement.  The brilliance of certain personalities in our history cannot be gainsaid, but the larger picture is what counts most. Ours was the first successful revolution against a colonial master in Asia.  Ours was the First Republic and the first Democratic Constitution of a liberated people.  Ours antedated the Chinese Revolution, it was the first guerrilla war in Asia waged by a colonized people against not only one, but two, colonial powers, antedating Vietnam by a good fifty years. 

Generalissimo Emilio Aguinaldo deserves a larger and more central place in the history of our struggle for self-determination and our national liberation.  For he was the leader who made all these “firsts” possible.  His was a sustained drive toward the full independence of the Philippines, which came to grief only because at that time it was not yet fashionable for colonial peoples to be freed from the yoke of colonial rule, denying Aguinaldo the assistance of the International Community.  For the rest of his, Aguinaldo had to watch on the sidelines as Filipinos lost their revolutionary ardor and their perspective on history. 

It is not too late to regain that perspective and pay our debt to this man.  Aguinaldo's life, his career as a soldier, statesman, and leader of men have all the necessary elements of a truly great national hero.  He was respected by all his adversaries.  The Spanish naturally feared him.  The American consul and war correspondent who knew him says of him:  “In the nineteenth century there has not been a more unique figure among the native races of the earth than this Tagalog patriot.”  It is only the Filipino people who have not honored him properly.  It is time that they did so. 

May I suggest that the name of the province of Cavite be changed to Aguinaldo and that a monument be erected in his memory on the Luneta.  These are tributes that he fully deserves in the same manner that the name of the province of Tayabas was changed to Quezon and the province Rizal (formerly Morong) was named after our national hero.  It is not too late to glorify with visible honors a great hero who had the courage, the wisdom, and the vision to lead our country in an unequal fight to achieve our freedom.  His was the first attempt and with the limited means at his disposal, he succeeded in winning victory after victory against the forces of what was once a powerful colonial empire. 

For by doing so, by putting his memory back in the heart of every Filipino man, woman, and child, as they had done in the case of Rizal, Bonifacio, Mabini, they would be doing themselves a great service, just as they would if they were to pay greater homage to Lapu-Lapu, Diego Silang, Dagohoy, Sultan Kudarat, and others who kept the flame of freedom and dignity alive and contributed to that nationhood which today we have begun to fully realize. 

The habiliments of a traditional hero sutied him ill – he was shy, prudent to a fault and remarkably unassertive.  But he had one shining virtue: He had the will of iron in his undeviating pursuit of the ideals of his people. 

National heroes come in different molds.  Nehru and Washington were patricians.  But to find the closest analogue to Aguinaldo, we have to go back to classical times.  He was the Cincinnatus of the Philippines, called to action by popular claim and by his own overriding sense of duty. 

Of General Aguinaldo it can be said in the words of a great poet:

 

“Those who were truly great,

Who wore in their hearts The fire’s centre

Born of the sun, They traveled briefly in the sun. 

And left the vivid air

Singed with their honour.”

The Controversial Pratt-Aguinaldo Agreement

(This write-up is identical to the article with the same title found on pages 129-141 of the book entitled "The Filipino Tragedy and Other Historical Facts Every Filipino Should Know," published by the author. The sources and references indicated here are contained on pages 402-415 of the book.)

The American involvement in the Philippines was initiated by then Commodore George Dewey while the American Asiatic fleet was anchored in Mirs Bay in China near Hongkong in March 1898,  awaiting orders,  in anticipation of the declaration of war against Spain (war was declared on April 24, 1898). At that time also, Emilio Aguinaldo and several leaders of the revolution of 1896-1897 were residing in Hongkong as exiles, in compliance with the provisions of the Pact of Biak-na-bato.

The First Meeting with Aguinaldo

According to Aguinaldo, the commander of the U.S.S. Petrel, Captain Wood, acting as an emissary of Dewey, called on him on March 16, 1898, to urge him to return to the Philippines, to renew hostilities against the Spaniards, with the object of gaining independence. He was assured of American assistance in terms of armaments and supplies, and protection of the U.S. fleet.  Another meeting on the subject was held on the 6th of April. (Aguinaldo[True Version], 6)

When asked by Aguinaldo what the United States would concede to the Filipinos, the Commander replied: “The United States is a great and rich nation and needs no colonies.” (Aguinaldo[True Version], 7)

The series of meetings was interrupted because Aguinaldo had to leave Hongkong to escape the suit filed by Isabelo Artacho on April 15, 1898, for the division of the money that Aguinaldo deposited in two Hongkong banks, which was paid by the Spaniards in consideration of the peace pact of Biak-na-bato.

Aguinaldo left Hongkong on the 7th of April for Saigon and proceeded to Singapore, traveling incognito to evade Spanish spies who were tracking his whereabouts. He was accompanied by Gregorio del Pilar and Jose Leyba. The group arrived in Singapore on the 21st of April. They stayed in the house of a Filipino resident dentist by the name of Dr. Marcelino Santos.

The Meeting in Singapore

The American Consul-General in Singapore, Edward Spencer-Pratt, was alerted by Admiral Dewey of Aguinaldo’s arrival. That same day Aguinaldo received a visitor, Howard W. Bray, an Englishman, a long-time resident of the Philippines, who left his business and property in the islands to escape the Spanish misrule. He was known to Aguinaldo in the Philippines as a family friend. Bray made the arrangement for Mr. Pratt and Aguinaldo to meet at “The Mansions” on River Valley Road in April 24th. Also present during the meeting were Mr. Bray, Dr. Santos, Gregorio del Pilar, and Jose Leyba.  A second meeting was held at Raffles Hotel the day after.

According to Aguinaldo, Consul Pratt told him:

“That the United States would at least recognize the Independence of the Philippines under the protection of the United States Navy. The Consul added that there was no necessity for entering into a formal written agreement because the word of the Admiral and of the United States Consul were in fact equivalent to the most solemn pledge that their verbal promises and assurance would be fulfilled to the letter and were not to be classed with Spanish promises or Spanish ideas of a man's word of honour. In conclusion the Consul said, “The Government of North America is very honest, just, and powerful government.” (Aguinaldo[True Version], 10)

On the 28th of April, Mr. Pratt telegrammed Washington, viz:

“On the evening of Saturday, the 23rd instant, I was confidentially informed of the arrival here, incognito, of the supreme leader of the Philippine insurgents, General Emilio Aguinaldo, by Mr. Howard W. Bray, an English gentleman of high standing, who, after fifteen years residence as a merchant and planter in the Philippines, had been compelled by the disturbed condition of things resulting from Spanish misrule to abandon his property and leave there, and from whom I had previously obtained much valuable information for Commodore Dewey regarding fortifications, coal deposits, etc., at different points in the islands.

“Being aware of the great prestige of General Aguinaldo with the insurgents, and that no one, either at home or abroad, could exert over them the same influence and control that he could, I determined at once to see him, and, at my request, a secret interview was accordingly arranged for the following morning, Sunday, the 24th, in which, besides General Aguinaldo, were only present the general’s trusted advisers and Mr. Bray, who acted as interpreter…. I telegraphed the commodore the same day as follows, through our consul-general at Hongkong:

“Aguinaldo, insurgent leader, here. Will come Hongkong. Arrange with commodore for general cooperation insurgents Manila if desired.

Telegraph. Pratt.”

The commodore’s reply reading thus:

“Tell Aguinaldo come soon as possible. Dewey.”

I received it late that night, and at once communicated it to General Aguinaldo, whom, with his aide-de-camp and private secretary, all under assumed names, I succeeded in getting off by the British steamer Malacca, which left here on Tuesday, the 26th.

“E. Spencer Pratt,

U.S. Consul-General at Singapore.” (Robinson, 42-43, citing U.S. Senate Document No. 62, Part I, Fifty-fifth Congress, Third Session, Despatch 212)

The meeting between Aguinaldo and Consul Pratt was big news in Singapore. The Singapore Free Press published an article on May 4, 1898, citing the historic event and the agreement of cooperation between Aguinaldo and Dewey, detailing the policy of Aguinaldo in collaborating with the Americans, as follows:

“General Aguinaldo’s policy embraces the independence of the Philippines, whose internal affairs would be controlled under European and American advisers. American protection would be desirable temporarily, on the same lines as that which might be instituted hereafter in Cuba. The ports of the Philippines would be free to the trade of the world, safeguards being enacted against an influx of Chinese aliens who would compete with the industrious population of the country. There would be a complete reform of the present corrupt judicature of the country under experienced European law officers. Entire freedom of the press would be established, as well as the right of public meeting. There would be general religious toleration and steps would be taken for the abolition and expulsion of the tyrannical religious fraternities who have laid such strong hands on every branch of civil administration. Full provision would be given for the exploration of the natural resources and wealth of the country by roads and railways, and the removal of hindrances to enterprise and investment of capital. Spanish officials would be removed to a place of safety until opportunity offered to return them to Spain. The preservation of public safety and order and the checking of reprisals against Spaniards would, naturally, have to be a first care of the Government in the new state of things.” (The Singapore Free Press, May 4, 1898, p. 3)

Consul Pratt did not question the publishers of the newspaper about the items of commitments mentioned in the article, more particularly, on the subject of independence. He even sent clippings of the newspaper to Washington.

The Filipino Serenade of Pratt

On or about three weeks after the Pratt-Aguinaldo meeting, the Filipino community in Singapore led by Dr. Marcelino Santos serenaded Consul-General Pratt at his residence. In his message of congratulation and expression of gratitude  Dr. Santos said this:

“Our countrymen at home, and those of us residing here, refugees from Spanish misrule and tyranny in our beloved native land, hope that the United States, your nation, persevering in its humane policy, will efficaciously second the programme arranged between you, Sir, and General Aguinaldo in this port of Singapore, and secure to us our independence under the protection of the United States.” ((Singapore[Pratt and Philippinos], 3, emphasis supplied)

Consul Pratt gave this reply:

“Gentlemen, the honour you have conferred upon me is so unexpected that I cannot find appropriate words with which to thank you, with which to reply to the eloquent address you have just read to me. Rest assured, however, that I fully understand and sincerely appreciate the motives that have prompted your present action, and that your words, which have sunk deep in my heart, shall be faithfully repeated to the President, to Admiral Dewey, and to the American people, from whom I am sure that they will meet with full and generous response.”

The Filipino side was clear in their attestation of independence.  Again, there was no qualification from the side of Mr. Pratt, nor a comment about the matter of independence.  Mr. Pratt's reaction can only be interpreted as acquiescence that that was the arrangement with Aguinaldo, which the Consul later denied.

Aguinaldo Back in Hongkong

Aguinaldo and his two aides returned to Hongkong on the 1st of May but he was unable to meet with Commodore Dewey because the Asiatic fleet had already sailed for Manila. In the meantime, Aguinaldo received an invitation from Consul Rounsevelle Wildman to meet at the U.S. Consulate. In this meeting, he was told that Commodore Dewey had made arrangements for a gunboat to take him across to the Philippines. They also agreed on the matter of purchase and shipment of arms to the islands. The sum of $50,000 was handed to Consul Wildman which was used to purchase a steam launch, 2,000 rifles, and 200,000 rounds of ammunition. (Aguinaldo[True Version], 14)

On the same day, a meeting of the Filipino junta was immediately convened with the following in attendance: Felipe Agoncillo, Mariano Llanera, Miguel Malvar, Andres Garchitorena, Severo Buenaventura, Anastasio Francisco, Teodoro Sandico, Maximo Kabigting, Faustino Lichauco, Antonio Montenegro, and Doroteo Lopez. The issue to resolve was the insistence of Aguinaldo that it would be reckless to go to the Philippines in the absence of a written agreement with Admiral Dewey.

Agoncillo recommended that Aguinaldo should go home because of the “advantages which would come to the Philippines if the president (Aguinaldo) should go there in the present critical circumstances and the great injury could which was sure to be done if his departure was postponed any longer”. It was also the consensus that if Washington was true to the fundamental principles of its constitution, “there was no doubt that it would not attempt to colonize the Philippines, or even to annex them.” In any case, “the President with his prestige in the Philippines would be able to arouse those masses to combat the demands of the United States if they colonized that country, and would drive them, if circumstances rendered it necessary, to a Titanic struggle for their independence, even if they should succumb in shaking off the yoke of a new oppressor.” (Taylor[I], 505-510)

Thus, the proposal to send Aguinaldo home to renew the revolution was approved by the Junta which paved the way for the return of Aguinaldo to the Philippines.

Aguinaldo’s Return to the Philippines

On the 17th of May, the U.S. gunboat McCulloch left Hongkong with Aguinaldo on board and arrived off Cavite on the 19th of May. A steam launch came alongside the gunboat to fetch Aguinaldo and a companion, Mr. Leyba, for a meeting with Commodore Dewey abroad the flagship Olympia.

Aguinaldo narrated the meeting with Admiral Dewey (promoted after his victory on May 1, 1898, over the Spanish armada) as follows:

“The Admiral ushered me into his private quarters, and after the exchange of the usual greetings I asked whether it was true that he had sent all the telegrams to the Consul at Singapore, Mr. Pratt, which that gentleman had told me he received in regard to myself. The Admiral replied in the affirmative, adding that the United States had come to the Philippines to protect the natives and free them from the yoke of Spain. He said, moreover, that America is exceedingly well off as regards territory, revenue, and resources and therefore needs no colonies, assuring me finally that there was no occasion for me to entertain any doubts whatever about the recognition of the Independence of the Philippines by the United States. Then Admiral Dewey asked me if I could induce the people to rise against the Spaniards and make a short, sharp, and decisive campaign of it.

“I said in reply that events would speak for themselves, but while a certain arms expedition … was delayed in China we could do nothing, because without arms every victory would assuredly cost us the lives of many brave and dashing Filipino warriors. The Admiral thereupon offered to dispatch a steamer to hurry up the expedition. Then he at once placed at my disposal all the guns seized on board the Spanish warships as well as 62 Mausers and a good many rounds of ammunition which had been brought from Corregidor Island by the U.S.S. Petrel.” (Aguinaldo[True Version], 16-17)

Aguinaldo immediately set himself to organize an army. In less than a month he liberated the province of Cavite, defeated the Spaniards, declared independence, laid siege on the city awaiting its surrender, and established a republican government in September of 1898.

In the June 30, 1898 issue of the Singapore Free Press, it is mentioned that Consul Pratt of Singapore received a letter from Aguinaldo dated June 11th. The letter gave an update on the progress of the campaign – the victory of the insurgents in Cavite. It also mentioned that Filipino forces were less than a mile from the old walled city and that the Spanish forces were now surrounded. The letter was sealed with General Aguinaldo’s official seal, a representation of the rising sun, surrounded by the phrase “Gobierno Dictatorial Filipinas.” (Singapore Free Press, June 30, 1898 issue, p. 5)

Official U.S. Government Position

Consul Pratt did not reply to Aguinaldo’s letter. Perhaps he did not want to have anything further to do with him because on or about June 16, 1898, he received an admonishment from Washington that he should not attempt to commit the U.S. government in his dealings with Aguinaldo. The cable reads:

“It is assumed that you did not attempt to commit this government to any alliance with the Philippine insurgents. To obtain the unconditional personal assistance of General Aguinaldo in the expedition to Manila was proper if in so doing he was not induced to form hopes which it might not be practicable to gratify … If, in the course of your conferences with Aguinaldo, you acted upon the assumption that this government would cooperate with him for the furtherance of any plan of his own, or that, in accepting his cooperation, it would consider itself pledged to recognize political claims which he may put forward, your action was unauthorized and cannot be approved.” (Robinson, 46)

The above cablegram lays out the official position of the U.S. government. However, Pratt did not mention this to Aguinaldo, who continued to entertain the idea that the Americans would recognize Philippine independence once the Spaniards were driven out of the islands through the combined efforts of Aguinaldo’s army and the American navy.

Washington’s warning was not also sent to Admiral Dewey, perhaps in deference to the sensibilities of the hero of the naval battle of Manila Bay. Or, if he was similarly advised, he did not communicate the position of the United States government to Aguinaldo. And so, Aguinaldo was unaware that the United States government did not wish to have any dealings with him although he did not suspect that such was the policy from the American military and consular officials who continued to deal with him.

Meanwhile, Aguinaldo was busy fighting the Spaniards. The American Navy that had recently destroyed the Spanish armada laid anchor in Manila Bay, blockading the islands against any possible Spanish reinforcement from Madrid. There were no American land troops present at the time because the American army was still recruiting volunteer soldiers to be sent to the islands.

As the Filipinos were taking significant steps to establish their government, the administration of President William McKinley and its representatives on the islands were silent about American intentions. Aguinaldo was never told that he was only supposed to defeat the Spaniards and that his duty was to hand over the country to the Americans. Thus, Aguinaldo continued to entertain the idea that the Americans were standing by their commitment in Singapore and that they would recognize the independence of the Philippines.

When a large contingent of American troops arrived, Aguinaldo was still trusting in the supposed promise of the Americans. He willingly gave away large Filipino encampments to house new American troop arrivals and provided them with the supplies that they requested. However, after the Treaty of Paris was signed and McKinley had issued a proclamation requiring all Filipinos to submit to American rule, Aguinaldo protested. However, the Americans ignored his protest, and war broke out on February 4, 1899, which influenced the wavering United States Senate to ratify the Treaty of Paris that sealed the fate of the Philippines.

The John Foreman Book Injunction

The controversial agreement between Consul Pratt and Aguinaldo broke into international limelight after John Foreman F.R.G.S, (Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society), a British historian, published his book, “The Philippine Islands” in 1899.

Pages 567-568 of the book contain what purportedly was the draft of the agreement between Consul Pratt and Aguinaldo in Singapore. The alleged draft agreement provided for the proclamation of Philippine independence, the establishment of a federal republic, and other provisions relating to commerce and investments and control and protection of foreign nationals.

The purported agreement was essentially identical to Aguinaldo’s stated policy which was contained in the article published in the May 4, 1898 issue of the Singapore Free Press that covered the meeting between Consul Pratt and Aguinaldo as previously mentioned. The Foreman book confirmed that there was indeed an agreement between Pratt and Aguinaldo to the effect that the independence of the Philippines was the underlying factor in Aguinaldo’s decision to cooperate with Dewey. And that this draft agreement needed only the signature of Dewey and confirmation by President William McKinley.

Consul Spencer Pratt was about to be retired from service when the Foreman book was published in 1899. After getting hold of a copy of the book, Pratt filed an injunction against the publishers, Kelly and Walsh, to prevent the publication and circulation of the book.

During the consideration of the case, the judge concluded that the contents of the book cited in the suit were not only false and defamatory but a prima facie case of libel. However, a compromise agreement was reached wherein the libel case was dropped but the injunction was ordered on the publishers, “perpetually restraining the defendants from selling, circulating, or distributing, or causing to be sold, circulated, or distributed any copies of the “The Philippine Islands”. (Newspaper Article - MR SPENCER-PRATT AND AGUINALDO., Straits Budget, 23 June 1899, Page 16 (nlb.gov.sg))

Interestingly, in the reprint of the third edition of John Foreman’s book that was published in Manila in 1980 by the Filipiniana Book Guild, the same incident was mentioned in the preface, viz:

“The first edition of his book originally appeared in 1890 printed by the firm of Kelly & Walsh of Hongkong and reprinted two years later in London. A second edition, revised and enlarged, was issued in 1899, and this has an interesting story. In the first impression of the edition, there appeared certain statements in regard to the relations of Edward Spencer Pratt, the United States Consul-General in Singapore, with General Emilio Aguinaldo which were objected to by that consular official. Pratt brought court action against the publishers of the book, won the case and its Shanghai publisher fined and ordered to withdraw from sale all copies of the book. As a result of the case, the author deleted the materials objected to pages 567 and 568 in the first impression-necessitating the issuance of a second impression without the offending statements. It seems that the offending passage attributed to Pratt statements that he had inveigled Aguinaldo into returning to Manila to collaborate with Commodore Dewey on the consul's assurance that the United States would allow the Filipinos to gain their independence. T. H. Pardo de Tavera, creole scholar in his Biblioteca Filipina, believed that it was Consul Rounsevelle Wildman of Hongkong who deceived Aguinaldo and who claimed that Foreman's documents "were false and a calumny on the American government." Significantly, the names of Pratt and Wildman do not appear in the 1906 edition. Pardo also believed that Foreman later took the vows of a priest in the Augustinian convent in Mexico.” (Foreman, xi-xii)

The denial

While in retirement, ex-Consul Spencer Pratt denied he made any promise of independence to Aguinaldo. However, in his affidavit supporting his complaint against the publishers of the book “The Philippines,” he admitted that he refrained from questioning the article in the Singapore press on May 4 and 5, 1898, containing Aguinaldo’s independence policy that was purportedly among the items agreed upon in his meeting with Aguinaldo. If Mr. Pratt did not seek clarification on the truthfulness of the article's contents in the Singapore press, Pratt probably agreed with it. But after Pratt received the reprimand from Washington, he changed his position to one of denial.

Admiral Dewey similarly denied he made any promises to Aguinaldo. In an interview with the Frisco Examiner, Dewey gave this statement:

“I never in any way promised Aguinaldo anything, nor have I given him the slightest recognition as an ally, I was importuned by the American consul at Hongkong and by several others to allow Aguinaldo and several of his leaders to come to Cavite on one of my dispatch boats. My first reply was decidedly in the negative, and afterward, thinking that he might be of use in harassing the enemy, I gave my consent, which allowed the insurgent General and eleven of his people to come down here on the Zafiro (McCullough?).”(Singapore[Aguinaldo’s], 11)

Admiral Dewey's position on the subject of Aguinaldo's independence policy was in line with the position of the consular officials who Washington reprimanded. But it is undeniable that Dewey initiated the first contact with Aguinaldo when he sent Captain Wood to confer with Aguinaldo on March 16, 1898. Dewey was also instrumental in inviting Aguinaldo to return to Hongkong from Singapore to discuss a collaboration arrangement.

Dewey did not question Aguinaldo’s declaration of Philippine independence on June 12, 1898, although he did not accept the invitation to come as a guest. On Dewey’s order, Aguinaldo and his comrades were brought back to the Philippines on board his dispatch boat, and he supplied them with the initial cache of arms. Dewey allowed the free passage of arms and ammunition purchased in China and delivered to the Philippines through arrangements made by no less the Consul-General of Hongkong, Mr. Rounsevell Wildman. He also allowed the Filipino flag to fly in buildings and ships of the small nascent Filipino navy.

During the Subic incident, when the Filipino gunship, Filipinas, bombarded the Spanish fort and the Spaniards raised the flag of surrender, the German ship Irene challenged the Filipinas. After Aguinaldo told Dewey what happened, Dewey sent Raleigh and Concord's gunboats to go after Irene, who fled. The Americans accepted the surrender of the Spanish fort, and Dewey handed over the 500 prisoners to Aguinaldo.

While it was the official policy of the U.S. government not to deal with Aguinaldo, and the fact that the American military and consular officials were not authorized to enter into any political agreement with him, Washington should have advised their representatives to make the policy known to Aguinaldo so that he was forewarned of the change in arrangements. The fact that he was kept uninformed of the policy, which he only inferred from military actions of American intention to annex the Philippines, the behavior of the Americans was deceitful, if not treacherous.

In defense of Aguinaldo, Howard W. Bray said this:

“I have known the Philippines intimately for 17 years, probably better and more thoroughly than most people, and I must confess I was surprised at this unstinted and unselfish devotion, which I submit is indeed a charming trait in the character of these much-maligned people, against whom the “free people’ of the United States are committing one of the greatest crimes in history, in the name of what McKinley with Methodistical cant and revolting hypocrisy terms “benevolent assimilation.” (Singapore[True account], 14, emphasis supplied)

Similarly, the American Consul in Hongkong, Mr. Rounsevelle Wildman, who was also relieved of his post, was more sympathetic to the Filipinos when he said:

“I wish to put myself on record as stating that the insurgent government of the Philippines cannot be dealt with as though they were North American Indians, willing to be removed from one reservation to another at the whim of their masters. If the United States decides not to retain the Philippine islands its 10,000,000 people will demand independence, and the attempt of any foreign nation to obtain territory or coaling stations will be resisted with the same spirit which they fought the Spaniards.” (Singapore[American], 10)

In a letter to the Chicago Record of May 13, 1899, U.S. General Charles King, writing of the Filipinos then, said:

“The situation was a strange one. We were allies at the start, and became enemies through force of circumstances.” (Van Meter, 236)

Given these considerations, to say there was no alliance and there was no promise of recognition of Philippine independence is ludicrous.

The Two Faces of Apolinario Mabini

(This write-up is identical to the article with the same title found on pages 227-232 of the book entitled "The Filipino Tragedy and Other Historical Facts Every Filipino Should Know," published by the author. The sources and references indicated here are contained on pages 402-415 of the book.)

At a closer look, there were two Apolinario Mabini's.  The first was the Mabini before the Americans exiled him to Guam, and the second was the Mabini who returned from exile.  The first Mabini was pro-Aguinaldo, but the second Mabini was anti-Aguinaldo.  The first Mabini was in favor of the execution of Bonifacio, but the second Mabini criticized Aguinaldo saying his greed for power caused Bonifacio’s death. 

These are conflicting views of the same person.  How could a reputed intellectual and so-called “brain of the revolution” entertain opposing opinions at the same time without reconciling them?  How could this happen? What could have caused the change?

No one knows what happened to Mabini during his exile.  He was in Guam with Artemio Ricarte, a loyal supporter of Andres Bonifacio. Was Ricarte possibly instrumental in converting the first Mabini to the second Mabini?  Were the Americans involved in his conversion? Did the Americans allow Mabini to return from exile in exchange for favors he had to pay in exchange? Hopefully, new historical facts would shed light on this mystery.  Meanwhile, everyone should know that the attacks by Mabini on Aguinaldo was made through the former’s book,  “La Revolucion Filipina,” which the second Mabini wrote while in exile in Guam.

In his criticism of Aguinaldo regarding the case of Andres Bonifacio, the second Mabini says in his book, viz:

“The death of Andres Bonifacio had plainly shown in Mr. Aguinaldo a boundless appetite for power.” (Mabini, 62-63)

However, back in June 1898, after the declaration of Philippine independence, when Aguinaldo appointed the first Mabini as an adviser,  he decried the cold treatment accorded to Bonifacio, saying that if it happened to him (Mabini), he would have immediately applied summary judgment (Juicio Sumaresimo) or shot without the benefit of trial on Bonifacio and his companions. (Ronquillo, 27)

In the case of the killing of General Antonio Luna, the second Mabini attacks Aguinaldo in his book, viz:

“…instead of killing Luna (allowing Luna to be killed),  had supported him with all his power, the Revolution would have triumphed, would be presumption indeed, but I have not the least doubt that the Americans would have had a higher regard for the courage and military abilities of the Filipinos. ….the Revolution failed because it was badly led; because its leader won his post by reprehensible rather than meritorious acts; because instead of supporting the men most useful to the people, he made them useless out of jealousy. Identifying the aggrandizement of the people with his own men, he judged the worth of men not by their ability, character, and patriotism but rather by their degree of friendship and kinship with him; and, anxious to secure the readiness of his favorites to sacrifice themselves for him, he was tolerant of their transgressions.  Because he thus neglected by people, the people forsook him; and forsaken by the people, he was bound to fall like a waxen idol melting in the heat of adversity.  God grant we do not forget such a terrible lesson, learnt at the cost of untold suffering.” (Mabini, 63)

And yet, back in December 1898, when Aguinaldo caused the printing of an appeal to his Filipino brothers to allow him to retire and be replaced by someone educated and more capable, it was the first Mabini who secretly ordered the seizure and burning of Aguinaldo’s resignation letter knowing its adverse effect at a time when the fate of the revolutionary government was hanging in the balance. (Saulo, 285).

The first Mabini was also very critical of General Antonio Luna.  In the book of  Jose P. Santos titled  “Si Apolinario Mabini Laban Kay Heneral Antonio Luna” (Apolinario Mabini Against General Antonio Luna),  the first Mabini secretly wrote President Emilio Aguinaldo expressing his hatred and hidden resentment against General Antonio Luna. He called Luna a despot, issuing orders to kill without trial.  He accused Luna of not understanding the limitations of his position in the army and interfering in government administration. The first Mabini even went as far as secretly recommending Luna's replacement.

 

And yet, the second Mabini praised Luna, he says in his book:

 

“All of Luna’s acts revealed integrity and patriotism combined with a zealous activity that measured up to the situation.  If he was sometimes hasty and even cruel in his decisions, it was because the army was in a desperate position due to the demoralization of the troops and the lack of munitions; only acts of daring and extraordinary energy could prevent its disintegration.” (Mabini, 62)

 

But when Luna was killed, the first Mabini wrote his friend, Galicano Apacible, telling him that losing Luna was beneficial because it prevented the coming of the threatening upheaval.  The first Mabini even said that Luna was mistaken in perceiving Aguinaldo as a weakling like a mannequin because, knowing Aguinaldo,  he said if by chance Luna's plan materialized, there would have been a fragmentation that would be the end of all.

In all these conflicting narrations of the two Mabini's about the characters of Luna and  Aguinaldo, which should be believed and considered the truthful one?

 

According to Santos, the first Mabini’s opinion about the actions of Luna in his letter to Apacible should prevail.  It could also be mentioned that the secret letters of the first Mabini to Aguinaldo will also stay over the praises the second Mabini gave Luna in the book he has written for public consumption. Santos should be right because words said to one's intimate friends (or kaututang dila, as the Tagalogs say) are closest to one's heart as compared to statements prepared for the public or for a big audience to hear or know.

It is also mentioned by Gregoria de Jesus  (Oryang), the widow of Supremo Andres Bonifacio, in her opening lines in the book of Santos that Mabini should not be considered the “brains of the revolution” (that title should belong to Emilio Jacinto - Author) because  Mabini was a late-joiner of the revolution. Oryang further expounded that the food was already cooked and served on the table when Mabini came; he tasted it and feasted it (Santos, 9). 

So, here is the question: if, in the perception of  Mabini, both Luna and Aguinaldo were bad, who should then be considered good? The answer, perhaps, will not be far from what can be gleaned from the short narration of Oryang about Mabini. She said:

I remember when we once visited him (Mabini) I, Bonifacio and Emilio Jacinto, were together with others. While we were walking on our way home, I heard Emilio Jacinto say to Andres Bonifacio: 'This Mabini is weird, criticizing Rizal which he should not say in front of us,  to which,  Bonifacio replied, ‘That's true, but Mabini wanted to show us he was greater than Rizal’, and the two had a good laugh. (Author’s translation of Tagalog text in Santos, 9)  

Here is the author’s translation of the Tagalog text of the third section of Jose Santos's book dealing with the supposed contradiction in Mabini’s position on Aguinaldo and Luna, viz:

Who would say that Mabini, the famous paralytic and recognized as the brains of the revolution had two contradicting opinions? 

If this was merely told to the writer of this book I might not believe it at once.  But that is the truth.  I have the evidence with me, that is why I do not have to hesitate.

In his widely circulated book,  La Revolucion Filipina which he wrote in Spanish in Guam and also translated into English, he severely criticized Aguinaldo with very bitter accusations.  Let me read to you Chapter X of the English version, viz:

Andres Bonifacio’s death had plainly shown Mr. Aguinaldo’s immeasurable ambition for power, and the use of clever intrigues by the personal enemies of  Luna to exploit this weakness to ruin him.  If Aguinaldo, instead of killing Luna, had supported him with all his might, it should be too much presumption to say that the revolution would have triumphed; but I have not the least doubt that the Americans would have had a higher idea of the courage and military capacity of the Filipinos.  If Luna were living, I am certain that the death blow given by General Otis would have been checked or at least avoided in time, and Aguinaldo’s incapacity in the military command would not have been demonstrated.  Moreover, to get rid of Luna, Aguinaldo availed himself of the same soldiers the former had punished for breach of discipline; then Aguinaldo killed the discipline, destroying his army.  With Luna its firmest support, the revolution fell, and the ignominy of the fall, weighing entirely upon Aguinaldo, caused his moral death, a thousand times bitterer than the physical one; then Aguinaldo ruined himself, condemned by his actions.  That is why Providence punishes the great crimes. 

In this opinion of Mabini, it is clear that he regrets the death of Luna.  That is for one work that he wrote which he wanted many people to read.  But in solitude, in one letter he wrote to Mr. Galicano Apacible, who was formerly the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and a close friend of Mabini, who was then in Hongkong, he had a different perception of the death of Luna.  Let me read the third paragraph of his long letter which was written in Rosales on July 25, 1899, and this is what he said: 

“… while I regret and disapprove of the violent death of Luna, his disappearance banished a menacing danger.  Luna aspired a great deal,  convinced perhaps that he was better educated than Puno (Aguinaldo); and if he had not done anything, it was because he had not yet acquired the necessary prestige to put himself face to face with Puno.  It was for this reason that he aspired to the presidency of the Council as Secretary of War.  The confidence that Puno had in him contributed a great deal to feed his ambition; for since Puno (Aguinaldo) gave him a free hand, he thought that he could manage the president as an automaton.  But as I know Puno (Aguinaldo) it would not be a risky thing to suppose that if Luna had secured what he wanted there would have occurred a division which would have annihilated us.” 

Given the two contradictory opinions of Mabini, it does not come as a surprise that there would be hesitancy in accepting which one should be taken as true: whether it should be the one which is intended for the public, or the one that he purposely wrote in confidence 

This is again another complicated puzzle that had to be referred to the famous oracle, Lola Basiang. (Author’s translation of Tagalog text in Santos, 23-26) 

[Author’s note: Lola Basiang was the namesake of the anchor of  a defunct popular radio program where listeners from across the islands could get answers through broadcast on practically anything.]

 

AGUINALDO IN HISTORY

(This write-up is identical to the article with the same title found on pages 142-165 of the book entitled "The Filipino Tragedy and Other Historical Facts Every Filipino Should Know," published by the author.  The sources and references indicated here are contained on pages 402-415 of the book.)

Aguinaldo is the liberator of the Filipino people.  He is the founder of the first Filipino state known as the First Philippine Republic (or the Malolos Republic) that promulgated a constitution bestowing Filipino citizenship to all residents of the archipelago, not anymore as “Peninsulares,” “Insulares,” “Indios,” and “Naturales.” He also initiated the campaign to recognize this first Filipino republic by independent nations of the world. This fact is unclear or misunderstood by Filipinos because of miseducation and outright lies and propaganda proffered by interest groups.

According to U.S. General Douglas MacArthur, he was the very incarnation of the Filipino desire for liberty and freedom, while President Lyndon B. Johnson said his monument is the Republic of the Philippines 

The Rise and Fall of Cavite

Aguinaldo provided the first Filipino victory of the revolution at the battle of Imus [district of Alapan - Author] (Ronquillo, 287-297). Had the Cavitenos been defeated by General Aguirre, it is almost certain that the nascent rebellion would have been quickly crushed. Instead, by inflicting a crushing defeat upon Aguirre and the Spanish forces, Aguinaldo catapulted revolutionary morale to new heights. 

Governor-General Blanco had to wait till he had sufficient troops before daring to attack Cavite again. He returned to Cavite in November 1896, but Aguinaldo handed him a humiliating defeat at Binakayan (Ronquillo, 345-358). Aguinaldo’s victory gave the Cavitenos and other revolutionaries time to consolidate their victories and secure their territories from isolated Spanish garrisons, all of which raised Aguinaldo's fame and prestige and secured him a place of leadership among the revolutionary commanders.

With these victories, he liberated the province of Cavite, which became the refuge for besieged Katipuneros from nearby provinces. And in an expression of gratitude and recognition of his leadership, he was elected president of the revolutionary government at Tejeros. However, internal disputes and the stubbornness of Bonifacio in refusing to merge forces under a unified command and, at times, his reluctance to provide aid to Aguinaldo in the face of the massive Spanish offensive (Saulo[Aguinaldo], 140-141) contributed to the untimely fall of Cavite.

Aguinaldo saved the revolution and turned defeat into a stalemate by forcing the Spaniards to sue for peace at Biak-na-Bato. The agreement provided respite for the battle-weary revolutionaries. It shielded them from bodily harm and reprisal while obtaining a promise of long-sought reforms and a considerable sum of money in exchange for the surrender of the arms and exile of the leaders abroad.

Decisive Victory Over the Spaniards

The second phase of the revolution commenced upon the return of Aguinaldo in May 1898 from Hong Kong, and he immediately took to the task of organizing an army and supplying it with weapons purchased abroad out of the funds secured from the peace pact of Biak-na-Bato. Through foresight and audacity, he raised the level of revolutionary thrust by building a modern army with better weapons and, in the process, defeated the Spanish army, leading to the establishment of the first Filipino state, represented by the First Philippine Republic that administered Luzon and various islands in the Visayas and some parts of Mindanao, excepting the city of Manila and isolated garrisons. In less than two months, Aguinaldo and his forces conquered practically the whole of Luzon. He surrounded the city of Manila with his troops, sent Gov. Gen. Basilio Agustin a demand to surrender, and laid a siege awaiting Agustin’s reply. He set his sights on the Visayan islands and Mindanao, sending expeditionary forces to help local revolutionaries take control of their territory.

Here’s an eyewitness account of Aguinaldo’s first major victory against the Spaniards in Cavite:

As the prospects for fighting between the United States naval forces and the Spanish troops on shore were now practically nil, I devoted my time to watching the proceedings of the Filipinos under Aguinaldo. Within a week after his arrival in Cavite he had about 1,000 men under arms. Admiral Dewey gave him a large number of Mauser rifles and a considerable quantity of ammunition, captured from the Spaniards, and in a day or two a small steamer called the Faon, an assumed name, by the way, came into port from Canton, bringing about 3,00“0 stand of Remington breechloading rifles and a large stock of cartridges for these pieces.

“On the night of May 26th Aguinaldo sent 600 men across Bakor Bay to land between the detachment of Spaniards who were holding Cavite Viejo (Old Cavite) and the detachment quartered in the powder magazine, a little to the east of Cavite Viejo. The garrison in each of these strong positions was about 300 men, so that the insurgents were represented by a force equal to that of their enemy. But, while the Spaniards had fully 1,000 men and several pieces of artillery within easy call of both these positions, the natives had no artillery and no possibility of getting reinforcements. Once landed on the Old Cavite side of Bakor Bay, they must fight it out for themselves.

“On the morning of May 28th a detachment of Spaniards attacked the insurgents and were not only repulsed but forced to surrender, the insurgents capturing in two skirmishes 418 Spaniards, including fifteen officers. The country where these affairs took place was covered with a thick tropical undergrowth, while numerous streams and swamps permitted no military order to be maintained.

“… On May 29th, before the sun had yet risen, General Aguinaldo reinforced his troops on the mainland with about one thousand men. I expected to witness a charge over the narrow neck of land that connects Cavite peninsula with the mainland, where the Spaniards were known to have at least one field gun and the bulk of their troops. Before noon, however, General Aguinaldo told me he had changed his plan, because the Spaniards held the peninsula with such a large force that he feared an assault would not be successful. If he failed he would not be able to reinforce his men on the other side of the bay without taking great chances from the Mausers of the Spaniards stationed at the Bakor magazine and at Old Cavite. Also, in case the Spaniards should bring heavy reinforcements from Manila, his men would be caught between two fires, where they might all be captured or killed. As this was the situation he refused to give me any assistance to get to the front, and would not even give me a guide to show me where to land my boat on the other side.

“… As I was intently watching the events on shore I did not notice what was happening behind me and was suddenly surprised to hear the roar of a heavy gun. I could tell by the scream of the projectile as it passed over me that it came from a rifled gun of large calibre, and for a moment I thought the Petrel must have entered into the fight. I could not discover where the shot struck; but looking back to Cavite, I distinguished a group of rebels surrounding four muzzle-loading rifles that pointed toward the Spaniards from the Cavite wall. In front of the guns a long stovepipe was throwing out a column of signal smoke like the one on the beach near me. This was the plan Aguinaldo had been keeping in reserve, and he was now letting his men at the front know he was ready to take part in the fight.

“… Like ants now, the little brown men swarmed along the beach toward Bakor Church. This was the only place where the Spaniards seemed to be strong except at Old Cavite. It was evident that the rebels were pressing upon them harder from the land side than from the beach; for, while the field piece fired a few shots and reports of rifles were frequent, fewer bullets came in my direction.

“… In a few moments two or three wounded men staggered to their feet, waved their hats in the air, and then sank down, exhausted but victorious. Presently the rebel flag-a band of red above and blue below, with half a white diamond near the flagstaff-fluttered from the roof of Bakor Church. Everything on the beach had been captured except Old Cavite.” (Stickney, 75-81)

Felipe Buencamino, a Colonel in the Spanish army in command of a regiment of militias, observed the movements of the rebel army while he was in detention in Aguinaldo’s camp after a failed mission on orders of Spanish Governor-General Basilio Agustin to convince Aguinaldo to fight alongside Spain against the Americans. And he had this to say in his letter to Agustin, urging the Governor-General to surrender:

"… Having been sent back to my prison, …I could see … the passing of wagons laden with arms, cannon, and ammunition, which would go to the landing and unloaded on cascos, small and large craft which came every day to this city with large masses of men whom I estimate would amount to more than four thousand. Vessels loaded with arms, ammunition and former insurgents would also come from Hongkong and afterward, I learned from those who visited me, after I was released from solitary confinement, that on the 28th of last month a column of three-hundred men of the Marine Infantry, commanded by Major Pazos, was captured between Imus and Kavite Viejo, and at the same time firing was heard on all sides of this province, which showed the general movement of the new revolution.

“I also learned that General Pena with his staff surrendered without exchanging a shot; surrendering cannon and other arms, public and Government treasure, with 200 volunteers from Apalit recruited by me, but which General Monet delivered to the Army Captain, Don Jesus Roldan. The news also came to me that the detachment of Bacoor composed of 200 volunteers from my regiment and over one-hundred men of the Marine Infantry, in command of Lieutenant Colonel, Don Luciano Toledo, having been besieged, … had to surrender; as did also the detachment of Baccor on the following day.

“And thus, in less than six successive days, the detachments of Imus, Binakayan, Noveleta, Santa Cruz de Malabon, Rosario, Salinas, Kavite Viejo and other pueblos of this province which is now in the power of Don Emilio Aguinaldo surrendered.

“But that is not all because there also came as prisoners from Kalamba, Binan, Muntinlupa and from the province of Bataan - among them the Governor and Administrator with their wives and daughters - 200 volunteers of the Blanco Regiment with its captain, Gomez, and 4 officers, besides 170 Cazadores with Lieutenant Colonel Baquero. Colonel Francia escaped to Pampanga, leaving the volunteers.

“In a word: in eight days of operations, Don Emilio Aguinaldo has, here and in the conquered pueblos, 2,500 prisoners and more than five thousand arms, 8 cannon and a large number of friars, which has decided him to direct an attack on Manila, in combination with his forces from Bulacan, from this province, and those from that capital, which will amount to some thirty-thousand men armed with rifles and cannon; sending his forces from Bataan and Nueva Ecija to surround General Monet’s, who is in Pampanga, and those of Paciano Rizal in Kalamba to invade Batangas."  (Taylor, v3:92-97)

Buencamino's account of Aguinaldo’s victory over the Spanish army is confirmed by U.S. General Thomas Anderson in this interview published in the North American Review of February 1900, viz:

"At that time [July 1898] the insurgent Filipinos had driven the Spanish soldiers within the defenses of Manila and had them completely invested on the land side by light field works, which they held with about fourteen thousand men. They were poorly armed and equipped, yet, as they had defeated the Spaniards in a number of fights in the field, and had taken four thousand prisoners, it may be asserted in the vernacular of the camp that they ' had the morale on them.' The Manila garrison was so demoralized at that time and so incomplete was their line of defense that I believe it would have been possible, by coming to an understanding with Aguinaldo, to have carried their advance works by storm and to have captured all of the city, except the walled city or the old Spanish town. Under existing orders we could not have struck a bargain with the Filipinos, as our Government did not recognize the authority of Aguinaldo as constituting a de facto government; and, if Manila had been taken with his co-operation, it would have been his capture as much as ours. We could not have held so large a city with so small a force, and, it would, therefore, have been practically under Filipino control. (Philippine Information Society, 7-8)

Liberation of Luzon and some parts of Visayas and Mindanao 

The Filipino government extended its successful destruction of the Spanish Army not only in the province of Cavite but also in the whole island of Luzon and in the Visayas and Mindanao.  Leandro H. Fernandez describes this campaign of Aguinaldo in his book, “The Philippines Republic,” viz:

“This first expedition, under the command of a young officer, Manuel Tinio, was detailed to operate in the Ilocos region, in north-western Luzon. It started its march to the north from San Fernando de la Union, then already under insurgent control. The expedition met no serious opposition, for the Spanish forces retreated at its approach; and Tinio, between August 7 and 17, occupied the important towns of Bangar, Tagudin, Vigan and Laoag.  At Bangui, a coast town in Ilocos Norte, the Spanish detachments, numbering in all from two to three hundred men, finding themselves cut off, surrendered. By the end of August the control of the Ilocos provinces, including Abra, had passed to the Filipino Government.

 

“The next important expedition was that sent to the Cagayan valley, in north-eastern Luzon, under the command of Colonel Daniel Tirona. It was made up of six companies conveyed by the insurgent transport  ‘Filipinas’  to Aparri, at which port it arrived on August 25.  Operations against this town were begun immediately: a company was posted at the village of Linao, another at Kalamaniugan, and a third at the town of Lal-lo, formerly the seat of a diocese, so that Aparri was completely isolated. The Spanish detachment, seeing that the people, hitherto considered ‘loyal to Spain, would not fight against their fellow Filipinos’ and believing further resistance useless, capitulated. With Aparri in their hands, the expeditionary troops occupied the important coast towns; then, on August 3, they also took Tuguegarao. The main towns in the province of Isabela were likewise taken possession of, including Ilagan, the provincial capital. On the same day (September 14) that Ilagan was occupied, Bayombong, the capital of the province of Nueva Vizcaya, capitulated to another force of revolutionists under Major Delfin Esquivel.  Thus the entire Cagayan valley, as well as the Batanes islands, off the north coast of Luzon, which were also occupied at this time, passed into insurgent hands.

 

“The extension of the authority of the Filipino Government to the Bicol region, in south-eastern Luzon, came about in a different manner. In Ambos Camarines and Albay conditions had never been satisfactory since 1896, and the people in the chief towns of Daet, Nueva Caceres and Albay were ready to join the revolt. In Daet and Nueva Caceres feeling ran high, so much so that the Spanish officials and residents of the former abandoned it in August, while those of the latter were besieged and disarmed in September by local revolutionists.  A provisional government was formed, and ‘the Philippine Republic began to rule’ the province. Albay and Sorsogon followed the example of Ambos Camarines and set up their own local governments. That established in Albay, on September 22, which was patterned after the scheme decreed on June 18, immediately notified Aguinaldo of its constitution, declaring its ‘most sincere adhesion to the Republican Government of the Philippines’ and announced its readiness to turn the control of affairs over to the representative of the Central Government on his arrival.  When Vicente Lukban, therefore, arrived in October at the head of an expedition, his mission was accomplished without any difficulty, and, in a few weeks, the Bicol provinces were thoroughly committed to the revolution.

 

“The islands adjacent to southern Luzon came under insurgent control at different times. Northern Mindoro was early the objective of a small expedition from Batangas, and, on July 2, the town of Calapan, after a siege of thirty-one days, was occupied by the revolutionists. Marinduque, lying close to the Tayabas coast but belonging to Mindoro, organized itself about this time, and, in pursuance to a petition by its inhabitants, it was authorized by the Revolutionary Government on July 20 to constitute itself an independent province.  From Marinduque and the Tayabas coast, small expeditions were sent to the island of Masbate, which, on November 9, became, with the near-by island of Ticao, a ‘politico-military district’ of the insurgent government.' The Romblon group, i.e. Romblon, Tablas and Sibuyan islands, early in September, ‘ was already in the hands of the Bisayans who inhabit this group, aided, however, by a few Tagalog soldiers from the mainland of Luzon.’

 

“As in Luzon and the adjacent islands, the authority of the Filipino Government was extended readily to the Bisayas proper. Here however, with the exception of Panay and Negros, little or no fighting occurred between Filipinos and Spaniards. General Diego de los Rios, who had been appointed by the Spanish Government ‘governor and captain-general’ of Bisayas and Mindanao, found in October, 1898, that all was not well with the territory of his command, where he discovered secret plots even among the native soldiers he considered loyal, and he, therefore, decided to order the concentration of his troops in Iloilo and in Cebu.  Later, in December, after the signing of the treaty of peace at Paris, he withdrew from these points, and retired to the distant outpost of Zamboanga, where he managed, for some months, to maintain a semblance of Spanish rule. His withdrawal from these places was the occasion for the open assumption of control by local revolutionary authorities, which then generally existed in one form or another.

 

“Leyte and the near-by island of Samar which had been reached by emissaries from Masbate and southern Luzon as early as August, was ripe for trouble even before the virtual evacuation by the Spanish in October. Thereafter troops were sent from Luzon, and General Vicente, Lukban was ordered to take charge of affairs.  On January 1, 1899, he issued a long proclamation addressed to the ‘Citizens of Samar and Leyte’ calling on them to stand united and to live in peace under the protection of the new-born Republic. But even before this time, the people of Tacloban, capital of Leyte, had constituted a provisional government and raised the Filipino, flag, declaring their solemn adherence to the Philippine Republic and their loyalty to Aguinaldo and pledging their cooperation for the furtherance of the ideals of the new regime.  What had occurred in Leyte, also took place, in a general way, in Samar, Cebu and Bohol  . However, while the revolutionary party in Cebu, where a local government had been established on December 25, was quite strong, that in Bohol was comparatively weak at this time a circumstance due, perhaps, to the fact that only a few rifles had found their way thither and no armed expedition had reached the island. 

 

“In Panay island the revolutionary movement began as early as July or August, when a ‘regional committee’ was established at Molo,  a suburb of Iloilo. The Panay revolutionists not only conducted a propaganda to stir the people to action, but also sent, in September, agents to Luzon to purchase arms and to ask the aid of the Central Government at Malolos,  and, on November 17, organized a ‘provisional revolutionary government’ at Santa Barbara.  As a matter of policy and in response to the request made, expeditionary troops were sent from Luzon: first from Cavite to Antique late in September under Leandro Fullon, then from Batangas to Capiz about the middle of November under Ananias Diokno, commander-in-chief of the expeditionary forces to Panay. The following month, when General Miller was ordered by General Otis to proceed to Iloilo harbor, more reenforements were hurried by the Central Government to Panay.' Meanwhile, the ‘provisional revolutionary government’, later reorganized as the ‘council of the federal state of Bisayas’, had put in the field its troops under the supreme command of Martin Delgado. About the end of November, these commands - Fullon's in Antique, Diokno's in Capiz, Poblador's (a subordinate officer of Delgado) in the district of Concepcion,  and Delgado's; in Iloilo - had virtually freed Panay island from Spanish control. In the beginning of December, all that was left in the island to Spain was the town of Iloilo, which, on December 24, was abandoned finally (the Spaniards sailing to Zamboanga) in the hands of its mayor, Vicente Gay, who promptly turned it over to the revolutionists the following day. The last week of December, 1898, therefore, saw the Filipinos undisputed masters of the three provinces.

 

“The loyalty of the Panay revolutionists to the Filipino Government is sometimes doubted; but there are documents to show that the men who composed the ‘council of the federal state of Bisayas’ not only recognized the authority of the Central Government, which, according to them, was ‘that of the whole Philippines’", but also acclaimed Aguinaldo and the Filipino flag. There was an unmistakable desire on their part for a federal union, to be composed of the three regions of Luzon, Bisayas and Mindanao, instead of a centralized state, which the functionaries in Luzon favored and finally embodied in the Malolos constitution; but beyond this desire they did not go. That they were sincere in their adherence to the Filipino Government was shown best in their repeated refusals to allow General Miller to land troops at Iloilo without previous authorization from Malolos, inasmuch as this, they said, ‘involved the integrity of the entire republic.’  In the words of Roque Lopez, president of the "council of the federal state, ‘the supposed authority of the United States began with the treaty of Paris, on December 10, 1898,’ but " the authority of the Central Government of Malolos is founded in the sacred and natural bonds of blood, language, uses, customs, ideas, sacrifices, etc." Further on he adds: ‘we insist in not giving our consent to the disembarkation of your (Millers) troops without an express order from our Central Government at Malolos.’

 

“The people of Negros island, which lies south-east of Panay, were drawn into the insurgent ranks mainly through the infiltration of revolutionary ideas from Iloilo. Although a revolutionary committee had been established early at the town of Silay, the actual uprising did not begin until after the receipt, on November 3, of a letter from Roque Lopez, giving news of the successful course of the war in Iloilo.   Encouraged by the example of this province, the revolt began on November 5 under the leadership of Aniceto Lacson and Juan Araneta, the town of Silay being the first to raise the Filipino flag. On November 6, Bacolod, capital of West Negroes, surrendered,  and, the following day, the insurgent leaders, to whom the Spanish governor had just turned over the control of affairs, established a ‘provisional revolutionary government’.   East Negros followed the example of its sister province, raised the standard of revolt, and organized, toward the end of the same month, its own ‘revolutionary government’, although that established at Bacolod, especially after its reconstitution on November 6 into what was often called the gobierno cantonal de la isla de Negros, made pretenses at governing the entire island. At all events, the whole island came under the rule, in one form or another, of the local revolutionists.

 

“The insurgent leaders in West Negros, who made up the ‘provisional revolutionary government’, were, beyond doubt, half-hearted in their adherence to the Central Government. They flew the Filipino flag, informed Aguinaldo and Roque Lopez of the establishment of the ‘provisional revolutionary government ‘, and apparently assumed that their organization, both before and after the promulgation of the ‘cantonal government’", was but a part of the Philippine Republic;   yet, at the same time, they acted with extreme independence, going even as far as sending to General Miller at Iloilo bay on November 12 a communication inviting protection.  While they never proclaimed a separate republic, as is sometimes wrongly assumed, their relation to the Central Government up to March, 1899, when Colonel James F. Smith was sent by General Otis to Bacolod as military governor of Negros, was purely nominal. Believing as they did in a confederation, rather than a centralized republic, their loyalty, if it could be so called, to the Filipino Government has always been open to serious doubt. What has been said regarding West Negros, however, does not apply with equal force, if at all, to East Negros. 

“In the rest of the Archipelago, the revolutionary movement was reflected with varying strength or weakness at various times. In the province of Misamis, in northern Mindanao, a ‘provisional provincial government’ under Jose Roa was established in January, I899.  In Surigao, on the north-eastern coast of the same island, rival factions prevented the organization of a strong government for the province. The same conditions existed in Cotabato, which was abandoned by the Spaniards in January, 1899, and in Zamboanga, wherein the actual outbreak of hostilities against the Spanish troops did not occur till May. In the island of Palawan, an insurgent party, which had early taken Puerto Princesa, the capital, and the towns on the northeast coast, set up some sort of revolutionary government in November or December, 1898, but the greater part of the island was never brought under its control. The non-Christian population (i e. pagan and Mohammedan) of Mindanao, and the Moros of the Sulu islands, as well as most of the pagan mountaineers in northern Luzon, were not affected by the revolutionary movement, and, throughout the months of revolt in the rest of the Archipelago, retained the semi-independent status they always had enjoyed under the Spanish rule.”  (Fernandez, 129-139)

Aguinaldo’s success is the first known achievement of an Asian people toppling down a western power. But the Spaniards did not go down in defeat before their former subjects technically because the mixed-up situation gave them a way out of their predicament by surrendering themselves not to Aguinaldo but to the Americans after a sham battle and in the process, saving the honor of Spain.

As soon as the republic was formed, Aguinaldo organized the first foreign diplomatic corp and sent emissaries and envoys like Felipe Agoncillo, Galicano Apacible, Mariano Ponce, Jose Sixto Lopez, Heriberto Zarcal, and Jose Alejandrino to the United States, Europe, and Japan to make known to the world about the existence of the newly-established Filipino Republic and obtain its recognition.

The republic's formation is the first-ever sovereign act of the natives of the Philippine islands previously known as “Indios” -  Tagalogs, Ilocanos, Kapampangans, Bicols, Visayans, etc. – who liberated themselves from the oppressed status of enslaved people or subjects of the Spanish crown for more than 300 years.  They promulgated the first constitution of the Filipino people, known as the Malolos constitution, arrogating for themselves the new title of Filipino citizens of the newly-established republic, the first republic in Asia. This feat is the most outstanding achievement of the Filipino people, unsurpassed to this day; this period is the golden age in their history.  

However, the expansionist policy of the McKinley administration and later by Roosevelt foretold the collapse of the First Philippine Republic.

Thus, on February 4, 1899, the third phase of the Philippine revolution broke out, this time against the United States, whose policy was that of the annexation of the Philippine islands. Throwing aside the purported alliance with the Filipinos against Spain, they withheld recognition of the sovereign rights of the Aguinaldo government. And this war lasted for more than three years. Here is the summary by an observer: 

"...126,500 Americans saw service in the Philippine Insurrection, the peak strength of the American army at any single time was 70,000, and this army suffered battle losses of over 4,200 men killed and over 2,800 wounded. This represented a casualty rate of 5.5 percent, one of the highest of any war in American history. The financial cost of the war was over $400 million, a figure 20 times the purchase price paid to Spain. The insurgents suffered battle losses of 16,000-20,000 killed. In addition, perhaps 200,000 Filipinos died of famine, disease, and other war-related calamities. (Welch, 42)

The tenacity of the Filipinos in keeping the Americans busy for such a long period may be traced to the generous support that the civilian population provided to the Filipino Republican Army. U.S. General Arthur MacArthur took note of this critical aspect of the war in a statement made to an American war correspondent and published in the New York Criterion of June 17, 1889, viz:

"When I first started in against these rebels I believed that Aguinaldo's troops represented only a fraction... I did not like to believe that the whole population of Luzon... was opposed to us, but having come thus far, and having been brought much in contact with both insurgents and amigos, I have been reluctantly compelled to believe that the Filipino masses are loyal to Aguinaldo and the government which he leads.” (Blount, 23-24; Storey and Lichauco, 102)

Why is Aguinaldo being Maligned? 

Today, false accusations stain Aguinaldo’s image, foremost of which are allegations of hunger for power, complicity in the death of two heroes, and as a Japanese collaborator. Why would a man of heroic and grandiose achievement be accused, insulted, and disrespected by the very people he had served?

The root cause of this anomaly may be traced to the archives of the United States Congress in the records of committee hearings giving light to the fact that after American authority was firmly established in the islands in early 1900, and the Aguinaldo-led resistance against the superior American war machine was put down, U.S. military and consular officials of the United States, particularly Admiral Dewey, claimed no alliance with Aguinaldo or promise of independence was ever made to him, viz:

“I never promised ... independence for the Filipinos. I never treated him as an ally, except to make use of him and the soldiers to assist me in my operations against the Spaniards. He never alluded to the word independence in any conversation with me or my officers.” (Malcolm, 121)

No alliance of any kind? Of course, this was a lie. Let us get down to the facts. The Americans were the ones who sought Aguinaldo’s cooperation in fighting the Spaniards in the Philippines. As early as March 1898, the Filipino Junta in Hongkong was elated when Captain Wood, Commander of U.S.S. Petrel, acting on behalf of Commodore Dewey, conferred with Aguinaldo, urging him to return to the Philippines to lead once more the revolution against Spain, on the assurance that Americans would supply him with the necessary arms. Asked about the policy of the United States following the expulsion of the Spaniards from the Philippines, Wood replied that America is a great and rich nation and neither needs nor desires colonies (Agoncillo[Malolos], 98).

Another conference occurred the following month at the residence of a Filipino dentist in Singapore named Dr. Santos, who was pressed by Howard Bray, a long-time resident of the Philippines, to have U.S. Consul Spencer Pratt talk to Aguinaldo who had slipped into the city incognito accompanied by Gregorio del Pilar and Jose Leyva to escape the Arcadio suit in Hong Kong. In this meeting that was also attended by Bray, del Pilar, and Leyva, Consul Pratt told Aguinaldo: “Spain and America have been at war. Now is the time for you to strike. Ally yourselves with America, and you will surely defeat the Spaniards.” (Ibid, 99)

While Aguinaldo was in Singapore, two members of the Hongkong Junta, Messrs. Jose Alejandrino and Andres Garchitorena conferred in French with Admiral Dewey on board the “Olympia” with Lieut. Brumby of the Signal Corp acting as interpreter, and the Admiral was quoted as saying:

“The American people, champion of liberty, will undertake this war with the humanitarian purpose of liberating from the Spanish yoke the people which are under it and to give them independence and liberty, as we have already proclaimed before the whole world. … America is rich under all concepts; it has territories scarcely populated, aside from the fact that our constitution does not permit us to expand territorially outside of America. For these reasons, the Filipinos can be sure of their independence and of the fact that they will not be despoiled of any piece of their territory.” (Alejandrino, 89-90)

A final meeting happened in Hong Kong with U.S. Consul Rounseville Wildman, who proposed to Aguinaldo to establish a dictatorial government to prosecute the war. He was even entrusted by Aguinaldo with the money to purchase 2,000 rifles and 200,000 rounds of ammunition (Agoncillo[Malolos], 102). And, of course, Aguinaldo and his associates were conveyed from Hong Kong to Cavite by U.S. gunboats.

The denial by the U.S. military and Consular officials that there was an alliance with the Filipinos is like saying that Aguinaldo was a liar. To them, his claim that he had a conference with the Admiral on board the “Olympia” upon arrival in Cavite, where he received assurance from the Admiral of support for Philippine independence (Aguinaldo[True Version], 16) was, therefore, a figment of Aguinaldo’s confused mind.

Why did the Americans deny any alliance with Aguinaldo?

Admitting the existence of an alliance would put the Americans in a bad light because it would show that they double-talked and manipulated Aguinaldo into fighting their war and trashed him aside to claim for themselves the victory over the Spaniards. Then when the land forces arrived, they turned against him and suppressed his resistance. This scenario was clearly expressed by Col. James Russell Codman:

"It is an undeniable fact, proved by unquestionable evidence, accessible to any citizen who will take the pains to obtain it, that Aguinaldo's assistance in the war with Spain was solicited by United States officials; that he and his friends were used as allies by the American naval and military commanders; that, until after the capture of Manila, to which they contributed, they were allowed to believe that the independence of the Philippine Islands would be recognized by the American government; and that it was not until after the American forces in the islands had been made strong enough to be able - as was supposed - to conquer the Islanders, that the mask was thrown off. Independence was then refused them, and the purpose of the president to extend the sovereignty of the United States over them by military force was openly proclaimed. That the Filipinos resisted, and that they took up arms against foreign rule, was something that ought to have been expected; for it is exactly what Americans would have done." (Codman, 1)

The fact is, the conquest of the Philippine Islands by the United States was an act of criminal aggression, using U.S. Pres. McKinley's own words, quoted from his speech before the U.S. Senate, as he urged for the declaration of war against Spain, viz: “I speak not of forcible annexation, for that cannot be thought of. That by our code of morality would be criminal aggression” (Storey and Lichauco, vi and 74). Using McKinley’s own words, the American conquest of the Philippines was criminal aggression as expressed by one of his critics as follows: “… the United States … establish its dominion by suppressing an indigenous revolution, ignoring a declaration of independence as a meaningful act of sovereignty, and overthrowing a representatively convened national assembly.” (Bankoff, 181) 

Yes, the Americans came as invaders. Their claim on the islands anchored on the Treaty of Paris was defective because, according to Mabini, the treaty was null and void. Spain had lost its right to cede the islands, having been divested of its claim to sovereignty and authority after its defeat and surrender (Taylor[IV], 66-69). Any negotiation about the islands' future should have been between the Americans and the Filipinos. The latter controlled and administered a significant territory area while the Americans only held the city of Manila. Therefore, it is safe to declare that excluding the Filipinos from the treaty conference and barring them from participating in the negotiations was a deliberate American design to keep them under wraps and unrecognized in consonance with McKinley’s imperialistic policy.

Maligning Aguinaldo - American Era

Given the background of Aguinaldo's relationship with the Americans, presenting him as a liar motivated by selfish interest was necessary. The Americans would not want to be remembered as the butcher of the Filipinos, the pillager of their land, and the destroyer of their republic. If Aguinaldo were looked upon as a liar, more so as a traitor, he would become unworthy of respect or sympathy by his compatriots. Naturally, everything else associated with him, especially his patriotic stand against the occupying forces of the United States, would be taken with skepticism, if not disbelief.

From this American position proceeded the deliberate act of muddling the historical accounts of the Filipino-American war and camouflaging the American conquest of the Philippines as a humanitarian mission consistent with the policy of “benevolent assimilation,” viz:  

(1)    The Filipinos were tagged as the initiator of the war, but the truth is it was the Americans who crossed into Filipino lines and fired the first shot;

 

(2)    The war was stripped of its rightful importance and conveniently tucked under the caption, “The Spanish-American War"; 

(3)    The war was not included in the official list of wars fought by the United States in the 19th or 20^th century;

 

(4)    The war was labeled “insurrection,” promoting the legal claim of the United States under the Treaty of Paris and pre-empting the sovereign rights of the Aguinaldo government; 

(5)    Voluminous records and war relics captured during the conflict were shipped to the United States and stowed away, beyond the reach of ordinary Filipinos, except to those historians given access by the U.S. military; 

(6)    The Sedition Act that was passed and was effective for 12 years  criminalized the display of the Filipino flag, any public gathering, or speech or writing that had a patriotic theme;  

(7)    A public school system was established to teach American history, culture, arts, songs, literature, and heroes that molded a new Filipino who is detached from his inherent intellect and knowledge and made him love America more than his own country; and, 

(8)    Aguinaldo was branded a traitor to his people for agreeing to the Biak-na-Bato peace pact and for taking the oath of allegiance to the United States, disregarding the fact that more than a thousand Filipino prisoners would be indefinitely jailed if he did not take the oath.

Among the early publications that pictured Aguinaldo negatively is the one by Murat Halstead (1829-1908), which, just by reading the title, gives the impression that the content is part of a grand conspiracy to besmirch the image of Aguinaldo. The title reads: “The politics of the Philippines: Aguinaldo a traitor to the Filipinos and a conspirator against the United States; the record of his transformation from a beggar to a tyrant.” (Halstead, 1)

Aguinaldo himself expressed his disenchantment at one time when he said:

"I have been loyal to America and the Americans. I have at all times acted upon their advice and complied with their desires, yet in their daily journals, they endeavor to humiliate me before my people. They call me thief, renegade, traitor, for no reason. I have done them no harm; I have assisted them to their ends, and they now consider me their enemy. Why am I called a renegade, traitor, thief?" (Sheridan, 90)

Paradoxically, today, we see a memorial in honor of McKinley. Why should the Filipinos dignify this hypocrite by naming after him a major thoroughfare that runs through the most expensive pieces of real estate in the country, terminating at the beautiful park in the plush commercial center in Taguig? Either Filipinos are gullible, or they are ignorant of their history.

Maligning Aguinaldo - Quezon era

Enter Manuel L. Quezon.  According to an article in the U.P. Los Banos Journal, Quezon served in the Batallion Leales Voluntarios de Manila of the Spanish army during the revolution against Spain (Javar, 5); his father,  Lucio, similarly took the side of the Spaniards and helped the beleaguered Spanish soldiers holed up in the church of Baler, was captured and killed by the revolutionaries  (Ibid, 10). 

Like several officers and soldiers of the Spanish army, Quezon joined the Filipino Republican Army after Spain surrendered.  His rise in the Philippine political scene was phenomenal. With the collapse of the First Philippine Republic, he concentrated on politics and became friends with Americans like Harry  Brandholtz, James G. Harbord, and General Douglas MacArthur. It was not implausible that he would cross paths with Aguinaldo, who was still considered the “El Caudillo” and hero for having led the revolution against Spain and the resistance against the Americans.

Here is how Quezon was viewed as a politician: 

". . . Quezon was ingratiating and charismatic, a brilliant orator and a consummate politician. He was audacious, resourceful, unencumbered by integrity, and capable of shrewdly using his political strengths to mold public opinion. His assessments of those with whom he dealt were unerring. He manipulated where he could – Filipinos and Americans alike – and used the electoral process to bludgeon those Filipinos who challenged him. He equated political opposition with enmity and was ruthless in dealing with influential Filipinos who were loyal to rival leadership or to abstract ideas that incurred his ire. These qualities were moderated only by the transfer to himself of the loyalty of Filipinos buffeted by his combativeness or their withdrawal from the arena of insular politics." (Golay, 166) 

Quezon and Aguinaldo did not see eye to eye. As soon as Quezon came home from his mission to the United States and reported that he was also considering two alternatives to independence that were not necessarily full, immediate, and absolute as originally agreed upon by the independence committee, Aguinaldo accused him of being a traitor to the Filipino cause. (Golay, 297). 

Did Quezon want independence?  Here is the answer of a critic:

"The answer is no... Quezon wanted to become the chief executive of a government ran by Filipinos and protected by a benevolent American people in exchange for which certain rights and privileges would be granted to the United States and Americans."  (Onorato, 229) 

This kind of arrangement would become a reality in the form of military bases and parity rights agreements that were signed after 1946.

And in Quezon’s conflict with Governor Leonard Wood, Aguinaldo took the opposite side. Whether these personal differences influenced a belligerent response from Quezon is unclear now. But the involvement of certain personalities associated with Quezon in incidents that dragged Aguinaldo’s name into controversies would lead to the conclusion that the active hand of Quezon was strongly evident. These incidents are as follows: 

1.    As early as 1917, Guillermo Masangkay, an associate of Supremo of the Katipunan, Andres Bonifacio, and later identified with Quezon, led a party to locate and exhume the remains of the Supremo in Cavite and had these identified by Bonifacio’s sister and proclaimed authentic by the National Museum Director, Epifanio delos Santos, (Santos[Katipunan], 178-183). The alleged bones were paraded around the city of Manila and placed in a beautiful glassed container, and displayed in the National Museum. This demonstration elicited sympathy for Bonifacio and anger at those suspected to be responsible, and the finger pointed at Aguinaldo for his alleged role and complicity.

 

2.    Pantaleon Garcia, a former General in Aguinaldo’s army, who had become the Sargeant-at-arms of the Philippine Senate of which Quezon was president,  issued  a statement in 1930 to the effect that Aguinaldo allegedly instructed him to kill General Antonio Luna, which he was unable to do because of sickness at the time. (Garcia[Pantaleon], 22)

 

3.     A certain Antonio Bautista, who used to be the campaign manager of Aguinaldo in Bulacan, abruptly moved over  to the Quezon camp.  He allegedly orchestrated the circulation of a story billed as "pagluluksa sa Malolos" (mourning in Malolos), in which the townspeople of the town were said to have hung black drapes and closed their windows when Aguinaldo arrived (Veneracion, 249; Constantino, 20-21).

 

4.     Aguinaldo was also subjected to harassment economically and financially. The annual pension of P12,000 granted to him under Philippine Legislature Act No. 2922, which was approved on March 24, 1920, was stopped by the express repeal of Commonwealth Act No. 288 under the Quezon administration in 1939.  The pension was only restored in 1957 through RA 1808.  

5.   And last but not least, Eulogio Rodriguez, then the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce in the cabinet of Quezon, summarily stripped Aguinaldo of all but 344 hectares of landholdings on the pretext that he failed to pay the installments due on the loan he had obtained from the government for the acquisition of the friar estate in Cavite. (Ara, 168-169)

So, for those with the critical eye, they will not fail to notice that three major thoroughfares in Quezon City that intersect each other are named after Manuel L. Quezon (the Quezon Avenue), Epifanio Delos Santos (the EDSA), and Eulogio Rodriguez (the E. Rodriguez Avenue). Is this a pure coincidence, or is it to immortalize the significant roles played together by the three personalities in history and not necessarily their contribution to the country?

Under the atmosphere at the time, it would not be difficult to add to the “sins” of Aguinaldo the alleged sell-out of the revolution at Biak-na-Bato, the alleged malversation of the peace agreement money, his alleged complicity in the death of Andres Bonifacio and General Antonio Luna, and the blame for the failure of the revolution. But true or not, the desired result was accomplished - Aguinaldo was transformed from hero to villain. Therefore, it seemed logical to conclude that Aguinaldo’s defeat in the 1935 election for the presidency of the Commonwealth was not really because Quezon was more popular than Aguinaldo but rather the result of the massive campaign to malign Aguinaldo in the eyes of very people he had endeavored to serve.

Maligning Aguinaldo - Japanese Occupation

The Second World War added to the denigration of the public image of Aguinaldo. When the Japanese-sponsored 2nd Philippine Republic was inaugurated with Jose P. Laurel as president, Aguinaldo considered it the realization of his dream. He believed the Japanese were more sympathetic to the Filipino aspirations for freedom because, in less than three years, a Filipino Republic was established, while the Americans required a ten-year Commonwealth period to determine if absolute independence would be granted. Perhaps, this belief was anchored on his positive experience with the Japanese, who sent advisers and armaments to help the Filipinos during the Filipino-American war. Accordingly, Aguinaldo actively assisted in efforts to end the Pacific war in the Philippines as soon as possible in the hope that peace would give the Second Philippine Republic a chance to succeed. But his efforts were construed differently - he was accused of aiding the enemy as a Japanese collaborator, a label that continues to haunt his memory to this day.

Maligning Aguinaldo - by Leftist Elements

The advent of Marxist-Leninist ideology in the Philippines added to the vilification of Aguinaldo’s image.  The ideology manifested itself in the early 1900s and propagated after World War II, taking root among nationalist-leaning historians, students, and academicians, especially in government-funded universities.  To bolster their leftist agenda, i.e.,  create a revolutionary situation leading towards the overthrow of the existing bourgeois establishment, the advocates took advantage of the anti-Aguinaldo propaganda during the American era.

Bonifacio was hijacked to serve as the vital component of the configuration.  He was made to represent the rallying symbol of their advocacy because, in the structure of their concept, Bonifacio personified the masses, Aguinaldo, the elite, and therefore, the enemy.  The two heroes were pitted against each other as a way of bringing back to life the leadership conflict of the revolution.  This conflict was made to represent the supposed contemporary and continuing class struggle in the Philippines.  And to make the complex Communist ideology easier for the youthful minds to absorb, the supposed class struggle was paralleled to the Bonifacio-Aguinaldo feud of old. 

In the process, the revolution of 1896 against Spain led by Bonifacio became the revolution of the leftist, even if the ideology was never a factor at that time.  By claiming that the revolution was that of the masses, it is effectively juxtapositioned to the present because, by their definition, the leftists are the masses.  So, as far as the leftists are concerned, to be a disciple of Marx, Lenin, or Mao is an act of patriotism,  and therefore to rebel against the established order is justified, in the same manner, that Bonifacio’s revolution was.  Of course, this is a pure and straightforward web of insidious machination and propaganda. 

But apparently, the strategy works.  The theoretical social conflict of masses versus the elite that used to be an abstraction in the minds of intellectuals has now become understandable to the neophytes. This explains why the incessant noise in social media about Aguinaldo being “hungry for power,” a “traitor,” “a murderer,” and a “coward” is coming from the younger generation who hardly knows the history of their country and Aguinaldo’s contribution to nationhood.

Conclusion

In the final analysis, Aguinaldo’s legacies – the national flag, the national anthem, but more importantly, the national aspiration to be free and independent handed down by the architects of the First Philippine Republic, will endure forever, and so will the memory of Aguinaldo. And today, the image of Aguinaldo as a patriot and hero is becoming strongly evident, bolstered by the exposure of historical facts clandestinely kept under wraps in the past that are now accessible through the internet.

In homage to the man, here is Aguinaldo’s role in history, according to Gabriel F. Fabella (Garcia[Mauro], 26-27): 

(1)    Aguinaldo was the first man to make the world conscious of the existence of the Philippines by leading two revolutions against Spain and a war of defense of their newly established republic against the United States. As a consequence, he is the first Filipino whose name appears in the world encyclopedias.

 

(2)    He helped to weld the Filipinos into a nation through deeds rather than by pen or words;

 

(3)    He was the first man to demonstrate that a Filipino is capable of running an orderly government of his own making;

 

(4)    He set an example of honesty, integrity, and incorruptibility in the government service; left happy memories of the First and Second Republics of the Philippines, and finally,

 

(5)    He bequeathed permanent legacies to our people: (a) Philippine independence, (b) A Filipino flag, and (c) A national anthem.