Did Aguinaldo Sell the Revolution to Spain?

(This write-up is identical to the article with the same title found on pages 113-116 of the book entitled "The Filipino Tragedy and Other Historical Facts Every Filipino Should Know," published by the author.  The sources and references indicated here are contained on pages 402-415 of the book.)

Not a few uninformed, if not biased, individuals, including some historians, accuse Aguinaldo of having sold the revolution to Spain. These detractors refer to the Biak-na-Bato Peace Pact, which called for the cessation of hostilities in exchange for the surrender of arms, amnesty to the rebels, and payment of a huge sum of money in favor of the rebels.

The truth is President Aguinaldo and sixty revolution leaders met and carefully considered the proposal for a cessation of hostilities to have a respite in the fighting and create a war fund. The Supreme Council of the Filipino government at Biak-na-Bato approved it unconditionally. 

After President Aguinaldo left Cavite to establish his headquarters at Biak-na-Bato, the focus of the Spaniards shifted from the province of Cavite to the other provinces, with its center in Bulacan.  As General Aguinaldo passed through the rebel zones north of Cavite, the local commanders submitted to his authority.  By the time he reached Biak-na-Bato, the revolutionists were organized under a single political leadership and military command. After being repulsed in several engagements, more recently his defeat at the battle of Mt. Puray, Governor Primo de Rivera realized the impossibility of crushing the revolution by force of arms. "I can take Biak na Bato," he said to the Spanish Cortes. "Any man can take it. but I cannot answer that I could crush the rebellion." (Gregorio and Sonia Zaide, 118)

This statement, tantamount to an admission of failure, was not new.  The previous Governor-General, Camilo de Polavieja, who was responsible for Dr. Jose Rizal's execution and for crushing the rebellion in Cavite had warned the Spanish government  before he returned to Spain that: "Cavite is the scandal, but Bulacan is the danger." (Veneracion, 82; Zaide, 155) The Spaniards realized that military option alone to suppress the rebellion would be too costly and results uncertain and decided that a negotiated peace was a more desirable option (Corpuz, 133).

In short, both sides needed the respite from the conflict that was draining them both of lives and resources, but both were naturally unwilling to admit their own agendas behind agreeing to the truce. The Filipinos needed the money to purchase modern rifles that would even the odds on the battlefield, and the Spaniards needed to show their government that they had successfully quelled the Tagalog Revolt.

Here's how the peace agreement was negotiated and agreed upon.

Pedro Paterno undertook the initiative for the peace negotiation by first attending a meeting with the Governor-General at Malacanang on August 1, 1897. The Governor-General entertained his idea of a peace settlement favorably, who at once reported it to the Prime Minister of Spain.

On August 4, Paterno crossed Spanish lines using a pass issued by the Spanish authorities and proceeded to Biak-na-Bato, arriving at the headquarters of President Emilio Aguinaldo on August 9. (Corpuz, 144)

President Aguinaldo told Paterno that no agreement was possible unless all the leaders of the revolution including those in the field were agreeable. So, Paterno travelled to Morong, Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Tayabas, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, Pampanga, Pangasinan, Tarlac, Infanta, Albay and Camarines and met with Vito Belarmino, Pantaleon Garcia, Pascual Alvarez, Doroteo Lopez, Perez Gil Manikis, Salvador Estrella, Mariano Noriel, Artemio Ricarte, Benito Natividad, Esteban Viola, Jose Alejandrino, and Anastacio Francisco. He had to go to Biak-na-bato four times to accomplish his mission (Corpuz, 145).

On September 27, 1897, leaders of the revolution met at Biak-na-Bato, and a strange event occurred. An oath was taken by the revolutionary leaders and signed in the presence of President Emilio Aguinaldo, to wit: (1) "For the increase and strengthening of the resources of Government we promise to add to the same our private fortunes," (2) "We will also turn over to the Government Treasury all taxes which we may collect in any town or village," and, (3) "We will not have the power to dispose of said funds without the knowledge and authorization of the President." The document further says that violation of the oath would mean a penalty of one or two gunshots in the breast until the violator is dead. (Taylor[1], 369)

Aguinaldo asserted in his account of the insurrection that there was an agreement drawn up by the insurgents in Biak-na-Bato to the effect that in case the Spaniards did not comply with the stipulations the money paid as an indemnity would not be divided but would be set aside to purchase arms to renew the war. (Taylor, 1:86) There is no evidence to the effect that such was the agreement among the leaders. 

However, the above oath concludes that the leaders agreed to create a war fund.  The fund referred to above would be composed of personal property and monies collected on behalf of the revolution.  does it not follow that the Biak-na-Bato money would also be part of the fund?  The answer is yes because the subsequent events show that the revolution leaders deposited the money in two banks in Hong Koong in the name of Aguinaldo and company, and withdrawals were subject to the authorization of Aguinaldo, following the above oath.

An undated document entitled "Draft of Agreement of Biak-na-Bato" was signed by President Aguinaldo, Llanera, and Mamerto Natividad is shown in Taylor's Philippine Insurgents Records (PIR) and proves that the peace agreement was agreeable to the leaders of the revolution (Taylor[I], 359-364; Corpuz, 145)

The inclination of the leaders of the revolution towards peace must have been the result of the recent reversals. Aguinaldo had exhausted his resources during the March and April Spanish offensive to retake the province of Cavite. And now, at Biak-na-Bato, they were left with meager supply to continue fighting, holed up in a secluded area far from the sources of food and other provisions with a reduced fighting force. The leaders of the revolution must have seen the offer of peace as an attractive opportunity to buy time, reorganize and create a war fund. 

In his letter to Ferdinand Blumentritt, General Jose Alejandrino said:

"In case peace is accepted it will only be for the money involved which we propose to use for the purpose of promoting immediately another decisive revolution." (Alejandrino, 78)

Accordingly, On November 15, the formal agreement was signed in Malacanang by Primo de Rivera and Paterno, the latter on behalf of President Aguinaldo under the title "Arbitrator" (Corpuz, 146)

Aguinaldo called a meeting of the leaders of the revolution at Biak-na-Bato on December 14, 1897, about sixty of them all, to confirm their acceptance of the proposal of Paterno and the draft agreement he, Natividad, and Llanera had signed. The leaders gave the Supreme Council the authority to act on the proposal. 

The Supreme Council, composed of President Emilio Aguinaldo; Vice-President Mariano Trias; Secretary of Interior Isabelo Artacho; Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Antonio Montenegro; of war, Emiliano Riego de Dios; of the Treasury, Baldomero Aguinaldo; Sub-secretary of the Interior, Lino Viola; of war, Vito Belarmino, and of Treasury, Paciano Rizal unconditionally approved the peace agreement, with objections from Paciano Rizal and Malvar who wished the war should continue. (Taylor[1], 422)

The Spanish government committed to pay 1,700,000 Mexican dollars to the revolutionists in consideration of the surrender of arms in exchange for amnesty and the institution of specific reforms. Of the total amount, 400,000 Mexican dollars were paid in Hong Kong to Aguinaldo, who went into exile together with eighteen other leaders, and 200,000 to the local leaders who stayed behind. The balance was never paid because both parties repudiated the agreement, and the revolution entered a new stage.

President Aguinaldo issued the pacification order on December 16. All but a few, like Isidoro Torres (Taylor, 1:417) and Francisco Macabulos, obeyed Aguinaldo’s order and surrendered themselves and their men to the Spanish authorities together with their arms. Macabulos eventually surrendered and was included in the distribution of the 2nd installment of 200,000 pesos to various stay-behind leaders of the revolution. Of the 14,000 pesos he received, he distributed 8,000 to his men, and the rest he kept for himself. (Taylor, 1:430)

At noon on December 25, Aguinaldo and eighteen leaders of the revolution left Biak-na-Bato on their way to Dagupan and then to Sual, where the steamer "Uranus" was waiting. They boarded at 3 o'clock on December 29, with them were Paterno and Col. Miguel Primo de Rivera, who was acting as security for the personal safety of the exiles and for compliance with the first payment. (Corpuz, 147)

Governor-General Primo de Rivera did not tell his superiors the whole truth about the agreement.  In his December 12, 1897 letter to the President of the Council of Ministers of Spain, he said that the leaders of the revolution offered themselves to surrender with only the condition that their lives be spared and that they should be given means to emigrate (Foreman[F.R.G.S.], 562).

Governor-General Primo de Rivera did not tell his superiors the whole truth about the agreement. In his December 12, 1897, letter to the President of the Council of Ministers of Spain, he said that the leaders of the revolution offered themselves to surrender with only the condition that their lives be spared and that they should be given the means to emigrate (Foreman[F.R.G.S.], 562). Rivera did not mention the promised reforms in his report to Madrid, which were itemized in the draft agreement that Aguinaldo, Llanera, and Natividad signed. Moreover, in the final agreement signed by Rivera and Paterno, the latter acting as Aguinaldo's representative, there was no reference to reforms (Taylor[I], 401-404 and 362-364). It is unknown whether or not Aguinaldo authorized Paterno to remove the provisions on reforms or if he acted independently without authority.

Both the Spaniards and the Americans later claimed Aguinaldo was bribed to surrender the revolution, and this is the same line that many critics of Aguinaldo are pushing today.

 

In conclusion, an American officer had this to say of the peace agreement: 

"Instead of dividing the money they had received from General Primo de Rivera among themselves, or paying the indemnity to the families that had suffered, they turned the whole sum into a War Fund for future use." (Blunt, 140)

The peace agreement was a moral victory for President Aguinaldo and the revolution's leaders because it provided them the respite needed from the exhaustive war and raised a war fund. In effect, the Spanish government recognized the status of belligerency of the revolutionary government and considered President Aguinaldo an equal in the negotiation for peace, despite the Spanish government's efforts to masquerade the event's true character.