Was Aguinaldo a Japanese Collaborator?

(This write-up is identical to the article with the same title found on pages 325-338 of the book entitled "The Filipino Tragedy and Other Historical Facts Every Filipino Should Know," published by the author.  The sources and references indicated here are contained on pages 402-415 of the book.)

The generation of Filipinos today is confused about the issue of Japanese collaboration during World War II. Due to the massive dosage of American indoctrination and propaganda, the Filipino people failed to appreciate that the Americans and the Japanese were both invaders and colonizers, which meant they were enemies of the Filipino people. Surprisingly, if a Filipino worked with the Japanese, he would be labeled an enemy collaborator, but not so visà-vis the Americans. Considering the Americans and Japanese were both enemies of the Filipino people at one time or another, it follows that working with the Americans was also an act of collaborating with the enemy. 

 Whenever the issue of Japanese collaboration comes up in the open, the name Aguinaldo is thrown into the limelight. If ever, the names of Recto, Laurel, Vargas, Madrigal, Aquino, and several others who collaborated with the Japanese, or Artemio Ricarte, who came along with the Japanese Imperial army in Japanese military uniform, are hardly mentioned. Aguinaldo has always been first in line in the shooting range of unfair criticism, and the accusation of collaboration with the Japanese occupation forces is always used in the apparent concerted effort to malign him.

If working with the Japanese was an act of collaboration, then the men and women who ran and administered the second Philippine Republic during the Japanese occupation (and Aguinaldo was not among them) were all collaborators.  Jorge Vargas, the Executive Secretary of the Philippine Commonwealth government, who was left behind to hold the reins of government, was instructed by president Manuel L. Quezon to deal with the Japanese in his absence.  Vargas was merely following the instructions of Quezon.   It is an accepted rule in an agency relationship that the acts of the agent,  in this case, Vargas, are acts of the principal, Quezon.  Therefore, it is not farfetched to suppose Quezon himself was the first enemy collaborator. Not only did he collaborate with the Americans, but also, he instructed Vargas to remain and authorized him to deal with the invading Japanese forces.  

Aguinaldo’s role during the Japanese occupation was not collaboration in the sense of helping the enemy, but rather his efforts were directed towards establishing the Filipino Republic to replace the one the Americans destroyed during the Filipino-American war.  He was among those who contributed to achieving this dream in less than three years through the Japanese sponsorship, which took the Americans more than 45 years to fulfill a promise. 

Condition of the Filipinos before the Japanese Invasion 

When the Philippine-American War ended in 1903, efforts were exerted by the American colonial administrators to suppress the Filipino nationalist spirit. Foremost of these actions were the promulgation of the sedition and libel laws. For 12 years, the Americans prohibited the display of the Filipino flag, including all activities that had a nationalistic flavor. Violators were sent to jail. English was taught to replace Spanish, and Filipinos were also forced to study American history and culture. So, after decades of re-education, the Filipino became someone other than his old self. His love of country, which was strongly displayed during the revolution and the subsequent war against the Americans, virtually vanished. He became a cheap copy of the American in thought, word, and deed. He lost his self-esteem and became subservient to the colonial masters, looking up to the white man as his superior. It is no wonder that the American Governor-General William Howard Taft called the Filipinos “Little brown brothers,” which can be interpreted to mean that the Filipinos are now one with us, no longer an enemy.

Before the Japanese invasion, a new Commonwealth government replaced the American colonial government in the Philippines. This government would operate for ten years, from 1935 to 1945, after which the Americans would determine if Filipinos were ready for freedom and self-government. Manuel L. Quezon was elected president and defeated Aguinaldo in an election held. General Douglas MacArthur was appointed head of the military. Whether the Filipinos would eventually be free of American control was the prerogative of the American government, which had the sole power to declare if the Filipinos had passed the test. In short, for as long as the Americans were still in control, the Filipinos were not yet independent, even if they were allowed to administer a Commonwealth government.

The Japanese Invasion 

After Pearl Harbor was bombed, the United States declared war on Japan. Similarly, the Philippine Commonwealth government, being an adjunct of the United States government, followed suit. And it came to pass that World War II in the Philippines was fought between two powers - the United States and Japan. The Filipinos who were neither citizens of the United States nor of a free and independent sovereign state were caught in the middle. Under these uncertain circumstances, most Filipinos bowed to the dictates of the Japanese Imperial Army in all aspects of day-to-day living. But some defied orders of the Japanese military and were executed, while the others took up arms to fight the invaders.

When the Japanese Imperial Army entered and occupied Manila on January 2, 1942, the United States Army and the Philippine scouts took refuge in Bataan and Corregidor. Then McArthur left for the United States, and so did Manuel L. Quezon, the president of the Commonwealth, including Sergio Osmena and other officials, leaving behind Jorge Vargas to deal with the Japanese. Eventually, the combined Filipino and American defenders surrendered, which ushered in the period of guerrilla warfare. The shift to guerrilla warfare did not change the character of the war; it was still a war between two powers - the United States and Japan. This time, the Filipinos were divided - the guerrillas, taking orders from the USAFFE, sided with the United States, while the members of Artemio Ricarte's MAKAPILI (or Makabayang Katipunan ng Mga Pilipino) sided with the Japanese.

Jose P. Laurel, the man who would occupy the highest position in the Japanese-sponsored second Filipino Republic, believed that the sovereignty of the United States had vanished.  It failed to protect the Philippines or even prepare the Filipinos to defend the country. He said it was useless to continue the unequal struggle, and a message was sent to Quezon and the American president to order the cessation of hostilities to save Filipino lives. (De Viana[Kulaboretor], 40)   

The Japanese-sponsored Government 

The first major act by the occupying Japanese forces was the formation on January 26, 1942, of the Philippine Executive Commission, which was granted both legislative and judicial powers and authorized to administer the affairs of government. Jorge B. Vargas, the Commonwealth official left behind and assigned by Quezon to represent the Commonwealth government in dealing with the Japanese invaders, was designated head, and the following were appointed to the respective positions: Benigno Aquino, Sr., commissioner of the Interior; Jose P. Laurel, Justice; Rafael Alunan, agriculture, and commerce; Quintin Paredes, public works and communications; Claro M. Recto, Education, Health and Public Welfare; Serafin Marabut, Executive Commissioner and Teofilo Sison, Auditor General and Chief of the Budget (De Viana[Kulaboretor], 31). 

Vargas later formed a consultative body to advise the Commission and appointed several persons, among them Emilio Aguinaldo. The other members were: Ramon Avancena, Alejandro Roces and Miguel Unson (De Viana[Kulaboretor],  32). The commission, however, was unable to act on its own, and more often, the Japanese interfered with the decisions. Eventually, the Commission operated on a recommendatory basis. 

As early as January 21, 1942, Japanese Premier Tojo said that Japan would "... gladly grant the Philippines its independence so long as it cooperates and recognizes Japan's program in establishing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." (Hartendorp, 468). As a step toward this direction, all political parties were dissolved in December (1942), and an organization called KALIBAPI (Kapisanan sa Paglilingkod sa Bagong Pilipinas) was formed. Among the associations dissolved and forced to join the KALIBAPI was the veterans association headed by Aguinaldo, whose objection was ignored by the Japanese.  

The Second Philippine Republic 

After some time, the Japanese Imperial Army announced that Burma was granted independence by the Japanese government and that the Philippines would follow suit on the condition of tangible cooperation in the shortest possible time. On October 23, 1943, the second Filipino Republic under Japanese sponsorship was established.  Jose P. Laurel was elected President by the national assembly composed of provincial governors and mayors. 

The first important task assigned by the Japanese military to the new government was to declare war on the United States and the allied powers. President Laurel took his time to decide and tried to sidestep the order. He feared that once the Philippines was allied with Japan in the war against the United States, the conscription of Filipinos to serve in the Japanese army would follow, which he did not want to authorize through a formal declaration of war against the United States. In the end, the Japanese military settled for Laurel's proposal to declare that a "state of war" existed in the country. This was entirely a different situation because it presupposed that the Philippine government was not at war with anyone, not with the Japanese, nor with the Americans.

It is important to note that President Laurel declared Manila an open city which signified neutrality, to save the city from the destruction wrought by the war. And it was not the Japanese war machine that destroyed the city. It was the continuous American bombardment that was done to soften Japanese resistance to an American invasion and ensure the survival of their citizens who were incarcerated at the University of Santo Tomas.

Aguinaldo's Participation 

Given these conditions, the former President of the First Philippine Republic and former General of the Revolution, Emilio Aguinaldo, participated and contributed to the creation of the second Filipino Republic. First, he accepted membership in the Council of State, which initially served as a consultative body to the Philippine Executive Commission. Then, he was nominated as a member of the PCPI, or Philippine Committee for Philippine Independence, which drafted the constitution of the proposed Philippine Republic. And during the inauguration of this Republic, Aguinaldo was prominently active. He and his former General, Artemio Ricarte, proudly and solemnly hoisted the Filipino flag, which flew in the skies for the first time since the first day of the Japanese occupation. 

But the most controversial of all that Aguinaldo did was his participation in the radio broadcast by the Japanese propaganda corps. His first broadcast asked Commonwealth President Manuel L. Quezon to come out of Corregidor island to lead the nation in administering the new government sponsored by the Japanese. Then, his other broadcast asked General MacArthur to surrender.  Finally, one of his last broadcasts was a call for the guerrillas to come out and surrender and give up the fight. 

Aguinaldo's reason for appealing was to stop the hostilities and prevent further loss of Filipino lives, given what Aguinaldo considered the superiority of Japanese arms. This parallels with what he did after his capture by the Americans on March 23, 1901, when he called upon the Filipino Republican Army commanders in the field to surrender and lay down their arms to prevent further bloodshed, given the superiority of American arms. Aguinaldo also did some traveling to the provinces, contacting his former officers in the Revolution and seeking their help in implementing the Japanese pacification campaign. 

After the defeat and surrender of Japan, Aguinaldo was arrested on March 8, 1945, by the CIC (Counter Intelligence Corps) of the United States Army and incarcerated in the Bilibid prison (De Viana[Kulaboretor], 114). After four days, he was released on the condition that he was under house arrest. He was charged with 15 counts of treason along with 5,556 other persons charged with treason by the Prosecutor's Office. The more prominent persons who were similarly charged were President Jose P. Laurel who had 130 counts of treason; Jorge B. Vargas who had 115 counts, Benigno Aquino, Sr., 111; Leon Guinto, 68; Claro M. Recto, 26; Quintin Paredes 20; Antonio de las Alas, 20, Camilo Osias, 14; Emiliano Tria Tirona, 13; Hilario Moncado, 15; Vicente Madrigal, 17; Pedro Subido, 8; Gen. Guillermo Francisco, 22; Francisco Lozada, 10 and Antonio Torres, 4 (De Viana[Kulaboretor], 129) 

President Roxas Amnesty Proclamation 

Aguinaldo's case was never tried in the People's Court. On January 28, 1948, Pres. Manuel Roxas, the president-elect of the 3rd Philippine Republic that succeeded the Commonwealth government, whose acts of collaboration with the Japanese were immediately absolved by MacArthur, issued Proclamation no. 51, which granted amnesty to all political and economic collaborators (De Viana[Kulaboretor], 191). It was a jubilation day for most of those accused of treason, but a few, like Laurel and Recto, had misgivings because it deprived them of the opportunity to prove their innocence. A day after the amnesty proclamation, the People's Court dismissed the treason cases of Aguinaldo. 

After the dismissal of his cases, Aguinaldo returned to his hometown in Kawit, Cavite, "to quietly spend the twilight years of his life.” However, he appeared in public in 1950 when Pres. Elpidio Quirino appointed him a member of the Council of State in Malacañang; he returned to retirement soon after, dedicating his time and attention to veteran soldiers’ "interests and welfare." When Pres. Diosdado Macapagal moved the celebration of Independence Day in 1962 from 4 July to 12 June. Aguinaldo made sure he attended that year’s commemoration despite poor health and illness..." (Ara, 185) 

The question may be asked why the collaboration cases were not tried to a conclusion. President Roxas did not explain why he issued the amnesty, except for saying that he belabored it for days. Perhaps, being a collaborator himself and shielded from the shame of being accused and incarcerated through the absolution granted by General MacArthur, he must have felt an obligation to grant similar relief to his colleagues and countrymen. 

In hindsight, there was a legal complication. At the time of the Japanese invasion, the Filipinos were not free and independent people. The country was still a territory of the United States, but the people were not American citizens. The Commonwealth was not a government established by the Filipino people; rather, it was a government imposed on them by the American colonizers. After the expiration of the ten years, the Commonwealth government was supplanted by the Third Philippine Republic, which was inaugurated on July 4, 1946, with Manuel Roxas as President. This happened while the collaboration cases were still pending with the People's Court. 

Note that the arrests of those accused of treason were made by the American agency, the CIC, but the trial was not performed by the U.S. Government because it no longer had a political personality in the Philippines after the country was declared independent. What should have been done was to extend the life of the defunct Commonwealth government so that the Americans would keep and maintain authority over the affairs of the country and still hold the authority to try the collaboration cases.  But that would have meant that the burden of reconstruction and rehabilitation on account of the destruction wrought by war would have been placed on the shoulders of the Americans.  

Then, there was a proposal to repatriate the accused to the United States, where the trial should have been conducted; but how could the accused, who were not citizens of the United States, commit a crime of treason against the United States? Finally, the accused were turned over to the newly-proclaimed Third Philippine Republic. It seems odd, however, that the plaintiff was a government that did not exist during the Japanese times. So, how could there be a crime committed against a non-existent government?   

It seems that the haste to grant the Philippines independence on July 4, 1946, notwithstanding that the country was in chaos by the ravages of war and the people were unprepared to handle a devastated country, was a condition favorable to the fate of the so-called collaborators.   

Jose P. Laurel’s position that American sovereignty in the Philippines had vanished could also provide a defense in favor of the supposed collaborators. Suppose American sovereignty was no longer effective in the Philippines after the fall of Bataan and Corregidor; that would mean the Filipinos could not be enemy collaborators because the Japanese were no longer their enemies who, by laws of war, were the sovereign power on the islands, replacing the Americans.

When is Collaboration a Crime?

 

But for purposes of discussion, what would ordinarily constitute collaboration? A simplified theory was expressed in this manner:

 

"Everybody was a collaborator during the war. It was said that everyone who used Japanese-issued war notes better known as Mickey Mouse money were collaborators. The use of notes during the Japanese occupation was an act of collaboration. ... Collaboration is a myth or everyone was guilty of it." (De Viana[Kulaboretor], citing Teodoro Locsin, summing up the stand of the Liberal Party on Collaboration, March 22, 1952). 

And when is collaboration treasonous? Collaboration in its legal sense generally refers to the willful acts by a country's citizens in assisting a foreign enemy to conquer or weaken the country in times of conflict. Collaborators operate against their own country's interests. They contribute to its destruction by weakening its capability to resist the enemy or by later helping in its administration under the enemy's control. (De Viana[Kulaboretor], 3)

There are two categories of collaboration. First, the act of cooperating with the enemy as may be required by the invading forces in furtherance of their military objectives, short of taking an oath of allegiance. This type of collaboration does not constitute a crime of treason. The other category of collaboration, one that constitutes treason, involves, in addition to the first type, an element of betrayal of one's country.

Aguinaldo did not Commit a Crime 

Aguinaldo's act of collaboration falls under the first type because there was no element of betrayal of his country. His country was the Philippines which was a colony of the United States at the time. His obligation was towards the oath of allegiance he took in favor of the United States. However, he was not a citizen of the United States, and therefore he could not be held accountable for the alleged crime of treason against a country of which he was not a citizen. The fact is, his motivations for cooperating with the Japanese were influenced by their grant of independence to the Filipinos, which had long been denied to them by the Americans for over 45 years. 

What attracted Aguinaldo to the Japanese was the immediate realization of an independent Filipino Republic, as first announced by Japanese Premier Tojo in January 1942. Perhaps, he became impatient with having to go through the ten-year Commonwealth period. Among the items of his program of government during the 1935  elections was the cutting of the ten-year preparatory commonwealth period down to three years.  He probably could not understand why the Americans were taking more than 45 years to determine if the Filipinos were fit to run their government. He must have doubted the sincerity of the Americans and perhaps suspected that they would likely extend the Commonwealth period or perhaps impose restrictions or compensation such as the ones that came after the grant of independence in 1946. He must have put his trust in the Japanese because during the Filipino-American war some years back, they supported him with arms and military advisers. 

Aguinaldo expressed this sentiment when he said: 

"Japan was the only nation in Asia overwhelming Western power in the region. I cannot trust the white race anymore particularly American people in pursuing our independence movement" (Ara, 175). 

He continued to suspect that the Americans were out to deceive the Filipinos again, as he had personally experienced with them: first, masquerading as an ally and later, withholding the promise to respect the Filipino aspiration for independence after the Spaniards were defeated.  How could he forget how everything that he had accomplished with so much sacrifice of lives and property, the most valuable and the ultimate prize of all - the First Philippine Republic - was ignored and destroyed by the Americans? 

He further expressed his misgivings and apprehensions about American colonialism when he said: 

“She [the US] could have been noble and magnanimous then by recognizing the Republic that we have already established. Instead, she chose the role of a selfish colonizer and would not agree to set us free by 1946 if our products had not competed with her in her own market.” and reiterated what he mentioned in his speech, viz: "...describing the independence to be granted by Japan as “the potent remedy for eradicating American influence which has been rooted deeply in these islands for the last 45 years” and as “the key to complete peace in the country.” (Ara, 177) 

On June 12, 1943, or four months before the inauguration of the Second Philippine Republic under the auspices of the Japanese, Aguinaldo was the guest speaker at the meeting of the Veterans of the Revolution, and he said:

 

“And why, I ask in all seriousness, should any Filipino expect, least of all desire, the return of America to the Philippines?  How can any self-respecting and patriotic individual, who calls himself a Filipino, desire the return of a people who have ever treated him and his countrymen as inferiors, and who, despite their professions of altruistic intentions, have always been guided by selfish motives in their policy towards the Philippines?  People will remind us that America had promised to grant us our independence in 1946.  But, it is well to remember that this so-called promise was inspired not by America’s respect for our historic aspirations but by a selfish desire to protect herself from the competition of our labor and our industries, and that a great deal of the pressure in behalf of Philippine independence was exerted by the isolationist opinion that prevailing among the Americans which favored America’s complete withdrawal from Far Eastern affairs in conjunction with the cane and beet sugar as well as cotton seed , oil, dairy and cordage interests.  Knowing that these were the principal influences which induced America to promise independence to the Philippines with what pride and self-respect can any Filipino today desire the return of America and the restoration of American sovereignty over this country.” (Aguinaldo[Historical], English speech, 5) 

All that Aguinaldo wanted was independence for the Philippines, which was the realization of the aspirations that he had long fought so hard. The Americans were taking a long time to make that happen. And the Japanese had overtaken them with an offer of independence and inaugurated a republic on October 23, 1943, after only a very short period. Aguinaldo had lost trust and confidence in the Americans in the light of his bitter experiences with them.  Recall that he was approached by U.S. Consul Pratt in Singapore on April 22, 1898, offering an alliance to fight Spain, to which he agreed, and then, on February 4, 1899, the Filipino army was attacked and routed by the Americans, ignoring his appeal for a ceasefire to settle the conflict. 

Why is Aguinaldo being Singled Out?

The Filipino people are pathetically unique in terms of experience with colonial powers – 300 years with the Spaniards, almost 50 years with the Americans, and finally, a little over three years with the Japanese. In the intervening periods of overlap of sovereignty that was interrupted by the First Philippine Republic of President Emilio Aguinaldo, certain acts that might be considered anti-Filipino had been committed by leading Filipinos, as follows: 

1. Rizal rejected the plan of revolt by the Katipunan and petitioned the Governor-General for him to serve as a medical officer of the Spanish army in Cuba;

 

2. Antonio Luna rejected the offer of Bonifacio to join the Katipunan, then squealed at Rizal as head of the Katipunan and pointed to the other members;

 

3. Bonifacio wrote a bogus list of contributors and sympathizers of the Katipunan, resulting in the arrest and execution of the innocent, one of which was the millionaire Francisco Rojas;

 

4. The thousands of native recruits that enlisted in the Spanish army, notably the Macabebes, fought and killed the patriotic revolutionaries;

 

5. General Artemio Ricarte, on orders of Andres Bonifacio, withheld support to the Magdalo led by Emilio Aguinaldo during the battle of Pasong Santol, in Dasmarinas Cavite, resulting in the defeat of the Magdalo forces and death of Kapitan Marcela Marcelo and Aguinaldo's brother, Crispulo;

 

6. Bonifacio and 40 other members of the Magdiwang Katipunan council, including two generals of the Magdalo, launched a coup d'etat against the newly formed government headed by President-elect Emilio Aguinaldo;

 

7. Paciano Rizal, Artemio Ricarte, Pedro Paterno, Isabelo Artacho, Francisco Makabulos, and the rest of the stay-behind leaders of the revolution demanded and received a share in the P200,000 second installment of the Biak-na-Bato money, which, according to Aguinaldo, was supposed to be a public trust fund;

 

8. Isabelo Artacho filed a suit against Aguinaldo for the partitioning of the P400,000 first installment of the Biak-na-Bato money deposited in Hong Kong, which was supposed to be a public trust fund;

9. Pablo Padilla, Emiliano Riego de Dios, Baldomero Aguinaldo, Mariano Trias, Artemio Ricarte, Pio del Pilar, Mariano Luna, and other former leaders of the revolution responded to the call of Spanish Governor-General Agustin to form a militia to fight alongside the Spaniards against the invasion by the Americans.

10. Jose Basa and several other Hong Kong exiles submitted a petition to the representative of the United States government expressing allegiance and desire to become United States citizens while the revolutionary army of President Aguinaldo was waging war;

 

11. Generals Licerio Geronimo, Juan Cailles, and Mariano Trias surrendered to the US military and enlisted into the Philippine scouts and went after the remnants of the Filipino Republican Army, resulting in the killing of General Luciano San Miguel and several others;

 

12. The hundreds of Americanistas, among them the likes of Lazaro Segovia, Hilario Tal Placido, Roman Roque, and several others who allowed themselves to be used by the Americans against the Filipino Republican Army while the war was still raging, resulting in the capture of President Emilio Aguinaldo;

 

13. Apolinario Mabini and the rest of the exiles of the Marianas took the oath of allegiance to the United States in exchange for being allowed to return to the country;

 

14. Pedro Paterno, Felipe Buencamino, Benito Legarda, Florentino Torres, Pardo H. De Tavera, and several others formed the Federal Party and went around the country, encouraging the Filipino Republican Army guerrillas to surrender and later accepting high positions in the American colonial government; 

15. Jose P. Laurel, Claro M. Recto, Antonio de las Alas, Rafael Alunan, Jr., Benigno Aquino Sr., Melecio Arnaiz, Ramon Avancena, Manuel C. Briones, Vicente Madrigal, Camilo Osias, Quintin Paredes, Claro M. Recto, Manuel Roxas, Pedro Subido, Sultan sa Ramain, Teofilo Sison, Emiliano Tria Tirona, Miguel Unson, Jorge B. Vargas and Jose Yulo, Serafin Marabut, Elpidio Quirino, Esteban de la Rama, Guillermo Francisco, Pio Duran, Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., Artemio Ricarte, Leon Guinto, Archbishop Gabriel Reyes and Bishop Enrique Sobrepena who accepted membership in the Council of State and the PCPI and later,  as key officers of the Japanese-sponsored Philippine Republic, have been accused of treason for  collaboration with the Japanese. 

Most of the above-mentioned Filipinos are today considered heroes, as seen in the names of major streets and places of Manila and the provinces. Indeed, it would seem that our concept of heroism is somewhat convoluted.   It is, and this is due to the overlapping pattern of our colonial experience, interspersed with the struggle for national liberation and extending up to this day and age, by the heirs of the legacy of the Philippine revolution who continue to aspire for true freedom and independence.

Emilio Aguinaldo was not a collaborator and a traitor.  Aside from leading the struggle for independence and self-government for the Filipino people against Spain and the United States, he continued the work even during the Japanese occupation. 

And so the controversial question baffling the minds of the present generation of Filipinos calls for a historically-accurate response: WHY IS EMILIO AGUINALDO SINGLED OUT WITH THE ACCUSATION OF BEING  COLLABORATOR AND TRAITOR?